

Collaborative Governance's Risk Management (Case Study: Implementation of Tobacco Control Policy in Kulonprogo and Pekalongan City)

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Article Info

Article History;

Received:

2022-12-27

Revised:

2023-01-04

Accepted:

2023-01-27

Abstract: This article explored collaborative governance risk management on implementing tobacco control policy in Kulonprogo Regency and Pekalongan City. The research methods used qualitative methods based on primary and secondary data. The authors collected the primary data through interviews with some actors. In contrast, the secondary data comprised online mass media and previous research on relevant topics. This article also uses the tool Nvivo12 Plus to help with data processing. The results showed that the collaborative governance of Kulonprogo Regency and Pekalongan City had some risks in their collaboration. Kulonprogo Regency could resolve those risks through decision-making to achieve the integrated mechanism. This step is easy to implicate because the actor has high cooperation to solve their problem through a joint decision. While the risk collaboration of Pekalongan city could not be solved properly cause of the lack the mechanical integration of the actor in that collaboration. The actor has different principles and impacts on a joint decision to achieve an integrated mechanism when solving the problems.

Keywords: Collaborative Governance; Risk Management; Tobacco Control Policy

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.18196/jgpp.v10i2.17304>



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INTRODUCTION

The tobacco control policy in Kulonprogo Regency was implemented in 2014 through the local regulation (Peraturan Daerah) number 5/2014, and this policy has a positive impact every year on tobacco control in this regency. Kulonprogo Regency's Government, Muhammadiyah Tobacco Control Center (MTCC) and The Union implemented this policy.




Figure 1. Progress of Tobacco Control Policy Implementation in Kulonprogo Regency

Source: Authors, 2022

Kulonprogo Regency has made positive progress every year through collaboration built. From 2014 until 2016, Kulonprogo's Government and other actors optimize the socialization of tobacco control policy in 3 free-smoke areas of their region. From 2017 until 2019, the collaboration has made a stronger effort to upgrade the collaboration capacity of tobacco policy implementation. In this period, the policy implementation has been expanded in 7 free smoke areas and even achieved the appreciation of Indonesia's Ministry of Health. The support of Kulonprogo's regent also positively impacted encouraging this policy implementation. In 2019 – 2021, the collaboration actors forbade tobacco advertising and upgraded law enforcement.

While tobacco control policy implementation was implicated by Pekalongan's Regent from 2012 through local regulation number 19/2012 has decreased in progress. The policy was implemented by Pekalongan Government and Aliansi Masyarakat Pekalongan Peduli Asap Rokok (AMPPAR). The negative progress of tobacco policy implementation in Pekalongan City was revoked by the forbid cigarette advertising and tobacco control policy by Pekalongan's Regent. AMPPAR has been dispersed, and even no more intensive collaboration with local government. The best practice of tobacco control policy implementation in Kulonprogo Regency also has collaboration risks, but those risks can be finished through integrated mechanisms. Differences of condition in Pekalongan City, an actor involved in collaboration can't solve their risk collaboration and trigger a failure.

Based on these problems, the author was interested in analyzing the risk management of collaboration established by Kulonprogo and Pekalongan's Governments which have a different outputs of their policy implementation. The author used Institutional Collective Action (ICA) perspective to analyze these problems. The author used this perspective to analyze the established risk management of collaboration.

RESEARCH METHOD

Research methods used qualitative methods and a case study approach. These methods were used because qualitative methods can help explain complex questions about how and why that case happens in depth (Hamilton & Finley, 2019). Qualitative methods have detailed descriptions of complex phenomena, experiences, unexpected events, and interpretations by actors involved in that case with the various stakes and roles (Lefèvre et al., 2019). The authors collected the data resources of this article through two resources: premiere and secondary data. The premier data were collected through in-depth interviews with the actors involved. At the same time, the secondary data were collected from online mass media and some previous research that has a relevant topic in the last five years.

