Framing Issues of Ex-Prisoners, Vote Buying, and Winning Teams: Evidence from Pilkada of the Palangka Raya

Anyualatha Haridison
Department of Government, Faculty of Political and Social Science, University of Palangka Raya, Indonesia
Corresponding Author: a.haridison@fisip.upr.ac.id
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Abstract: This manuscript specifically explores the dynamics of the *pilkada* of Palangka Raya in 2018. We observed a phenomenon in the *pilkada* of Palangka Raya; that having high popularity and strong political clientelism cannot help a person that is labeled an ex-prisoner to attain victory. Our study is complemented by a case study approach with a holistic analysis method. We observed and interviewed key informants to obtain some data related to the theme. Results show that the ability of the winning candidate's team to frame and counter-frame the candidate as an ex-prisoner who gives cash to former fellow inmates succeeded in helping the other candidate to won. We found that the implementation of the frame and counter-frame theories was successful in the *pilkada* context. This method of framing and counter framing is very effective in producing regional leaders with integrity and clean records and in instilling rationality in voters to reject corrupt leaders. Empirically, the limitations in framing these issues have not eliminated the pattern of giving money in politics.

Keyword: Framing Issues of ex-prisoners; Vote buying; The winning team; Palangka Raya.

INTRODUCTION

Democratic practices in Indonesia to be on the dark side since the reformation began and show that the practice of democracy has become a serious problem, among others, democracy is hijacked by the ruling elite (Boudreau, 2009; Lay, 2012), the face of violence is seen in democracy (Klinken, 2007), patronage and political clientelism, such as vote-buying, success teams (brokers), norms and social networks (Aspinal & Sukmajati, 2015; Aspinall, 2014a; Aspinall & As'ad, 2015; Hicken, 2011; Hutchcroft, 2014; Stokes et al., 2013; Tawakkal et al., 2020, 2017). Previous studies have illustrated that the regional election contestation that led to victory was dominated by the issues of patronage and clientelism and even other aspects such as social and cultural norms. We take a stance with the dynamics of late 2017 to early 2018; where the General Election Commission (KPU) campaigned for a ban on corrupt ex-prisoners participating in the contestation and the plan was to make a special rule in the KPU Regulation concerning the prohibition of ex-corrupt prisoners (Merdeka, 2018).

The article described the case of the pilkada of Palangka Raya in 2018. Our focus at the initial stage was to describe the dynamics of contestation, where four couples took part in electoral battles. Meanwhile, the practice of vote-buying and building a successful team is often a winning strategy. It is interesting to study from the previous controversy, where one pilkada candidate in Palangka Raya who was caught in a corruption case failed to won. Simultaneous pilkada data from 2015-2018 shows that candidates caught in corruption cases can still win contestation because of their popularity, and strong political clientelism networking (Dwiranda & Anggoro, 2020). However, the contestation in Palangka Raya is very different, because candidates with high popularity and strong patronage and strong clientele networks have been known to lose. Thus, this article explores the possibility of finding a connection between the candidates' victory, with

the practice of vote-buying, the network of successful teams and the problem of being an ex-prisoner.

Previous studies related declining popularity and electability further due to the shift in voter opinion from positive sentiment to negative sentiment. Anggalime (2017) in his doctoral dissertation research, found that online media had the power to frame Ahok's figure right at the 2017 DKI Regional Election. Eramuslim.com media framed by highlighting minority issues and policies that favoured ethnic Chinese interests, especially on the issue of evictions. Meanwhile, tirto.id is more focused on the issue of the DKI Regional Head Election which leaves hatred towards ethnic Chinese. Similar research was also conducted by Aprillia (2017) however, the findings look at the difference in framing, sindonews.com constructs that figure always hurts his supporters (negative sentiment), while metronews.com emphasizes more positive sentiment towards figure as an independent candidate who moves to the party line.

Framing the issue of the figures of Jokowi and Prabowo in the 2019 presidential election, reviewed by Ikasari & Arifina (2020) by tracking Kompas daily. He found that Kompas daily framed Jokowi and Prabowo differently. Jokowi is known as a president who is close and responsive to the people, while Prabowo is framed with unresolved human rights cases. Meanwhile, study Farida & Yoedtadi (2019) see more about the framing of identity politics in the online news of medcom.id. It was stated that medcom.id in its reporting framed the presidential election campaign more on religious and ethnic elements to support certain candidates.

