REFINEMENT OF THE TSEBELIS’ (1990) ECONOMIC SANCTION GAME

Khalifany Ash Shidiqi

Abstract


Economic sanction has been widely used and increasingly a popular tool in maintaining peace and political stability in the world. The use of economic sanction, as opposed to the use of military power, to punish target countries have been supported by the Charter of United Nations (UN). Tsebelis (1990) modelled economic sanctions using game theory namely the Sanction Game. This paper focuses on the refinement of the sanction game proposed by Tsebelis (1990) to analyse international relations. Recent findings from various studies on the effectiveness of economic sanction have been used to reconstruct the game.

Keywords


Economic Sanction, the Sanction/Inspection Games, Mixed Strategy Equilibrium.

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References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.18196/jesp.17.1.2455

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