

Political Brokers in Head of Village Elections (A Case Study in Sangal Village and Rantau Bangkiang Village, Central Kalimantan Province, Indonesia)

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Abstract: In Indonesia, the role of political brokers is a ubiquitous phenomenon in the context of electoral processes at all levels. A substantial body of research has been devoted to the study of political brokers in Indonesia. Nevertheless, research on political brokers at the rural level remains scarce. Accordingly, this study seeks to examine the role of political brokers in the context of village head elections, with a particular focus on the cases of Sanggal village and Rantau Bangkiang village in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. This research employs qualitative methods to elucidate the phenomenon of political brokers in village head elections. The concepts of political brokers, patron-client relationships, and forms of patronage were employed to analyze the manner in which candidates provide resources to the public through the intermediary of brokers. The findings revealed that political brokers were not only involved in the electoral processes for general and regional heads, but also in those for village heads. Furthermore, this study revealed that brokers played a pivotal role in securing victories for candidates in village head elections. The benefits received by brokers from candidates were not solely material, such as monetary compensation and goods, but also encompassed connections and promises of involvement in the village development agenda. Despite the methodological limitations of this study, it makes a valuable contribution to the field of political brokerage research in Indonesia, particularly in the context of rural elections.

Keywords: Political Brokers; Head Village; Election

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INTRODUCTION

The village is an administrative and political area within the Indonesian state. In general, its position is under the sub-district. In terms of politics, the village is understood as a government organization as well as a power organization that politically has certain authority because it is part of the state government (Maschab, 2013; Raharja, 2021). Law Number 6 of 2014 defines a village as a legal community unit that has territorial boundaries that are authorized to regulate and manage government affairs, local community interests based on community initiatives, rights of origin, and traditional rights that are recognized and respected in the government system of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Village government is carried out based on village autonomy. This condition will provide flexibility for the village to organize and regulate the government in the village and be able to carry out village head elections (*Pilkades*).

Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 112 of 2014 defines head of village election (Pilkades) as the exercise of people's sovereignty in the village to elect village heads who are direct, public, free, confidential, honest, and fair. This momentum is an opportunity for elite circulation in village governance. Pilkades became an important political event for the village (Yani, 2022). The magnet to become a village head is strengthened when the central government gives villages a very large space to manage their government, which is supported by the transfer of village funds from the central government through local governments to finance all governments (Hilmawan, 2022); Princess, 2020) This builds the assumption that the village head becomes a position of prestige and can bring financial benefits. So, every community member who becomes a candidate for village head will try to win the election contestation by building networks within the community through political brokers.

Political brokers are inevitable in every election agenda, legislative elections, presidential election, regional head elections, and village head elections. Many candidates in the race can win contests because of the work of political brokers. Post-reform in Indonesia, the position of brokers is very important in every political strategy implementation (M. Fachri Ilham Akbar, 2019; Pratitaswari & Wardani, 2020; Harnom et al., 2019). The role of political brokers greatly determines every victory of the contestants. Political brokers were originally a profession, namely intermediaries, liaisons, and brokers in the business world (Haridison, 2022). The Big Dictionary Indonesian defines a broker as an intermediary that connects one trader with another trader in terms of buying and selling or between sellers and buyers of shares. Broker can be said to be a profession in the world of marketing. In carrying out their role, brokers provide their services to execute client orders, which are paid in various ways, either through commissions, fees, or paid by the exchange (Cameliawati, 2020; Fauzia, 2021; Hidayaturrahman et al., 2022; Muhammad, 2019). Contextualized in the development of electoral democracy, brokers become important actors to connect candidates with voters.

Studies on political brokers in Indonesia, in general, have been many. First, some literature tries to explain the role of political brokers in bureaucratic institutions, such as bureaucratic officials who become brokers in winning Partai Golongan Karya (Liddle, 1992) and public officials who become brokers in budget mafia practices (Hamudy & Rais, 2014). Second, some literature that tries to explain the role of brokers in winning political parties, presidential elections, and regional elections, including the cartelization of political parties in Indonesia, which has a material distribution that ignores party ideology (Ambardi, 2009), the victory of Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia in Bitung City in the 2009 election cannot be separated from relying on political brokers (Palenewen, 2014). Furthermore, political brokers in election organizers have the potential to increase fraud in election results (Pratitaswari & Wardani, 2020), and the role of brokers in winning regional elections in the context of local politics: local political characteristics of Abangan Areas (Widyarini, 2022), and the occurrence of money political practices and relying on brokers in winning elections and regional elections (Aspinall, E., & Sukmajati, 2015; Aspinall, E., & Berenschot, 2019; Abbiyyu, 2020).