The scholar by Nurhajati & Wijayanto (2018) analyzes the framing of the issue of money politics in local elections in five online media reports, namely tribunnews.com, detik.com, liputan6.com, kompas.com and sindonews.com. They found that media framing did not differ much in bringing up money politics issues that were rife in the pilkada, only that the media were neutral and did not oppose or prohibit money politics in the pilkada. According to Entman (2009), the recommendation for settlement has not been carried out by online media in Indonesia.

Previous studies in Indonesia (Anggalime, 2017; Aprillia, 2017; Farida & Yoedtadi, 2019; Ikasari & Arifina, 2020) analyze online media more in framing political issues using the Entman framing approach. The framed issues can influence public opinion so that the packaged frames turn their backs on the real reality. In comparison, the study Nikolayenko (2019) analyzing the framing of twitter uploads by activists was able to mobilize collective action in protest against Russia in Ukraine and study Vitriol et al. (2020) related to increasing certainty of attitudes, polarization and voter behaviour during the 2012 presidential election campaign for Barack Obama and Mitt Romney. According to him, counter-persuasive political messages in the online context can damage electoral attitudes. Our study does not focus on online media but focuses on the framing of issues by the winning team in campaign activities targeting voters. Previous studies, predominantly using framing analysis Entman (2009) assesses framing as a selection of accepted realities and makes events more prominent in the media, by studying problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral evaluations, and resolution recommendations.

Our study refers to several views including, Slothuus & De Vreese (2010) that there is a construction of political issues or public controversies that can influence voter thinking. The approach of Chong & Druckman (2007; Jerit (2009; Sniderman & Theriault (2004) assert that framing issues can influence public opinion, including the interaction of frames with voters (Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Price et al., 2005) and the effects of framing develop over time (Chong & Druckman, 2008; Lecheler & De Vreese, 2011). Furthermore, we refer to the approach of Chong & Druckman (2013) regarding the "counter-frame" which is a frame that opposes the previous effective frame. According to him, there are three elements of the counter-frame, namely (1) the counter-frame comes at a later date from the initial frame. Initial frames have been received earlier and processed separately; (2) the counter-frame supports the position on the existing issue against the previous frame; (3) the frame influences opinion on the issue, thus creating an incentive for the frame. Chong & Druckman (2011) assessed that counterframing is part of frame competition, which can occur simultaneously or from time to time and involve frames from various perspectives.

RESEARCH METHOD

This article is the result of research conducted from 2017-2018, intending to explore the dynamics of the Pilkada of Palangka Raya. Several aspects were described, including brokerage, vote-buying and framing of prisoners' issues. Hence, this research is a case study. This effort is closely tied to issues and events that developed based on disaggregated periods Data was collected from observations and interviews with several informants, such as successful teams, candidates, and related individuals.

Figure 1. Map of Voter Distribution and Polling Stations (TPS)
Source: Data processed from BPS and KPU of Palangka Raya City, 2017.

RESULT AND DICUSSION

The Dynamics of Regional Election Contestation in Palangka Raya: Background

Administratively, Palangka Raya City consists of five districts and 30 villages. Based on the updating of voter data, 176,823 people are included in the Final Voters List (DPT) as Figure 1. The largest distribution of voters is in two districts, namely Jekan Raya (91,625 people) and Pahandut (60,815 people). Then followed by the districts of Sabangau (13,266 people), Bukit Batu (8,624 people) and Rakumpit (2,494 people).

Meanwhile, in early 2018, the public of Palangka Raya was shocked by the case of political dowry. As quoted from Tempo (2018), "the alleged political dowry was expressed by the pair of John Krisli and Maryono who intended to involve themselves in the Palangka Raya Regional Election but this pair failed to participate in the contest because they did not have a supporting political party". John Krisli, who is currently the chairman of the East Kotawaringin Regency regional legislative member (DPRD), admitted that the Gerindra Party asked him to pay IDR 350 million. This party has four seats in the DPRD of Palangka Raya, so that the money that must be given is IDR 1.4 billion. Then for PPP there are two seats and this party asked for a total of IDR. 1 billion. John admitted that he did not fulfil the request and only gave IDR 500 million to the Gerinda Party.

If we are to refer to the Decree of the KPU Palangka Raya Number 18/HK.03.1-Pt/6271/Kota/ II/2018, concerning the determination of candidate pairs for Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Palangka Raya 2018, It would be observed that four pairs of candidates for mayor and deputy mayor of Palangka Raya were selected, namely: (1) Rusliansyah - Rogas Usup; (2) Fairid Naparin - Umi Mastikah; (3) Tuty Dau - Rahmadi; and (4) Aries Narang - Habib Fawzy.