Table 1. The Component of Online Mass Media

Case Study	Online Mass Media Intensity
Kulonprogo Regency	16 Online Mass Media
Pekalongan City	8 Online Mass Media

The differences in online mass media intensity cause the online mass media, which talk about this case is limited. The authors also used research tools such as Nvivo12 Plus to help process and visualize data. The processing data used by Nvivo12 Plus has some steps: Ncapture data, visualization, analysis and results. The analysis data in this article used interactive models consisting of some steps of data reduction, visualization, and conducting the conclusion (Miles et al., 2018).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

From the literature search by the authors, several perspectives have been used to analyze the success or failure of collaboration, including the network structure perspective, network management perspective, institutional factors perspective, power and trust perspective, and perspective mix *framework*. The network structure perspective (Provan & Milward, 1995) explains that collaboration is influenced by network structure (network integration and external control) and network context (systems and resources). The collaboration will be successful if it can integrate the network with a centralized system.

The network management perspective (Herranz, 2008) explains that the success rate of collaboration between the government and non-state actors will be influenced by the network management strategy implemented. The perspective of institutional factors (Weymouth et al., 2015) explains that collaboration will be successful if it is supported by a strong coalition between actors who collaborate, support resources, and make the right decisions. The perspective of power and trust (Ran & Qi, 2018) states that power and trust are two things that reinforce each other if they can be synergized by actors who collaborate. *Perspectivemix framework* (Bryson et al., 2006), (Chris Ansell & Gash, 2008) stated that initial conditions, collaboration processes, institutional design, and leadership influence collaboration output.

These perspectives have not yet touched on the study of the risks that arise in the collaboration process, ultimately affecting institutional collective action decisions. Risk itself is an unavoidable part of collaboration besides problems (Carr et al., 2017), (Hansen et al., 2020), (Terman et al., 2020), (Vangen & Huxham, 2003). Risk management is an important part of the collaboration, considering that collective institutional decisions will be influenced by the risks faced in collaboration.

Serena Y Kim (S. Y. Kim et al., 2020) underlined the importance of risk management in collaboration because risk in collaboration can be a determining factor for collaboration failure. For this reason, this research study used the Institutional Collective Action (ICA) perspective as a risk management analysis tool in collaboration. Feiock's study, which introduced the ICA perspective in 2013, became a reference in studying collective institutional action using the integration mechanism (Feiock, 2013).

Feiock explained that an organization would have joint problems or shared risks. In his study, he stated three types of risk in organizations:

1. Coordination risk, which shows failure in achieving common goals.
2. Distribution/division risk indicates a failure to develop collective agreements to distribute benefits and risks together.
3. Deviation/defection risk shows stakeholders' inconsistency in continuing to follow the shared rules that have been made.

Feiock said that making joint decisions and creating an integration mechanism to resolve these collective problems is necessary to overcome these three risks. It is the main contribution from the perspective of the ICA. The integration mechanism is a system built to integrate various alternative solutions to the risks that occur. Several considerations will be used to obtain mutually agreed results in building an integration mechanism. Collaboration output will be more easily achieved if it is successfully carried out.

Studies on institutionalism have been discussed a lot, but very few still touch on risk management studies as an important point for maintaining collaborative outputs. In the mapping of the study, the study of institutionalism was recognized as an important part of collaboration because the institutional framework would become a reference in decision-making (Chris Ansell & Gash, 2018), (Baird et al., 2019), (Lahat, 2020). In addition to the institutional framework, several previous studies have explained that good and appropriate institutional design is a

requirement for creating better collaboration and is expected to last longer (Christopher Ansell et al., 2017), (Batory & Svensson, 2020), (Bell & Scott, 2020), (Berardo et al., 2020), (Cain et al., 2020), (S. Kim, 2016), (Bryson et al., 2020).