Unlike studies related to the phenomenon of brokers in general, this paper wants to explain the role of brokers in the context of village head elections in Central Kalimantan. This research was conducted to fill the gap in research related to the study of broker work on the village head election agenda, which is still lacking, and the lack of locality-based political studies in Central Kalimantan. The phenomenon of political brokerage practice certainly has its uniqueness in each region. Its uniqueness is found in local terms based on broker practices in several regions, such as "Botoh" in Java, "Calo" in Manado, and other terms in each other region, taking the locus of research in Sanggan Village and Rantau Bangkiang Village. These two villages are in Central Kalimantan Province, and this paper wants to answer big questions about the role of brokers in winning candidates for their respective village heads and the work patterns of brokers in the election of village heads. Furthermore, what are the supporting and inhibiting factors for brokers in the Pilkades of Sanggan Village and Rantau Bangkiang Village?

RESEARCH METHOD

This research used qualitative methods with a case study approach to explain the role of brokers in winning village head candidates in Sanggan Village and Rantau Bangkiang Village and

broker work patterns in the selection of village heads as well as what factors support and inhibit brokers in the Sanggan Village and Rantau Bangkiang Village Elections. The selection of informants in this study was carried out by purposive sampling, where the informant is selected subjectively with the intention that the selected informant has the information necessary for the research (Bryman, 2016; Creswell, 2016). The informants in this research were participants in the Sanggan Village and Rantau Bangkiang Village Pilkada contestations, the successful team of village head candidates who were brokers, and the community involved in the Village Head Election. The data used included primary data and secondary data. Primary data was obtained directly through in-depth observations and interviews to explore deeper information about the role of brokers in winning the candidate for village head. Secondary data came from literature studies and documentation related to the phenomenon of brokers in the election of village heads. The collected data were analyzed descriptively and qualitatively by describing and explaining the results in spoken and written words from several qualitative data. The data obtained is expressed in questions, responses, and interpretations obtained from observations, interviews, and literature studies to clarify the picture of research results.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Interpreting Brokers in Client Patrons

The study of the role of political brokers requires a set of concepts to frame and analyze data findings in the field. The first concept used is the patron-client concept. This concept helps in analyzing the relationship patterns between candidates as patrons and voters as clients. Second, the concept of a Political Broker will later provide an overview of the role and position of brokers in the election of village heads. Patronage and Clientelism are two concepts that are often difficult to distinguish.

On the one hand, some social scientists equate the two concepts (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). Furthermore, some scientists distinguish between the two concepts. Aspinall, E., & Sukmajati, 2015 try to distinguish between patronage and Clientelism. They argued that patronage refers to the material or other benefits distributed by politicians to voters or supporters. In contrast, Clientelism refers to the character of relations between politicians and voters or supporters.

Furthermore, understanding patronage and Clientelism must understand the clash of patron-client concepts. Conceptually, Political Brokers are a network of intermediaries that connect candidates and voters. Aspinall and Sukmajati (2015) described brokers at the grassroots level as formal and informal figures and ordinary community members. The role of the broker will be to work with the candidate to win the candidate in the contest. They will also distribute the candidate's political resources to voters to gain support from the community.

Scott (1972) provides an overview of the patron-client concept based on political systems in the Southeast Asian region. According to Scott, a patron relates to a group that has an influential figure in providing security guarantees and persuasion. Clients, who are individuals, become followers of the group to give support and loyalty to patrons. The image of the patron-client is that the patron gives protection and assurance while the client gives loyalty. In terms of socioeconomic status, patrons are higher than clients. Scott also shares the characteristics of relationships between patron clients. First, there is an imbalanced relationship between the two parties, observed from the gap in wealth, power, and status. Both are face-to-face relationships or personal relationships between patrons and clients. The relationship will build a sense of solidarity and trust so that patrons and clients can build an emotional bond. Third, there is a relationship of flexibility. This relationship relates to the exchange of resources between patrons and clients, which varies greatly over time. The picture of the relationship above is very clearly related in the context of elections, that every candidate who is a patron will give resources to voters as clients to get voters' votes. Aspinall, E., & Sukmajati, 2015, the resources provided can be variants in the practice of money politics.