Each candidate was relatively well known by the people of Palangka Raya City and had a qualified track record. Rusliansyah - Rogas Usup, an independent pair who met the minimum support threshold of 20,032 people. Rusliansyah was previously a Golkar party politician who resigned after declaring himself through an independent route and Rogas Usup is a businessman. Besides getting support from the community, this pair also received support from the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI).

The pair of Fairid Naparin - Umi Mastikah was considered as newcomers by the people of Palangka Raya, but their names were well known. Candidate pairs are promoted by the Golkar

Party (4 seats), Democrat (2 seats), PAN (2 seats), and PPP (2 seats). Fairid Naparin is chairman of the Regional Representative Council of the Indonesian Youth National Committee (KNPI) of Central Kalimantan Province, son of Abdul Razak, Chairman of the Golkar Party DPD Kalimantan Province and Deputy Chairperson of the Central Kalimantan Provincial DPRD. Meanwhile, the deputy mayor candidate, Umi Mastikah, is a member of the DPRD Palangka Raya from the Democratic faction.

The pair of Tuty Dau - Rahmadi was promoted by the Gerinda Party (4 seats), PKB (3 seats), Nasdem (2 seats). Tuty Dau has a background as an entrepreneur, social actor and coach in the arts. In 2013, she ran for mayor of Palangka Raya but lost. Meanwhile, Rahmadi is a bureaucrat in Central Kalimantan Province.

The pair of Aries Narang - Habib Fawzy, got 7 seats single by PDIP. This pair is so reckoned with because of the track records of both of them which are widely recognized by the people of Palangka Raya. Aries Narang is the biological son of R. Atu Narang, whose position is the Chair of the PDIP Central Kalimantan Province DPD, as well as the Chair of the Central Kalimantan Provincial DPRD. Aries Narang has been involved in many sports organizations and is listed as the Chairman of the Indonesian National Sports Committee (KONI) Central Kalimantan. He held a political position as chairman of the Palangka Raya DPRD from 2004 to 2009. Meanwhile, his running mate, Habib Fawzy has served as Chairman of the DPRD for Central Kalimantan Province and a senator for Central Kalimantan. In political organizations, he was the chairman of the DPW of the United Development Party (PPP), the chairman of the Tanfidziyah Regional Board of Nahdlatul Ulama (PWNU), the chairman of the Anshor Youth Region of Central Kalimantan from 1981 to 1983. Aries Narang was previously charged with a crime that was detrimental to the state, namely the embezzlement of human resources development funds in 2006 and was convicted in 2014 (Borneonews, 2016).

The series of regional elections for the City of Palangka Raya was held for six months from February to July 2018. Voting was held on 27 July 2018 at 592 polling stations. Several cases emerged after the voting, namely the discovery of fraud violations, such as voting using someone else's name. The final result was won by the pair of Fairid Naparin - Umi Mastikah, with a margin of 50.44%. Meanwhile, the pair of Aries Narang - Habib Fawzi was in the runner up position with 38.47%. Just like any other area, there was dowry politics, vote-buying (money politics) and also the development of a network of success teams (brokers) that were applied pragmatically by each candidate. In the following sections, we will discuss cases of the winning team, vote-buying and the issue of prisoners in the dynamics of the regional election of Palangka Raya.

Winning Teams

Each candidate in the pilkada of Palangka Raya formed a winning team, both structured and unstructured. Candidates were not able to interact directly with large voters so that an alternative to using brokerage services emerged (Stokes et al., 2013). Meanwhile, Aspinall & Sukmajati (2015), mentioned individuals who assigned brokers both formal and informal figures, success teams or winning teams or members of the public to work on the behalf of the candidates. They played a role of an intermediary between candidates and voters. The structured pattern is usually a formal way of working formed by the party bearing the candidate. The winning house is concentrated in the office of the supporting political party at the branch level, which is then formed down to the branch, sub-district and neighbourhood (RT) level.

The pair of Aries Narang - Habib Fawzi, supported by PDIP, took the militant party network to the grassroots level. During campaign observations, party members and party officials were more optimized in influencing voters. The winning team consisted of PDIP cadres who occupied important positions in the DPRD of Palangka Raya and the Central Kalimantan Provincial DPRD. The leader of the winning team was the candidate's brother.

