Ethnic Fractionalization and Polarization in New Capital City of Nusantara, Indonesia: Analysis of Potential Conflict

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Article Info

Abstract: This study analyzes ethnic fractionalization and polarization in the new Indonesian Capital of Nusantara (IKN), with a focus on the potential for ethnic conflict as the government directs significant resources towards its development. Data was collected from 54 villages within IKN territory over five months and analyzed quantitatively. The findings show a high ethnic fractionalization index of 0.79 and a slightly high polarization index of 0.61, indicating a moderate risk of conflict. However, the ethno-demographic and ethnopolitical conditions remain conducive to supporting IKN's development. While previous research has addressed ethnic conflict in Indonesia, few studies have examined its implications for major national projects like IKN's development. This study offers a new quantitative perspective on how ethnic diversity influences large-scale governmental projects, highlighting the role of ethnic fractionalization and polarization in shaping the stability of IKN's development. Although such a polarization index indicates the potential for conflict being slightly high, the ethno-demographic and ethnopolitical condition in IKN is still relatively conducive to providing supporting capacity to IKN development, viewed from a statistical and ethnopolitical perspective.

Keywords: *Ethnic fractionalization; ethnic polarization; potential conflict; IKN*

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is a country with a diverse ethnic makeup, comprising 633 distinct ethnic groups. When sub-ethnic groups are taken into account, the total number of ethnic/sub-ethnic groups in the country amounts to 1333 (Arifin et al., 2015). In East Kalimantan alone, there are 274 ethnic groups. When sub-ethnic groups are also taken into account, its total number reaches the figure of 434 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups (BPS, 2010), making it a province with a rich multi-ethnic heritage.

Ethnicity issues in Kalimantan are very prominent because of the high level of ethnic solidarity. This high level of ethnic solidarity had cost many lives in the West Kalimantan conflicts in 1999-2000. This bloody conflict then spread to Central Kalimantan in 2001 and claimed many lives. At that time, many were worried that the conflict in these two provinces would spread to East Kalimantan. Since the ethnic conflict did not reach East Kalimantan due to several factors (de Jonge & Nooteboom, 2006), many people are of the view that ethnopolitics in East Kalimantan, especially ethnic solidarity, is very different from that in the two provinces. What is even more confusing is the view that ethnic conflict has never occurred, or is highly unlikely to occur, in East Kalimantan. In fact, several ethnic conflicts have occurred in East Kalimantan, such as in Tarakan

(when it was part of East Kalimantan), West Kutai, Berau, Paser, and North Penajam Paser. Thus, East Kalimantan does have some traces of ethnic tension and ethnic conflict.

The Indonesian government and Parliament have decided to relocate the national capital from Jakarta to East Kalimantan through law No.3/2022 on State Capital (IKN), which was later amended by law No.21/2023. The IKN area was taken from two districts, namely Kutai Kartanegara (Kukar) and North Penajam Paser District (PPU). The IKN area is 252,660 hectares and administratively consists of 7 sub-districts and 54 existing villages with a population of 201,259 people in 2023. PPU contributed 16 villages within two sub-districts, while that of Kukar 38 villages within five sub-districts.

Considering that East Kalimantan has traces of ethnic conflicts, the relocation of the Indonesian capital to East Kalimantan raises concern as to whether the IKN region has the potential for ethnic conflict or not. This concern needs to be addressed, as ethnic riots have occurred in North Penajam Paser, certain parts of which now come within the IKN territory.

Ethnic tensions and the potential for ethnic conflict can be traced from the conditions of ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization. Research on this, covering the entire area of the IKN, has never been carried out. For this reason, this research will try to map its ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization. This research will academically contribute to providing baseline data on ethnicity and the potential for conflict in the IKN area. Practically, the results of this research can be used as material for decision-making by the IKN Authority (*Otorita* IKN) to anticipate and mitigate ethnic problems, including widely discussed indigenous people issues, so that IKN development can run smoothly or without significant obstacles.