When the candidate's goal is to get as much support as possible in the election contest, the patron will form a network of groups. Scott, 1972 mentions two forms of patron-client groups. First, the group that is built has a direct relationship between candidates and voters. This form of group is called the Patron Client Cluster. Second, groups are formed in stages at each level. The

pattern of relationships between candidates and voters in this group is indirect but has intermediaries. This form of group is called the patron-client pyramid. Forming groups with the second model provides a great opportunity for brokers to play a role in building scientific networks between candidates and voters. Will the candidate build a network with a new broker, or will the candidate build a network using the network that has been built in the community? As Tomsa, D., & Ufen, 2013 pointed out, patron-clients in electoral practice cannot be separated from political brokers.

The discussion of political brokers cannot be separated from the concept of Clientelism in the network to mobilize voters. The question arises: Who is the political broker? Stokes, Duning, (Nazareno & Brusco, 2013) define a broker as a person who can provide solutions for candidates to seek political support. Certain positions of brokers have a strong influence and have followers. Understandably, most brokers are not ordinary, powerless members of society but reliable elites. The position of the broker is very decisive in determining the relationship between candidates and voters. Aspinall, E., & Sukmajati, 2015 said brokers are usually formal, informal figures or ordinary community members. The main task of the broker is to persuade their neighbors and acquaintances to vote for the candidate. For Aspinall and Sukmajati, the efforts made by brokers to voters are in the form of providing resources, both in the form of politics and money, as well as patronage resources in other forms. The urgency of brokers is applied to gain compliance from voters to candidates in the form of votes.

In maintaining the relationship between candidates and voters, Aspinall and Sukmajati are to form a pure clientelistic network to ensure that the relationship is built not just for the short term but for the long term. Furthermore, according to Aspinall and Sukmajati, three forms of broker networks are used. First is the Success team; candidates mostly use this form. Almost all candidates who fought in both the Pilkades, Pilkada, Presidential Election, and Pileg had successful teams. The structure of this first form is very neat, has a working territory, and is building a network resembling multilevel marketing. Second, social networking machines; this form is to rely on influential public figures. The figure of this society as an elite has a mass. They often have formal positions such as village head, neighborhood, religious groups, ethnic organizations, and sports clubs. They also occupy informal positions such as village elders, kinship leaders, traditional leaders, and people considered important to their communities. Third, political parties; however, political parties have a very minimal role in organizing campaigns. However, political parties have little role in vote mobilization, especially for candidates who become political party administrators at that level or brokers occupying as political party administrators. It becomes commonplace when political parties carry out their functions amid society both as a means of political socialization and political communication.

Political Broker in Winning Set as Sangal Village Head

Winning the Village Head Election is a dream for every village head candidate. Each candidate's political strategy is well-planned and executed. Social and political capital is highlighted as a magnet for conducting campaigns to gain public sympathy. And almost every candidate builds networks in the community and relies on influential figures to build political power. Sangal Village is one of the villages in Central Kalimantan located in Gunung Mas Regency. Dayak *Ngaju's* culture and customs are highly maintained in community activities. Historically, Sangal village is estimated to have existed since the 18th century, which began with a residential settlement located on the right side of the Rungan River, facing west (*Dayak ngaju, "Naharep Matan Andau Belep"* Indonesian "Facing the Sunset"). The area is 29,000 Ha and has a total population of 490 people. Socio-political dynamics are quite conducive amid the condition of a society that is homogeneous in ethnic aspects (Dayak tribe) but heterogeneous in religion. Sangal village government territory has 1 Hamlet (Rukun Warga), which is divided into 3 Neighborhoods (Rukun Tetangga).

The election in Sangal village was held on November 17, 2021. The election agenda starts on August 12, 2021, namely the agenda for the formation of the headman election committee until the last agenda on March 9, 2022, namely the Inauguration of the elected Village Head (Stage of Election Committee, 2021). In the event, 3 candidates became candidates for village head, including Set Hull, Aket Merang, and Sedan. The number of registered voters was 325.

Table 1. Permanent Voter List

Permanent Voters List	Neighbourhood (RT 01)	Neighbourhood (RT 02)	Neighbourhood (RT 03)	Number of Voters
325	105	118	102	325

Source: Sangal Village Election Committee 2021

Set's victory in the Pilkades became an interesting phenomenon when it was able to outperform the other two candidates. The three candidates can be said to be newcomers competing. This context becomes fiercer in the fight to win the Pilkades. Set as a local elite became the candidate for village head Number 2. Vision and Mission offered "Sangal Maju, Bahalap, Hayak Harati". The potential resources possessed by Set as a candidate, namely having human resources with a Bachelor level of education, have experience in government when he became a temporary Kades official. Potential resources become important for a candidate in gaining loyalty (Adrain, in Haryanto, 2005). The nomination of the village head by Set, thus positioning him as a patron to give his resources to the community, as a political commodity to gain the sympathy of the community.