In addition to institutional design, based on tracing past studies, information is obtained that institutional structure is also an important factor in supporting the continuation of collaboration (Baldwin et al., 2019), (Bodin, 2017), (Koebele, 2020), (Nair et al., 2018), (Raitio, 2012), (Song et al., 2020), (Kathrin, 2019). The institutional structure relates to the range of regulations used in the collaboration, the inter-organizational structures involved, and the formal and informal structures.

Still very much related to the discussion of institutional structure, from the results of the author's search, it was found that many studies on networks are associated with the institutional context. Some writings about the network needed to strengthen institutions of which are writings (Christopher Ansell et al., 2020), (Barrutia & Echebarria, 2019), (Bodin et al., 2017), (Bonomi et al., 2020), (Bradford, 2016), (Calanni et al., 2015), (Hawkins et al., 2016), (Jovita et al., 2018), (Shrestha, 2018), (Gerber et al., 2013), (Lee, 2016), (Andrew & Carr, 2013). These studies found that network inclusiveness is needed, building formal and informal networks, strengthening coordination with networks, and creating network-based collaboration innovations, all of which will be crucial to accelerate and strengthening collaboration. Field studies found various problems that triggered collaboration risks in Kulonprogo Regency, as seen in Table 2.

Table 2. Problems on Collaboration Risks In Kulonprogo Regency

No.	Determination Factor	The problem that arises	Risk of Collaboration
1	Individuals	Serious administrative violation Transparency saving budget Differences in vision and mission Human resources (competency problems)	Collaborative activities have temporarily stopped, and distrust of one of the stakeholders The fragility of cohesiveness among members Internal conflict, some members left Collaborative activities did not run well and smoothly
2	Institution	There is no clear regulation regarding the recruitment of members There is no regulation on the use of a transparent budget There is no coordinating regulation between SKPD There is no regulatory mechanism to control the multilevel budget used The budget for enforcing local regulations is relatively small	There are incompetent members Budget abuse It makes coordination difficult between organizations Budget abuse Collaboration activities did not go well

As seen in Table 2, the first problem in the collaboration in Kulonprogo Regency was the biggest, a serious administrative violation entrusted with running programs or collaborative activities. For information, several activities are carried out jointly by MTCC, The Union and the Regional Government of Kulonprogo Regency in collaboration with tobacco control. Activities or activities that the three stakeholders have agreed upon are listed in the collaboration contract.

Another problem arising from storage saving budget management also caused cohesiveness among members to be disrupted. Ultimately, it also resulted in a change in the organizational structure because some members eventually left. The disruption of cohesiveness between members and some members' departure has disrupted coordination. Organizational restructuring and the entry of new members affected the coordination that had been built so far. Transferring knowledge to new members certainly takes time, coupled with disrupting collaboration activities due to organizational structure changes and new members' entry.

Another problem that arises in the collaboration in Kulonprogo Regency and the end creates a risk of coordination is the difference in perceptions of vision and mission and also the

problem of the quality of human resources who do not meet the qualifications needed to carry out collaborative tobacco control activities there. An internal conflict then follows the difference in perception. The problem with the quality of civil servants' understanding of smoke-free areas within the Kulonprogo Regional Government also disrupted coordination because some employees were on the task force tasked with overseeing the KTR Regional Regulation there. However, this issue can be overcome with several capacity-building pieces of training, which are also part of the mutually agreed collaborative activities. The Head of the Kulonprogo Regency Health Office stated that employees need time to properly understand the substance of a smoke-free area because a Regional Regulation has just been issued.

Those are some of the problems that are caused by individuals and raise the risk of coordination in collaboration on tobacco control in Kulonprogo Regency. In addition to problems caused by individuals, according to what has been listed in the table above, there are problems caused by institutions, including the absence of regulations governing the recruitment of members in collaboration and strict and multilevel regulations governing mechanisms for budget use and accountability.

The absence of these regulations has proven to create problems and ultimately disrupt coordination. The absence of good regulations regarding the pattern of recruiting members made the activity leaders at that time freely include their family members. The absence of regulations controlling the budget's use eventually led to problems that interfered with collaboration. The coordination risk finally arises due to the absence of regulation. Still related to regulations, it turns out that the absence of regulations governing coordination between regional apparatus organizations caused coordination problems within the Kulonprogo Regency Government.