In the history of conflict studies, both vertical conflict (state-society conflict) and horizontal conflict (society-society conflict), including ethnic conflict, there are two schools of thought that contest diametrically, namely grievance-driven conflict vs greed-driven conflict. The first argues that conflict results from feelings of alienation, relative deprivation, oppression, neglect, and the like. This continuous oppression and neglect fosters ethnic hatred, resentment, anger, complaints, and frustrations (Gurr, 1973, 1993; Rutaremara et al., 2000; Singer, 1992; Wanigasooriya, 1997). If certain incidents spark these grievances, they can give rise to resistance and open and prolonged conflict. This school of thought is often called a school of thought that sees conflicts as grievance-driven conflicts.

Collier and Hoeffler, through their international study cases with a quantitative approach, then offered a new approach to viewing prolonged conflicts in all parts of the world. From empirical cases of 161 countries, they found that grievance was not the main factor driving conflict but greed. The results of the statistical analysis concluded that "greed outperforms grievances" as a driver of conflict. The greed of the conflict/rebellion leaders is what triggers and perpetuates the conflict. Conflict/rebellion leaders indeed spread grievances. However, this was done to recruit followers for free (in contrast to government recruitment, which is expensive). However, the money generated from the conflict (diamonds, gems, timber, oil, etc.) is used to fulfill the greed of the conflict leaders (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2004). This new finding from Collier gave birth to a school of thought that sees conflict as greed-driven conflict.

Following Collier and Hoeffler's work, there was a growing number of research on various types of conflicts under the umbrella of greed and grievance issues in the conflicts. Some use both greed and grievance variables, while others emphasize grievance only (Denny & Walter, 2014; Dowd, 2015; Hoth & Mengal, 2016; Sizoo et al., 2022) or greed only (Lee, 2020; Spittaels, 2021). Sousa (2016) agreed with the greed and grievance model but introduced other factors, such as leadership and external intervention. Nevertheless, criticism of Collier and Hoeffler's work also exists. Laurie Nathan (2005, 2008) strongly criticized Collier and Hoeffler's work by stating that the results of their research are unreliable, as they used a subjective selection of proxy variables/indicators in their work, making their results and conclusions unreliable. Some scholars were dissatisfied with the dichotomic explanation and proposed a revision of the model. Vinci (2006), for instance, suggested that the primary motivation of survival is one of the superior explanations of the conflict.

Collier and Hoeffler have acknowledged the critiques of their work and stated that their research has called into question the importance of motivation, which was previously emphasized in their work (Collier et al., 2009). However, they have also pointed out that since their original research (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2004), the literature, data, and their thinking have

advanced considerably. In their later work, Collier et al. have expanded their argument by introducing a "feasibility" factor in addition to greed and grievance. They argue that for rebellions or civil wars to occur and sustain for a longer period, the rebel groups require both financial and military feasibility (Collier et al., 2009).

The greed and grievance theory was initially developed to analyze rebellions and civil wars, but it has since been applied to many other types of conflicts. In the case of Indonesia, Tadjoedin and Chowdhury researched violent conflicts and found that grievances resulting from relative deprivation, horizontal inequality, and marginalization can act as conflict drivers. The greed hypothesis of conflict in natural resource-rich regions does not seem to be as strong an explanation (Tadjoeddin & Chowdhury, 2009). Furthermore, Gunawan (2010) used the greed and grievance theory to analyze conflicts over forest resources between indigenous people (Dayak ethnic groups) and forest companies (forest concessionaire/HPH and industrial timber estate/HTI) in East Kalimantan. He found that grievance motives were strong in driving the conflict. The greed issue only applied to certain individual (*oknum*) in the resolution process, while for common people, economic motives such as cash compensation demands were quite prominent.