At present, the pair of Fairid Naparin - Umi Mastikah, formally followed the same pattern and tried to adopt the same strategies. The winning team was formed by relying on a network of supporting parties, namely Golkar, Demokrat, PAN and PPP. The results of the interview with the winning team revealed a unique fact that appeared on the screen that the bearing party network

was more dominant. The KNPI organization is the main wing in building the voters' chain, based on their admission that has been moving for a long time in early 2017. Their focus is on building a strong network with RT. The way they work lies in the control mechanism of the RT, starting from the sub-district, branches, residents' houses and individuals. For it to run effectively and not to fail, they submitted a written agreement to the RT to secure the voters' quota at the TPS. To ensure the RT worked according to the agreement, individuals were assigned to supervise RT, such as irregularities outside the agreement, supervision of the task of finding target voters, and confirmation to voters according to the RT report.

The second pattern, which is the development of the winning team network by the candidates for the pilkada of Palangka Raya was generally more sporadic and unstructured. Candidates mostly used individual, family (dynasty) and friendship networks. Aries Narang represents the success of the Narang dynasty in Central Kalimantan's politics for more than a decade (Aspinall & As' ad, 2016). The success of the family is the main force in forming the voters' network. Meanwhile, Fairid Naparin represented the success of Abdul Razak also succeeded in becoming the head of the 2015 Central Kalimantan Governor Election winning team.

It has been observed that candidates use personal networks and digital media networks. Fairid Naparin formed a network with Paguyuban Kulowargo Wong Jowo (Pakuwojo) Central Kalimantan (Kalteng Pos, 22/02/2018). Aries Narang formed a network with Dayak figures, namely the former Chairman of the DAD of Central Kalimantan (Kalteng Pos, 22/02/2018; Tabengan, 29/05/2018; Borneonews, 28/05/2018), Pahandut figures in Palangka Raya City (Kalteng Pos, 16/04/2018), and Banjarese figures (Tabengan, 02/04/2018). Meanwhile, we observed all the candidates' social media and found that generally, they used social media such as Facebook, WhatsApp and Instagram as a means of reaching voters.

Based on the case study, it can be seen that candidates will choose individuals who have a high level of reciprocity to reach electoral targets. (Leider et al., 2009; Ravanilla et al., 2017). Then, the winning team will do the same, aiming at the electoral clients who are used for mutual interaction with voters (Schaffer & Schedler, 2002). The winning team's network can ensure that voters carry out their obligations to cast their votes and can monitor and control voters' behaviours and enforce voters' loyalties (Wang & Kurzman, 2007). In our opinion, the pilkada of Palangka Raya was a battle between Aries Narang and Fairid Naparin, who used the same method with slight differences.

Vote Buying

The direct regional election pattern opened a fierce contestation between candidates, unlike the beginning of reform; the role of parliament is still strong in determining regional heads. Of course, in the context of direct regional elections, candidates seek to gain public support in various ways, one of which is through vote-buying. Purchasing votes can also be interpreted as the exchange of money, goods or services for votes or the exchange of personal items for votes during a campaign (Schaffer & Schedler, 2002; Wang & Kurzman, 2007). This can also be interpreted as an element of repetition if the exchange of resources for sound is part of a continuous relationship (Hicken, 2007, 2011).

Vote-buying often occurs, both before formal elections, as well as in campaign and voting activities. This situation was observed in the pilkada of Palangka Raya, where the practice of buying votes was rampant in various modes. The buying of votes was done in various ways such as first, cash giving. Cash was distributed to voters through a voters' network that is connected to the winning team. Based on the results of the interview, the amount of cash given varied from IDR 50 thousand to IDR 250,000 per person, depending on the reciprocal size. One voter said that he had seen residents receive IDR 50,000 ahead of the election. Some voters claimed to have received the sums of IDR 100,000 from the voters' network to direct support to certain candidates with the slogan "choose a young leader". In the Pahandut sub-district, some informants admitted that they received various cash rewards, starting from IDR 100,000 to IDR 250,000 per person. Other informants said that giving cash also helps to gain attention from the locals or the community. The

winning team entrusts the money to the owners of the "coffee shops" and organizes residents to come and then the owners of the "coffee shops" distribute the cash to the residents.