With an explanation of the risks that follow from the occurrence of problems from both the individual and the institution, it is clear that the risks of collaboration are coordination risks. Statements from several informants and observations made by the authors show that the coordination risk appears first compared to other collaboration risks. From the author's observation, collaboration risk in coordination risk can trigger other collaboration risks, namely distribution/division risk and defection/deviation risk. From the cases in Kulonprogo Regency, coordination risks emerged, which led to cessation of several collaborative activities. However, other collaboration risks can follow the emergence of coordination risks.

After the coordination risk arose, where several activities in the collaboration were finally stopped temporarily, it turned out to have created a negative stigma towards the collaboration. As a concrete example, when a serious administrative violation by one of the members results in uncontrolled use of the budget, this condition raises the coordination risk, which causes the parties not to trust each other anymore and finally, collaboration activities stop temporarily. This condition was followed by distrust from "The Union," which became a financial support institution for this collaboration. They felt that the collaboration budget was not being used properly.

According to the author, the distrust among collaborative stakeholders indicates that the defection/deviation risk has begun to emerge. One of the parties has begun to think about leaving the collaboration that has been built. When coordination risk arises and then is followed by defection risk, from the author's observation, the fact is also found that coordination risk also influences distribution risk. If related to the ICA theory, distribution/division risk can be understood as a condition in which an organization cannot distribute mutual benefits for all parties. Still, from the problem of serious administrative violations, as explained earlier, it turns out that this also raises division risk.

After the problem of violations arises, coordination risks lead to the cessation of collaborative activities. However, this was also followed by the emergence of distribution risk-stopping collaborative activities. Stakeholders should have obtained several benefits, which in the end, were not distributed properly. Some of the benefits could not be distributed properly, for example, the "tri dharma" activities of MTCC members, whose majority members were lecturers, which ended temporarily. The Kulonprogo Regency Regional Government did not benefit from collaborative activities, for example, increasing civil servants' capacity as KTR task forces or community empowerment related to tobacco control there.

Likewise, The Union felt that the trust given did not benefit them when serious administrative violations occurred in collaborative activities in Kulonprogo Regency. Some staff

from The Union felt that the accountability of the collaboration participants decreased with this incident. Collaboration Activity's reports stopped during this condition, resulting in the information received by The Union also being unable to forward the progress of collaborative activities to The Union's head office. Identifying problems that raise the risk of collaboration is taken from primary data conducted by the author. Data can be mutually reinforcing when combined with big data and secondary data from the internet that has been processed using the Nvivo software.




Figure 2. Risk Collaboration in Kulonprogo Regency

Source: Authors, 2022

The figure is the result of data processing using Nvivo which shows that based on observations, statements from sources and secondary data, these three risks did occur in the collaboration built in Kulonprogo Regency. On the other hand, if identified based on big internet data, the result is that the following sources generated the problems in the collaboration carried out in Kulonprogo Regency:




Figure 3. Collaboration problem in Kulonprogo Regency

Source: Authors, 2022

The data shows that the problems arise from individuals and institutions. Resources, in this case, are human resources and support for infrastructure, as well as problems arising from institutions in the form of bureaucratic characteristics that are still not optimal for carrying out tobacco control policies. Meanwhile, in Pekalongan City, various problems arise from individuals

and institutions, resulting in collaboration risk. Some of the issues that arise and cause collaboration risks based on data in the field are as follows.