In ethnically diverse societies, greed and grievance theory cannot fully explain three interesting phenomena. First, some areas have been prone to conflict for a long time. Second, there are areas where people live together peacefully without any conflict. Third, there are also areas where conflicts arise and subside repeatedly after a short or long period. These phenomena have piqued the curiosity of scholars. The focus shifted towards the structure of ethnicity. Initially, the studies focused on ethnic diversity in terms of ethnic heterogeneity. It is commonly believed that ethnic conflict occurs in societies with ethnically heterogeneous societies (Vanhanen, 2012, 2014). As many ethnically diverse societies do not experience ethnic conflicts, other scholars focused on ethnic fractionalization, which is a part of ethnic diversity or heterogeneity, and argued that it is ethnic fractionalization that relates to conflict (Alesina et al., 2003; Campos et al., 2009; Steele et al., 2022; Wegenast & Basedau, 2014). As "most of the literature fails to find any significant evidence of ethnic fractionalization as a determinant of conflict" (Esteban & Ray, 2008), some experts suggested giving more attention to ethnic polarization (Esteban & Ray, 2008; Klašnja & Novta, 2016; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2002, 2005) because ethnic fractionalization does not take into account ethnic distance and antagonism. They argued that the higher the polarization, the higher the potential for conflict (Esteban & Ray, 2008; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2002). Despite that, ethnic fractionalization is regarded as important in providing initial features toward polarization. This school of thought later proposes two parameters of ethnicity that must be considered to examine ethnic conflict, namely ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization. They also assert that these two parameters can be quantified.

Studies related to ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization have been carried out at the international and single-country levels, both concerning conflict or non-conflict. For instance, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005) discussed ethnic polarization and civil war. Bleaney & Dimico (2017) analyzed ethnic composition at the regional and national levels concerning ethnic polarization and ethnic conflict. Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2002), as well as Papyrakis & Mo (2014), discussed ethnic fractionalization, polarization, and economic growth. Nissan & Naghshpour (2013) highlighted the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and polarization with corruption. Python et al. (2017), on the other hand, examined ethnic polarization and terrorism, and Shoup (2018) discussed ethnic polarization and democratic practices.

In Indonesia, research on ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization has received considerable attention. However, what has been done is to link it to ethnic diversity in general (Ananta et al., 2016), social capital (Sanjaya, 2022), economic development, migration, and economic growth (Ananta et al., 2023) as well as expenditure inequality (Budi, 2020). Furthermore, previous studies on ethnic diversity have been limited to the district or city level, as the microdata provided by BPS on ethnicity only extends to that level. This research, however, will address ethnic conflict using baseline data at the village level within the IKN area, offering a more granular analysis of the issue.

This study utilizes recent developments in conflict theory, specifically ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization, to examine their relationship with potential conflict. The research questions aligned with the authors' objectives are as follows: first, what is the extent of ethnic fractionalization and polarization in the IKN area? Second, to what degree does the potential

for ethnic conflict exist in IKN? Third, are the ethno-demographic and ethnopolitical conditions conducive to supporting IKN's development?

RESEARCH METHOD
Research Sites
This research was conducted in the new Indonesian Capital of Nusantara (IKN), the area of which used to be parts of Kutai Kartanegara (Kukar) and North Penajam Paser (PPU) Districts, East Kalimantan Province. The total area of IKN is 252,660 hectares, consisting of 54 villages (*desa/kelurahan*) under seven sub-districts, where PPU contributes 16 villages and Kukar 38 villages. The research was carried out in all of these 54 villages (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Research Sites

Note: Kukar = Kutai Kartanegara District; PPU = Penajam Paser Utara/North Penajam Paser District; IKN = Ibu Kota Nusantara/Capital City of Nusantara; Desa = village with autonomy; Kelurahan (Kel.) = urban village without autonomy

Types of Research, Data Collection and Analysis
This study employs a quantitative approach to explain the observed phenomenon. The collected data are mainly numerical, collected by the authors, and assisted by many enumerators through field surveys in 54 villages across the IKN area from July to November 2023. This study also uses library research and interviews to obtain the necessary or related data and information (Adlini et al., 2022; Almalki, 2016; Disman et al., 2017). The numerical data is analyzed by using quantitative methods (Apuke, 2017), namely EFI and EPOI statistical formulas, correlation, regression, and path analyses.