In mobilizing voters for victory, Set cannot be separated from the presence of brokers. The role of the broker is very important in any election momentum. Brokers still color every election agenda (Aspinall, E., & Berenschot, 2019). Set relies on a network of political brokers in the form of a successful team, some people who are tasked with carrying out every work of victory efforts and social networking machines, Mr. Singkang, a community leader in Sangal Village. Mr. Singkang's role as a broker was strengthened when he became the leader of the Success Team. The appointment of Mr. Singkang by Set is because he has a great influence on the community in Sangal village due to having a large family network and community leaders who have integrity. Even interestingly, Mr. Singkang did not live in Sangal Village, but his influence and network were wide in Sangal Village.

Furthermore, the role of Mantir, who is a traditional figure, became the successful team Set and greatly influenced Set's victory. It is known that the mentor position is respected and has considerable influence. Moreover, this is strong in the contest for approval from Dayak customary institutions. One side of this will get attention from people who strongly hold Dayak customs.

Family networks in Sangal village, as an informal organization, become a successful team. The emotional connection and kinship for Set were crucial in gaining support for him to become village chief. Mr. Set's family ties certainly have an impact on direct support for him, and the family will be a successful team in influencing other communities. While successful teams are identical to receiving direct rewards that are money, successful teams based on emotional connection in this form realize money politics or rewards. The presence of this successful team tends to be voluntary, and its work is very optimal. In general, in every election, the provision of resources by candidates to voters is often carried out to become a tool exchanged for support in the form of sound. These resources are often used in the form of vote buying (money or goods), club goods, pork barrels, and constituency services (Aspinall, E., & Sukmajati, 2015). This variant of patronage is carried out in every campaign. In gaining the support of the Sangal village community, brokers distribute patron resources to the community in the form of money. The art of Vote buying became the variant chosen by both Set and his successful team. The nominal distribution is Rp. 50,000 per voter. This amount is relatively small compared to money politics in local elections and elections. However, under any circumstances, the community still accepts the money for various reasons and rationalizations. Money has become a transaction tool for obtaining public votes because, for Set, the current condition of the community is more in need of money—the most relevant when the community is still affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, the community has a precedent that distributing money is considered a natural thing done by candidates for village head.

The strategy carried out by Mr. Singkang and other Success Teams in winning Mr. Set was to carry out conventional mapping of political power with the term *Telik Sandi*. This method is used to find out how much initial power sets have with the hope that their work can be measured and be on target. In distributing money to the community, that is, directly entering from house to house to give money. Money is given to people registered in the electoral roll. The giving of this money is done very carefully by successful candidates and teams. They make sure the accepting community does not inform others to prevent violations against them. Politic's promise is one of the most

powerful resources in building a network of Zet as a candidate with brokers as well as to the community. The broker certainly does not necessarily seem voluntaristic but receives benefits from the work done. Set promised Pak Singkang and other teams for the improvement of village government in the future. In addition to being assumed, the broker gets operational money to do his job.

Furthermore, Mr. Singkang and other Success Teams continue to convey political promises to the community. It departs from the community and is related to the poor services of the previous village government. For brokers and successful teams, this is a crucial point in embracing the community with political offers and promises from the candidate set. Before the campaign and arriving at the agenda of the campaign, the issue of changes to village government services was conveyed. For the community, what is conveyed by the broker can be realized for the future of Sangal Village.

Sustainability in the promises of political promises is created through the political communication between Mr. Set, Mr. Singkang, and other Success Teams. Political communication is generally understood as the process of communicators delivering political messages to the public so that the community can be influenced. In conducting political communication, communicators must have the ability and skills to convey the content of political promises. Even apart from that, the communicator must have power over the message to be conveyed. Mr. Singkang and other successful teams build political communication with each community. Although in terms of work, Mr. Singkang is only a landfill employee, because of his character and skills, he can influence the community. The broker network that was built in the selection of Han was dominant because Mr. Set was able to rely on Mr. Singkang as an influential figure and family kinship network from Set himself. A patron-client network is formed in the pyramid cluster because candidates rely on influential individuals in Sangal village. Even candidates rely on family networks that have been built. The broker's work paid off when he was able to win the candidate to become the head of the Village. The victory achieved in the count is significant because it gained more than 50% votes even when Mr. Set competed with two other pairs of candidates. Relying on a broker and a successful team is a candidate's strategy for winning contests.