Table 3. Problems with Collaboration Risks In Pekalongan City

No	Determination Factor	The problem that arises	Collaboration risks
1	Individuals	Revocation of the Mayor's Regulation regarding the prohibition of cigarette advertising and sponsorship	Collaborative activities have temporarily stopped, and coordination has been disrupted
		There was no previous collaboration, and the work backgrounds of AMPPAR members were diverse, and only a few came from the health sector	The fragility of cohesiveness between members and weak understanding of collaboration themes
		Differences in vision and mission, perceptions among stakeholders	Internal conflict
		Human resources (Competence issues of AMPPAR members)	Collaborative activities did not run well and smoothly
2	Institution	There is no clear regulation regarding the recruitment of members	There are incompetent members
		There are no regulations governing collaboration	Domination of one stakeholder
		There is no coordinating regulation between SKPD	It makes coordination difficult between organizations
		The budget for enforcing local regulations is relatively small	Collaboration activities did not go well

From the table, the biggest problem in tobacco control collaboration that the informants believed was the repeal of the Mayor's regulation regarding the ban on cigarette advertisements and cigarette sponsorship in all activities there, which were carried out starting in 2018. Collaborative activities could no longer be carried out because the "legal umbrella" of tobacco control had been removed. That mutual benefits cannot be recovered. Suppose it is related to the ICA theory. In that case, it is included in the risk of coordination, considering that nothing more can be widely obtained from the activities carried out. The change in the type of activity impacts the relationship between collaborating stakeholders. According to AMPPAR sources, coordination between their organization and the Pekalongan City Health Office is also slowly decreasing in intensity.

Unlike the case in Kulonprogo Regency, which will soon be responded to with a new strategy or policy to minimize the impact of collaboration risks, the case in Pekalongan City did not get a good response from stakeholders to reduce the impact that occurred. The main factor is the absence of collaboration rules that can become a "legal umbrella" in dealing with problems. This condition has also prevented AMPPAR from taking serious action to pressure the mayor to cancel his intention to revise the regulation of banning cigarette advertisements and sponsorships there.

Collaborative solidity is a problem that arises in Pekalongan City when there is a risk of collaboration. On the one hand, AMPPAR is not strong internally, considering that they joined only voluntarily or because the previous Pekalongan mayor appointed them to join AMPPAR, there is no contract or clear rules regarding the collaboration process, and on the other hand, the position of the Health Department was very weak in front of The Mayor of Pekalongan City. So that getting support from external parties when taking persuasive actions against the mayor is a trigger for the emergence of collaboration risks, especially the risk of coordination.

This data is reinforced by the results of Nvivo data processing from big internet data, which shows several problems that raise collaboration risks originating from human resources, infrastructure, environmental conditions, and bureaucratic institutions, as in the following table:




Figure 3. Collaboration problem in Pekalongan City

Source: Authors, 2022

The data shows that the primary data taken directly by the author is reinforced by secondary data processed by secondary data, which provides information that problems arise from individuals and institutions. The conditions in Kulonprogo Regency and Pekalongan City in managing risk gave different results. If associated with the ICA theory regarding collective *learning*, then the incident in Pekalongan City strengthens the argument that the risk of collaboration can indeed be minimized by collective *learning*.

Collaboration in Kulonprogo Regency provides an example of how shared learning can be done well by taking joint actions/decisions based on regulations or collaboration contracts that have been mutually agreed upon. Meanwhile, joint learning in Pekalongan City did not go well because there was no joint action between actors to be able to take persuasive action against the Mayor.

Collectivity among stakeholders in Pekalongan City is believed to be less strong, according to the authors, because of the background of cooperation and work backgrounds that are different from one another. Coupled with the background of the majority of AMPPAR members who do not have a health issue background, even though the collaboration theme is closely related to health issues, it makes the members' sensitivity even less good.

In Kulonprogo Regency, where most collaborative actors have educational or occupational backgrounds in the health sector. The similarity of professions in the same field with the collaboration theme they built made collective learning easier. This condition greatly benefits the collaboration in Kulonprogo Regency, and it was not found in the Pekalongan City collaboration.