This research used the following criteria (Table 1) to categorize any village based on ethnicity, whether ethnically homogenous or heterogeneous.

Table 1. Homogeneity and Heterogeneity of the Population

No	Percentage of the Largest Ethnic Group	Remarks
1.	≥95%	Homogeneous
2.	80% - 94%	Almost homogeneous
3.	60% - 79%	Less homogeneous
4.	40% - 59%	Less heterogeneous
5.	20% - 39%	Almost heterogeneous
6.	<20%	Heterogeneous

Source: Arifin et al. (2015)

This research used statistical formulas of EFI and EPOI as follows to calculate the Ethnic Fractionalization Index (EFI) and Ethnic Polarization Index (EPOI) at the village level and in the whole IKN area:

$$EFI_j \ = \ 1 \ - \ \sum_{i=1}^{N} S_{ij}^2 \qquad \text{and} \qquad EPOI_j \ = \ 1 \ - \ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left(\frac{0.5 - S_{ij}}{0.5} \right)^2 S_{ij}$$

Where:
   EFIj is the Ethnic Fractionalization Index in region j,
   *EPOI*j is the Ethnic Polarization Index in region j,
   Sij is the proportion of ethnic group i (i= 1...N) in area j
Source: Ananta et al. (2016). Cf. Alesina et al. (2003); Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2002, 2005)

     The EFI and EPOI scores have a range from 0 to 1. The meaning of the EFI and EPOI scores are as follows (Table 2).

Table 2. Scale of Ethnic Fractionalization and Polarization Indices

No.	Scale Index	Remarks
1.	0.00 - 0.05	Extremely low
2.	0.06 - 0.15	Very low
3.	0.16 - 0.25	Low
4.	0.26 - 0.35	Somewhat low
5.	0,36 - 0.45	Slightly low
6.	0.46 - 0.54	Moderate
7.	0,55 - 0.64	Slightly high
8.	0.65 - 0.74	Somewhat high
9.	0.75 - 0.84	High
10.	0.85 - 0.94	Very high
11.	0,95 - 1.00	Extremely high

Source: Based on an 11-point Likert scale, where the initial 0.00-0.05 scale and the last 0.95-1.00 scale are extreme points. For the extreme points (e.g.,≥95%), Cf. Table 1.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Homogeneity/Heterogeneity in the IKN Area
     Field observation and survey were carried out in 54 villages (*desa/kelurahan*) in the IKN area. The survey collected data on the village population by ethnic background. In each village, a complete list of ethnic and sub-ethnic groups is obtained, along with the total population per ethnic or sub-ethnic group. Table 3 simplifies the data presentation.

Table 3. Ethnic Data in the IKN Areas Based on Field Survey

No	Villages (Desa/Kelurahan)	Number of Ethnic Groups	Population	The Largest Ethnic Group Name	Percentage
1	Kelurahan Muara Jawa Ulu	33	12,306	Buginese	21
2	Desa Binuang	18	1,904	Javanese	22
3	Desa Loaduri Ulu	19	9,210	Toraja	22
4	Kelurahan Maridan	21	4,127	Toraja	23
5	Kelurahan Sungai Merdeka	18	7,009	Banjarese	29
6	Desa Sungai Payang	25	3,145	Kutai	30
7	Kelurahan Karya Merdeka	18	6,789	Buginese	33
8	Desa Loaduri Ilir	23	13,535	Javanese	34
9	Kelurahan Muara Jawa Tengah	15	5,225	Banjarese	34
10	Desa Telemow	17	3,917	Toraja	35
11	Kelurahan Teluk Pamedas	25	3,998	Buginese	36
11	Kelurahan Teluk Pamedas	26	3,998	Buginese	36
12	Kelurahan Dondang	17	2,626	Banjarese	37
13	Kelurahan Ambarawang Darat	16	2,578	Javanese	37
14	Kelurahan Pemaluan	11	1,539	Paser	38
15	Kelurahan Salok Api Darat	19	1,804	Buginese	38
16	Kelurahan Ambarawang Laut	15	1,729	Buginese	39
17	Kelurahan Riko	13	2,239	Paser	40
18	Kelurahan Muara Jawa Ilir	13	4,261	Banjarese	45
19	Kelurahan Muara Kembang	17	3,417	Buginese	47
20	Kelurahan Kampung Lama	9	1,967	Banjarese	47
21	Desa Bakungan	22	10,469	Banjarese	48