Table 2. Recapitulation of the 2021 Sangal Election Votes

No Sort	Nominee Name	Voting Place			Abstainer	Invalid Votes
		Vote Gain	Percentage	Permanent Voters List		
1	Aket	35	13,25 %	325	58	3
2	Set	147	55,69 %			
3	Sedan	82	31,06 %			
Total		264	100 %			

Source: Sangal Village Election Committee 2021

Broker in Winning Akhmad Rianto in Rantau Bangkiang Village

Rantau Bangkiang Village is an expansion village from the main village in 2008. Compared to Sangal village, this village is still relatively young. Geographically, this village is included in an urban cluster adjacent to the sub-district center, namely Sanaman Mantikei and Katingan Regency. The total area is 2700 km. Administratively, this village has 3 Neighbourhoods (RT)—population 2082 inhabitants. Social culture is strongly influenced by Dayak customs and Muslim traditions, which are the majority religion in Rantau Bangkiang village. Human resources vary but are dominated by people who graduated from elementary school and below. Furthermore, the economic condition of the people of Rantau Bangkiang village is relatively stable because it has qualified natural resource potential, where the community manages the potential of natural resources to meet the needs of daily life. The Rantau Bangkiang village election was held simultaneously with other villages in Katingan Regency on November 23, 2021. This event was attended by four candidates for village head, consisting of 1 incumbent, Marsaku, and 3 newcomers (newcomers) among them. Puri Haryanto, Ambrulah and Akhmad Rinto. The number of voters registered on the Permanent Voters List was 385.

Table 3. Permanent Voter List of Rantau Bangkiang Village

No	Neighbourhood	Elector		Sum
		Man	Woman	
1.	01	75	80	155
2.	02	50	77	127
3.	03	30	73	103
	Total	155	230	385

Source: Rantau Bangkiang Village Election Committee 2021

Akhmad Rinto's victory in the Pilkades contestation became interesting when he defeated another candidate, specifically the incumbent, Marsaku. In general, the government could win by mastering the government's bureaucratic network. In winning the contest, of course, the candidate must have resources as a modality in the fight. According to Charles Adrain, resources are commodities that influence society to realize compliance (Haryanto, 2005). The figure of Rinto, as the winning candidate, is indeed a native of the village of Rantau Bangkiang, is actively involved in community social activities, and is generous in the lives of the village community. It is certainly a capital to contest in the elections or become a potential power.

Brokers still color the winning process of Rinto as village head because brokers have a great influence on community groups and understanding of a particular social environment in which to approach people. Mr. Dagung and Mr. Isikman became a successful team in winning Mr. Rinto. These two figures were chosen because they have a great influence on society. The second is a respected Muslim figure, of course, in the number of Muslims that many of the villagers of Rantau Bangkiang are. It is important in the emotional relationship between brokers and the community. Both brokers work as retirees and workers at the port of crossing. Although they do not have strategic positions in religion, such as *imam* or *ustad*, both brokers are always involved in Islamic religious activities. Their activity in religion brings good judgment to the community, especially Muslims as community leaders. Their character became a big capital in influencing the community to support Rinto.

The agenda of the Pilkades in Rantau Bangkiang village is much based on clientelistic relations. Third parties usually mediate Tomsa, D., & Ufen, 2013 Clientelistic relationships. The key elements of clientelistic transactions are quantity (routine interaction between patron and lien), status inequality, reciprocity, and voluntariness. The resources used by both brokers in winning Rinto as a candidate for village head include the modalities owned by the candidate. It is what continues to be sold to the public, like the generosity of Rinto. Every candidate who nominates a village head must certainly have resources to be used as capital. Although not a wealthy candidate, Tapir Into is very generous. Economic resources were used by Rinto and Broker, such as donating materials to mosques and repairing village roads. As stated by Aspinnal and Sukmajati, this is a form of club goods because candidates use this patronage tool to address social groups rather than individuals.

Indeed, this is considered appropriate for electoral activity in rural communities because it is considered a good and religious candidate. Furthermore, the two brokers divide the candidate's resources by distributing necessities such as rice, cooking oil, and soap. These resources are carried out on a dor-to-dor basis in people's homes. Aspinal and Sukmajati refer to this empowerment as an individual gift due to personal giving to voters directly when meeting with voters, either making visits to homes or during campaigns. This gift is not in the form of money but in the form of foodstuffs or household needs. Of the many patronage variants delivered by Asspinal and Sukmajati, Rianto and the successful team prefer to use club goods and individual gifts.