The variety of professions that have joined the AMPPAR organization means that the members there also have various interests. However, they cannot be tied to health interests because the organization's members' professions are very diverse. Meanwhile, in Kulonprogo Regency, the variety of individual interests can vary. However, they can be integrated with health interests because most are health sector workers. The dynamics of problems and triggering the risk of collaboration in the two research locations, if described by Nvivo data processing, will produce information from anywhere information about the emergence of collaboration risks appears, as shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Information about Collaboration Problems

Source: Authors, 2022

Figure 4 illustrates that several informants provided information regarding problems managing tobacco control policies in the two research locations. All problems that arise and trigger the risk of collaboration must immediately get a fast response to solve the problem to maintain the collaboration output.

RESPONSE TO COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE RISK

Collaboration risks should then be anticipated with several steps to minimize at least the losses that will be obtained. The collaboration output can be disrupted if the risks are not resolved immediately. Of course, many factors can determine the success or failure of the anticipations made or the solutions used to reduce the risks of collaboration that arise. The practice of responding to collaboration risks carried out in Kulonprogo Regency uses a multilevel mechanism.

When the source of the problem comes from one of the stakeholders involved in the collaboration, it will be resolved internally first. After being resolved internally, it will be raised for a thorough discussion with stakeholders from different institutions participating in the collaboration. The authors contribute to the ongoing collaboration because each stakeholder has its internal mechanism to resolve problems that interfere with collaborative activities.

If owned by all collaborating parties, the organization's ability to solve problems internally will positively contribute to the collaboration. However, not all parties can and have the strength to solve problems that interfere with the course of the collaboration. When problems arise and pose risks, the collaboration cannot complete and cause collaboration outputs to be disrupted. An ability to solve problems and minimize the risk of collaboration if it is related to ICA theory is included in the category of collective *learning* (joint learning), which is carried out jointly to minimize the risk of collaboration that occurs. The problem is that Feiock does not explain how collective *learning* can positively influence the continuation of collaboration. However, the practice in Kulonprogo Regency can at least provide an overview of how the joint learning activities work to maintain collaboration.

One concrete example of responsive action taken by actors collaborating in Kulonprogo Regency in responding to acts of serious administrative violations is proof of the successful implementation of joint learning. If the problem of budget misappropriation occurs, then action is taken (in the form of returning the misappropriated budget, in *blacklist* in all tobacco control activities around the world, or organizational restructuring) and creating new policies to minimize it, so it doesn't happen again in the future is a form of responsive shared learning. A form of success in efforts to keep collaboration running and output can be achieved.

This process will be discussed further in the next chapter. The responsive process carried out to anticipate collaboration risks was acknowledged by several sources requiring a common vision between the collaborating actors. It can only be achieved if the members have similarities in several fields, such as educational or occupational backgrounds and previous cooperation backgrounds. The resource persons said that some of these similarities made it easier to coordinate and facilitate the process of carrying out collaborative activities.

In the context of Kulonprogo Regency, homogeneity in several of these fields is recognized as having a positive impact when problems occur and raising the risk of collaboration. In brief, it was explained that activists at the MTCC and the Kulonprogo Regent had homogeneity in the field of work because many MTCC activists became doctors and had the same profession as the Kulonprogo Regent dr. Hasto Wardoyo, before this collaboration was carried out, they already knew each other. They made coordinating and aligning vision and mission easier because the collaborative implementation of control policies in Kulonprogo Regency was in the health sector.

The theme of collaboration that is built is very closely related to the health sector. Thus, when most members are workers in the health sector, it will be easier to learn. Most MTCC members are lecturers who work as doctors and health workers/nurses. Meanwhile, The Union is focused on health studies. Coupled with the Head of the Kulonprogo Regency at that time, Mr. Hasto Wardoyo, who had a doctor's background, the tobacco control collaboration there had advantages from the point of view of the work background of the stakeholders involved.

From observations made by the author, the homogeneity of the work provides an advantage in compiling collaborative activities, especially those related to outreach to the community, empowering/increasing the capacity of the KTR task force in Kulonprogo Regency,

and formulating strategies to improve public health. It is logical given the collaboration theme related to health which is, of course, the area of expertise of the members involved in the collaboration. The process of shared learning to make collaboration work well becomes more open.