Based on interview data, RT was the mastermind behind the victory because they were considered to have the votes in one area. The entire winning team collaborated with the RT and left some cash. In general, not all candidates can monopolize votes in the RT. The quota of votes obtained from each RT depends on the approach and benefits received. In some cases, each RT can receive vote orders from several candidates at once. Consequently, the results of the interview showed that each candidate requested a vote target from the RT, the quota was different, namely 10%, 30% and 50% of the target of the total votes at the TPS. Still in the context of RT, in other places, the candidates asked for a list of voters who could be invited for direct support. The list is calculated, and the amount is distributed through the respective RT. There is little evidence that can be obtained regarding the amount of cash that was distributed to RT and then distributed to voters. The phenomenon is that RT accepts cash from candidates so it is difficult to say that RT will be loyal to a candidate. On the other hand, voters' loyalty is determined by the amount of cash received. However, some stated that the amount of cash had no effect on the decision to vote.

However, the winning team said that voters must maintain their loyalties and be bound by it. From the start, they entered into a written agreement with the RT and gave IDR 1,500,000 cash to the RT. They stated that the written agreement contained an agreement specifically regarding the votes target, the amount of cash and additional cash if the RT met the target. This mechanism was recognized by the winning team as a binding agreement to the broker (Aspinall, 2014b), so that loyalty does not shift to other candidates. The monthly cash and bonuses needed to ensure RT's loyalty normally exceeds the target in a voting quota. On the other hand, candidates are given the assurance that the calculation of the target voters can be known and measured. As previously discussed, this belief is limited to belief, but in practice, the RT commitment must be monitored by a certain team behind the scenes. This team is also given a cash bonus to ensure that its job, which is to supervise and convey accurate information to the winning team, is properly carried out. How is the RT mechanism used to find voters? It is known that the common method is to detail C6 (invitation to voters), with the intention that on the voting day certain individuals would be asked to cast ballots for voters who are not present. Then, the RT mobilizes voters to cast their votes for a candidate by giving cash. The winning team also revealed that the amount of cash that is provided was not small. The cost of winning candidates over was mostly absorbed by giving cash to voters. Candidates choose a variety of forms of money politics in a bid to gain votes. The victory of the pair of Fairid Naparin - Umi Mastikah was very surprising and fantastic because they gained 50,44% of the total voters of Palangka Raya. The question that should be asked is whether the victory was due to the amount of cash that was distributed to voters? This means that the greater the distribution received by voters, the more it will determine the victory of the candidate and vice versa. However, it should be noted that based on KPU data, Aries Narang was the richest among the candidates with a net worth of IDR 40,600 billion, while Fairid Naparin had a net worth of IDR 14,695 billion. Ironically, the wealth associated with vote-buying is not linear with Aries Narang's victory. We observed that there were other possibilities for the pilkada of Palangka Raya, which may not be based only on the analysis of money politics.

The Framing "Prisoners Issue"

Some parties considered the 2018 regional elections in Palangka Raya to be peaceful and safe, with a lot of tolerance. Although it is common for violations and irregularities to be found in a democracy, these are surmountable with a system of solutions and procedures. However, the existing, tolerant and democratic party also addressed the "peaceful practice of money politics". In plain view, this practice is not monitored even by the election supervisory agency. The observation of the campaign activities of the four pairs of candidates revealed that the candidates campaigned for peaceful regional elections and rejected primordial issues (religion, ethnicity, race and between groups). Campaign materials were more on the idea of improving infrastructure to improve the welfare of the community and employees and to meet the standards of community needs. The only difference lies in the campaign jargon. The pilkada was carried out elegantly in front of the stage

and it did not show any open contradiction as in other areas, for example by packaging primordial issues to form public opinion on certain candidates. The formation of four candidate pairs in the regional elections of Palangka Raya is asymmetrical from a primordial aspect. The formation of candidates follows the characteristics of voters in Palangka Raya and depicts representation, especially ethnicity and religion, so it is difficult to frame them into a winning concept.

Various studies themselves show that a candidate's victory in the elections can be caused by various factors, including vision, mission, programs, party machines, winning logistics, packaging of primordial issues, money politics, indicators of popularity, electability, acceptability and others. Aries Narang is considered to have the potential to win the pilkada because of its resource strength, such as being popular with the public in several surveys, personal logistics, entrenched party constituencies, large campaign funds. We traced through in-depth interviews to the candidate's team in triangulation, there were interesting facts that pointed to the fact that the "prisoners' issue" is a weakness for the candidate with the highest popularity. Our interpretation of the winning team's statement is that they considered the fact that certain candidates were labelled ex-prisoners as a "blessing" to them. He said that this sort of "blessing" was obtained not without some effort, but with maximum effort.