Interestingly, candidates do not use vote buying because they are considered not good in the election process. Indeed, for the community in general, assistance such as necessities and other material assistance is not considered money politics. Compared to voice buying, such as in Dawn Raid.

Identity politics, on the other hand, became an instrument of political campaigning used by brokers as a primordial bond. Of the candidates, only Rianto is a native of the tribe and village of Rantau Bangkiang. The broker considers that he understands the condition of the village best and is worthy of leading the village. The issue of campaigning about indigenous people is often heard

in every election agenda, especially in regional elections and elections. After the 2017 regional elections in DKI Jakarta, political nuances in political constellations became a political weapon for candidates to gain public support. It is also a powerful weapon for Rianto's successful team to win public sympathy. The performance of Rianto's broker received a good response from the public, and it could bring victory to Akhad Rianto in the head village election.

Table 4. Results of the Rantau Bangkiang Village Head Election

No	Name	Gaining Votes
1.	Haryanto Castle	31
2.	My Marsaku	19
3.	Collapse	73
4.	Akhmad Rinto	186
5.	Invalid Votes	4
6.	Not Selecting	72
Total Votes		309

Source: Rantau Bangkiang Village Election Committee 2021

Broker Benefits in Sanggan Village and Rantau Bangkiang Head Village Elections

IDEA (2016) argues that in many Asian countries, clientelistic networks connect politicians with voters through the exchange of gifts or money for political support. This phenomenon happened in the election of the village head. Broker in the election of village heads in the hope that it will bring victory to candidates. The presence of brokers certainly brings benefits to candidates, including political messages conveyed by carrying out various campaign activities to the public. Furthermore, mobilizing masses with the resources owned by candidates by using forms of patronage such as vote buying, individual gifts, constituency service, and pork barrels. However, in certain situations, mass mobilization uses the resources owned by the broker because the broker works volintaristically. Boker work for candidates is based on patron-client relationships. Specifically in the form of patron-client pyramid relationships, the relationship between candidates and society indirectly. Brokers are relied on because they have the influence or capability to invite the community as done by Pak Singkang in winning the Set in Pilakdes Sanggal Village and Pak Dagung and Pak Isikman in winning Akhad Rianto in the Rantau Bangkiang Village Pilkades. The above brokers connect candidates with the community and distribute candidate resources to voters. However, sometimes, for brokers, their political work may not necessarily be able to bring victory in the contestation of candidates.

In carrying out activities as political brokers, successful teams usually expect profits from candidates. Benefits are often capital for brokers in campaigning to voters. In general, the benefits received by brokers are in the form of resources from candidates, such as money, goods, or other forms that candidates directly give before carrying out campaign activities. However, in certain cases, the broker does not obtain resources from the candidate before the campaign. However, the candidate promises the broker something to receive resources or profits when the candidate wins the contest. In elections in Sanggal village and Rantau Bangkiang village, the benefits received by brokers are not in the form of money and goods but in the form of political promises by candidates where their interests can be accommodated in village development. Benefits for brokers are always present in elections, regional elections, and elections. When compared in the context of elections and regional elections, brokers receive tremendous benefits, such as operating money and goods, not to mention the offers of positions by candidates to whom brokers allot positions. Unlike Head Village, the benefits obtained by brokers are not as much as those received by brokers in elections and elections. Brokers win candidates in elections because they are based on kinship, usually volunteers, and get promises to be involved in the village development agenda.

CONCLUSION

Brokers are not only present in elections and regional elections but also in village head elections. The victory of candidates in the elections cannot be separated from the role of brokers who bridge between candidates and the community. The victory of village heads in the two

villages that became the locus of research was influenced by the performance of brokers who were known as community leaders and had a strong influence on the community. In encouraging broker candidates to conduct political campaigns and carry out forms of patronage variants, political propaganda to the public, vote buying by dividing money, individual gifts, and club goods, namely by distributing necessities to each family and helping houses of worship and street facilities. The benefits obtained from the broker in winning candidates, namely, to accommodate the interests of the broker during village government. Furthermore, brokers also have confidence that they influence society in social conditions. Although the role of brokers is identical to obtaining profits from candidates, in this condition, the benefits of brokers are not much because their presence in winning candidates is voluntaristic.

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