MUTUAL DECISION-MAKING TO MINIMIZE THE IMPACT OF COLLABORATION RISK

Joint decision-making steps are carried out by actors collaborating in Kulonprogo Regency to minimize the impact that arises from this problem. Within the MTCC, there was a fundamental regulatory change. Revise Budget management is made, transparency budget activities knowing by the vice-rector in the financial sector, MTCC Director, and MTCC Treasurer. The multilevel and open mechanism has made financial management healthier to date. Arrangement and creation of standard operating procedures for each type of activity are carried out to minimize activity failures and facilitate the replacement of actors if someone leaves because the regulations are clear.

The mechanism for reporting collaborative activities to the chancellor and other university leaders so that they become controlled- new regulations and activity control activities by the University shows a shared decision-making mechanism carried out at the MTCC. Based on information in the field, the decision-making mechanism internally at MTCC was also known by other parties collaborating in Kulonprogo Regency. A layered mechanism that involves all collaborating parties provides the fact that there is a responsiveness of all collaborating parties to immediately make a joint agreement in solving problems. Even so, the time needed to solve the problem takes about 2 months because several activities must be completed before deciding on changing management, for example, the audit mechanism and the process of finding supporting data on the budget transparency problem.

On the other hand, joint decision-making in the Regional Government of Kulonprogo Regency related to the collaboration risk does not encounter many obstacles because the regent at that time was very supportive of collaborative tobacco control activities. Identification that the author has carried out obtained data that the cause of the risk of collaboration that occurred there was only the problem of the absence of regulations governing how the Satpol PP should report the activities of supervising the implementation of the KTR Regional Regulation to the Health Service as leading *sector* and the lack of capacity of civil servants to be able to support KTR activities in Kulonprogo Regency.

A joint decision has been made to resolve the issue. When coordination risks arise due to the absence of regulations governing the mechanism for reporting surveillance activities by Satpol PP to the Health office, the solution is to resolve it with intense communication between the two local organization office leaders. Likewise, with the issue of the capacity of civil servants who were used as KTR task forces in Kulonprogo Regency who lacked capacity or knowledge about KTR, the joint decision taken by the Regional Government of Kulonprogo Regency, The Union, and MTCC was to make empowerment activities routinely carried out to increase the capacity of civil servants who became KTR task force. Joint decision-making among the three actors is usually carried out at evaluation meetings of collaborative activities held every 3 months. However, the decision-making planning process can be carried out more quickly because every month, there must be a report and evaluation of activities that are reported together. If you look at this information, you can see that for the Kulonprogo Regional Government, there are no significant problems related to joint decision-making because the regent is also very supportive of this collaborative activity.

Unlike in Kulonprogo Regency, joint decision-making in tobacco control collaboration in Pekalongan City experienced problems. Even joint decisions were difficult to realize, especially after the Previous Mayor of Pekalongan City, who initiated the establishment of AMPPAR, passed away. The collaboration practice that was built underwent a significant change after he passed away. AMPPAR, a combination of various elements of society, was put together by the Mayor. However, the unity and integrity of the organization were disrupted when the unifying force was no longer there. From the start, with the various educational and occupational backgrounds of AMPPAR members, it would have been more or less difficult to carry out collaborative activities on the health theme. The cohesiveness of thought becomes weak when there is no majority of members with a health background.

Coupled with the history of the unity of AMPPAR members in one organization initiated by the Mayor and not because of the personal desire of all members to unite to form the organization, the strength and togetherness among the members become weak. It is proven by the ease with which their members move in and out of the organization for certain reasons. Thus when collaboration is faced with a big problem, the power to solve the collaboration problem cannot be carried out optimally. Based on information from the Pekalongan City Health Office, from the initial process of implementing collaboration, the Health Office often carried out initiations, both in selecting collaborative activities or making decisions and strategies to strengthen the implementation of KTR in Pekalongan City.