The notion of Slothuus & De Vreese (2010), the winning team describes and constructs political issues of public controversies. The fact that there were ex-prisoners in the candidates' formation was lost to the minds of the voters of Palangka Raya, but the winning team returned to discussing the issue in the electoral circle. Meanwhile, the framing effect of the issue occurred when the communication frame affected the thinking of the recipient. This takes the form of a change in cognitive understanding of a particular situation (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Several studies have also examined how the framing of issues can influence public opinion, particularly the effect of frame competition (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Jerit, 2009; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004), including the frame interaction with the voting community (Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Price et al., 2005) and the framing effect that develops with time (Chong & Druckman, 2008; Lecheler & De Vreese, 2011).

We also found a way to fight money politics, by collating the amount of cash that is involved. Our reference point is the opinion of Chong & Druckman (2013), regarding the "counter-frame" i.e. the frame that opposes the previous effective frame. There are three elements to this definition. First, the counter-frame comes later than the initial frame. Initial frames have been received early and processed separately. Second, the counter-frame supports positioning on an existing issue as opposed to the previous frame. Third, the frame influences opinion on the issue, thereby creating an incentive to counter-frame. In a sense, counter-frame is part of frame competition, which can occur simultaneously or over time and which involve frames from multiple perspectives. The competition between frames can offer interpretations of issues as opposed to communication patterns (Chong & Druckman, 2011).

We found a mechanism for framing the issue of "prisoners" in two cases, first, reducing the existence of voters on the basis of other candidates. The potential for voting in the regional elections of Palangka Raya rested on two districts, namely Jekan Raya and Pahandut Districts. Jekan Raya sub-district had the largest voters' population on the official voters' list. In several pilkada and pileg, the Jekan Raya District has always been won by the PDIP so that in turn it was the base of the PDIP. In the 2018 Palangka Raya regional election, this white muzzle party brought the pair of Aries Narang-Habib Fawzi. Of course, in simple political logic, the existing voters were those who were loyal to PDIP and furthermore the strength of this base was very crucial and beneficial to the candidates.

The results of the interview revealed that getting the most votes in Jekan Raya District was a target. In more depth, we found a mechanism to destroy the loyal voters' base by framing the issue as "reducing the emotional ties of voters by encouraging voters' rationality". One of the candidates in the Palangka Raya regional election was involved in a corruption case and was sentenced to prison. This issue was framed as influencing the thinking of voters (Chong & Druckman, 2007), to weaken public trust and campaign to the public to elect clean leaders and not prisoners. The winning team's effort was to change cognitive awareness patterns to leave the

original frame of "candidate's popularity with a strong base of voters' loyalty". The material used as the frame was the past track records that affected the preferences of base voters. We compared the material to what Cleveland Ferguson called a "negative campaign" (Juditha, 2014).

The formation of public opinion not to vote for "ex-prisoners" was carried out by the winning team's network in disguise and through door-to-door mechanisms as well as sourcing places for people who have an interest in politics, such as coffee shops, markets, and community chat places. The researchers observed that the issue of rejecting prisoners has never been carried out openly, either in large campaigns, open and limited campaigns, leaflets, banners or in other forms of campaign materials. The winning team revealed that the effect of packaging the issue of rejecting ex-prisoners as leaders in the next five years received a strong response from the community and strengthened the aspects of society's rationality for their behaviour in selecting a candidate. The opportunity for the rationality of voters in Jekan Raya District was used to embed a certain candidate's tag line on the head of voters, namely "clean, young, smart and modest". Table 1 is an illustration of the efforts of the winning team to reduce the existence of voters in Jekan Raya District.

Table 1. Results of Voice Recapitulation of Sub-District in the City of Palangka Raya

Candidate Pair	Number of Votes (Sub-district)					%
	Bukit Batu	Jekan Raya	Pahandut	Rakumpit	Sabangau	
Tuty Dau and Rahmadi	560	4112	2961	252	1881	09.77
Rusliansyah and Rogas Usup	687	8336	5246	428	1101	15.79
Fairid Naparin and Umi Mastikah	2575	23215	21180	357	3111	50.44
Aries Narang and Habib Fawzi	2598	21291	11006	670	2901	38.47

Source: KPU of Palangka Raya City, 2018.

Second, we found a case against cash giving by other candidates through a "counter-frame" (Chong & Druckman, 2013). We assumed that all candidates practised voting at different rates. The winning team predicted that candidates with great logistics will provide more cash. The results of in-depth interviews with the winning team stated that they must form voters' opinions since there is a difference in the value of the cash received. It was revealed that they aggressively campaigned to voters so as to know who the money was taken from. They coined a polite way of gaining votes from voters, which read: "Our gifts are not as big as other people's gifts, although they are little, yet they were brought from personal pockets". The issue they wanted to convey to voters was that large gifts from other candidates were a result of the looting of public funds and such candidates should not be elected.

Voters faced a dichotomy in the value of money received; therefore the team coined a jargon that affected the behavioural pattern of voters, thereby causing them to refuse to vote for candidates who gave cash from public funds. According to the author, packaging issues like this is effective in overcoming the ferocity of money politics in an era of democracy, even though people are still trapped in the euphoria of facing a political year that is considered a "blessed year". The pattern applied by candidates cannot be considered as an activity that encourages the achievement of a leader who is clean and without a dowry. The packaging of issues like this is only a distraction because there has not been any change in value based on rationality. This phenomenon is a unique fact in the election contestation and a kind of ethics in the practice of money politics. Voters are asked to agree in the social sphere to choose candidates who prioritize ethics instead of giving money. New frames are constructed and contested, this influences opinion on issues, thus creating frame competition (Chong & Druckman, 2013). There is an attempt to contrast the meaning of money received from the original frame (public money) to a new frame (private money) as is the opinion of (Chong & Druckman, 2011).

We find that the difference between framing and counter framing in the media is so different from what the winning team did that the fact that certain candidates are framed again to carry out persuasive political messages during campaigns, the difference is the study of Vitriol et al. (2020) and Nikolayenko (2019) operate in online media, but the principle is that supporters of Aries Narang-Habib Fawzi show a change in loyalty consistency by framing the issue of corrupt candidates, as in the case of Jekan Raya. Framing and counter framing as the study of Anggalime (2017); Aprillia (2017); Farida & Yoedtadi (2019); Ikasari & Arifina (2020) is a framing and frame resistance between online media, the difference with the Palangka Raya election, namely between loyal voters and the winning team. The success of framing issues is relatively different, whether it is in favour of negative or positive sentiments.

Fairid Naparin's victory was not due to the fact that he was "young, intelligent and unpretentious" these attributes are easily perceived by people because other candidates also had attributes that were not so different, but merely framing public issues that were appropriate and according to facts. The framing of the issue of ex-prisoners by the winning team was the only strategy that they could use to deceive voters, as they progressed in creating rational voters' awareness and a maturing of electoral democracy. Consequently, voters are still trapped in the more refined practices of money politics.

CONCLUSION

Pilkada is an electoral democratic process to elect leaders who have integrity and clean records. However, pilkada regulations still provide room for problematic candidates to exercise their rights to be elected as public officers. In reality, pilkada in Indonesia also creates avenues for problematic candidates to advance in contestation and some of these candidates have won the contest. Many studies show that the level of popularity, aspects of patronage and political clientelism are not the determining factors for their victory. The pilkada of Palangka Raya is unique in that the ex-prisoners who ran for electoral offices proved to be very tough on the other candidates, as they won some in the contests. Our study found that ex-prisoners turned electoral candidates who have high levels of popularity, vote-buying abilities and a strong winning team network did not correlate with success in the election. The determining factor for the candidates' victory in Palangka Raya was the ability of the winning team to manipulate the "ex-prisoners' issue" so that it can appeal to voters' reasoning. The theory of framing the issue and counter-frame operationally occurred and did not occur in some of the regions that held pilkada from 2015-2018.

Based on this discourse, there are several determinations and limitations in this proposition. First, the fact that ex-prisoners turned electoral candidates' victory in the pilkada of Palangka Raya is more certain due to the fact that they are successfully packaged by the winning team, but will not be able to work without money politics and the loyalty of the winning team. On the one hand, we considered that the framing of the issue of ex-prisoners and the counter-frame of corrupt politics is positive but has not yet resolved the problems of electoral democracy, because money politics is still rampant in subtle ways. The great relief that we have is that the rationality of voters has been formed to reject corrupt leaders, though there has not been any pragmatic politics in the discourse.

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