So when the current mayor wants to change the Perwal regarding cigarette advertisements, there is no significant pressure from AMPPAR. This condition illustrates that it is very difficult to make joint decisions in response to the risks of collaboration in Pekalongan City. There is no reliable and strong shared power to suppress or minimize any actions contrary to the collaboration vision built together. In the context of Pekalongan City, the basic weakness comes from the collaborating NGO, AMPPAR, which does not have strong solidarity and joint strength.

If identified in more depth, the interests of AMPPAR members are not much accommodated in the collaboration that is built. Unlike what happened in Kulonprogo Regency. As previously explained, most MTCC members who are lecturers and have health and medical educational backgrounds greatly benefit from collaborative tobacco control activities because they can take advantage of these activities as a medium for conducting research and community service, which is the responsibility of the lecturers, coupled with the theme of collaboration, which is relevant to their educational background. In addition, there are also financial benefits to be gained from this collaborative activity—an ideal condition for them to continue to survive and strengthen the implementation of collaboration. Meanwhile, an extraordinary difference occurred in Pekalongan City with the existence of AMPPAR, which was not as ideal as the presence of MTCC.

Several AMPPAR members asked for information about their reasons for leaving AMPPAR and said they were more concerned with their main job than continuing to be active in the organization. Individual interests are not much accommodated when they join this collaboration in Pekalongan City. According to the author, changes in regulations at the institutional level and the non-accommodation of members' interests cause the failure of joint decision-making to control the risks of collaboration that arise. Coordination risks that arise and result in difficulties in being able to gather stronger joint forces result in poor collaboration outcomes. It can be said that even collaboration in Pekalongan City is experiencing setbacks due to the inability to make joint decisions that agree with the aim of collaboration.

INTEGRATION MECHANISM

The integration mechanism is a deeper activity than collective decision-making. Suppose it was explained about joint decision-making, which is the opening series of integration mechanism activities, then in this chapter. In that case, it will be explained in more detail how the tug-of-war occurs and the decision-making dynamics to create an integration mechanism. In the case of collaboration that occurred in Kulonprogo Regency, several activities supported the integration mechanism. Based on the results of observations and interviews conducted, it was found that to solve a problem. A multilevel mechanism was carried out. The first is through internal meetings with each stakeholder involved in the collaboration. If the process has been completed, it will be increased to make a common understanding among all stakeholders. It is where the integration mechanism process can occur because all stakeholders are willing to accept the solutions that are decided jointly. This pattern of integration mechanisms is carried out for all problems in the collaboration built in Kulonprogo Regency.

Meanwhile, for the collaboration carried out in Pekalongan City, the integration mechanism could not be realized due to the strong position of the Pekalongan Mayor, who determined the policies in the collaboration. No other stakeholders can influence or change the Mayor's policies that are contrary to the vision of the collaboration being built. The mayor's repeal of the Mayor's Regulation on the prohibition of cigarette advertisements and sponsorship contradicts the collaborative vision of tobacco control. The differences in the conditions of the processes leading to different integration mechanisms in the two cities have already begun to be

seen during joint learning activities, and decision-making in the two locations is already in different conditions. The joint learning and decision-making process that went well in Kulonprogo Regency strongly supported the subsequent integration mechanism. It differs from Pekalongan City, where joint learning and joint decision-making on collaboration risk do not go well.

CONCLUSION

Collaborative risks arose in both research locations. However, the collaboration in Kulonprogo Regency overcame the collaboration risks that arose by immediately making multilevel decision-making and achieving an integration mechanism. One of the supporting factors is the mechanism of shared learning which is relatively easier to do. In contrast, the collaboration carried out in Pekalongan City was unsuccessful in joint decision-making considering the lack of strong position of NGOs and bureaucracy before the Regional Head, who made controversial decisions. As a result, the integration mechanism did not occur, and the collaboration output became poor.

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