Table 3. Ethnic Data in the IKN Areas Based on Field Survey (cont')

No	Villages (Desa/Kelurahan)	Number of		The Largest Ethnic Group	
		Ethnic Groups	Population	Name	Percentage
22	Desa Beringin Agung	19	2,088	Javanese	49
23	Kelurahan Muara Sembilang	12	2,430	Buginese	49
24	Kelurahan Sepaku	19	1,888	Javanese	50
25	Kelurahan Mentawir	12	683	Paser	51
26	Kelurahan Sungai Seluang	13	3,825	Banjarese	51
27	Desa Jonggon Desa	21	2,835	Javanese	54
28	Kelurahan Muara Jawa Pesisir	18	9,767	Buginese	58
29	Kelurahan Handil Baru	8	3,735	Banjarese	60
30	Desa Tani Bakti	11	2,128	Buginese	60
31	Kelurahan Tanjung Harapan	16	2,207	Javanese	63
32	Kelurahan Tama Pole	12	501	Banjarese	63
33	Desa Teluk Dalam	12	1,096	Buginese	66
34	Desa Sukaraja	16	3,967	Javanese	66
35	Kelurahan Bukit Merdeka	19	4,731	Buginese	67
36	Kelurahan Handil Baru Darat	12	2,339	Banjarese	67
37	Desa Bumi Harapan	22	1,902	Javanese	69
38	Kelurahan Samboja Kuala	17	5,979	Buginese	70
39	Desa Bukit Raya (Sepaku)	20	2,724	Javanese	71
40	Kelurahan Sanipah	19	5,008	Buginese	71
41	Kelurahan Wonotirto	19	1,920	Javanese	72
42	Kelurahan Margomulyo	15	1,389	Javanese	75
43	Kelurahan Salok Api Laut	11	1,383	Javanese	76
44	Desa Tengin Baru	20	3,411	Javanese	80
45	Kelurahan Argosari	11	742	Javanese	82
46	Desa Karya Jaya	11	1,697	Javanese	83
47	Desa Bukit Raya (Samboja)	10	1,959	Javanese	84
48	Desa Wonosari	8	1,233	Javanese	85
49	Desa Karang Jinawi	18	1,033	Javanese	85
50	Desa Batuah	13	11,255	Buginese	86
51	Desa Sukomulyo	15	2,092	Javanese	87
52	Desa Semoi Dua	15	3,404	Javanese	89
53	Desa Argomulyo	12	3,568	Javanese	95
54	Desa Tani Harapan	9	2,546	Buginese	96
Total			201,259		

Source: Field survey (2023)

Based on Table 3, the percentage of the largest ethnic group in each village varies from the lowest 21% to the highest 96%. The ethnic group with the largest percentage of 21% is almost heterogeneous, while 96% is ethnically homogeneous. The overall typology of the ethnicity of the IKN community can be seen in Figure 2.


Figure 2. Number of Homogenous/Heterogenous Villages in the IKN Area
Source: Authors' calculation based on field survey data (2023)

Thus, in IKN, there are two homogeneous villages with an ethnic percentage of 95% (Argomulyo) and 96% (Tani Harapan). However, overall, 28 villages (52%) have an ethnic composition characterized by a society that tends to be heterogeneous, while 26 villages (48%) tend to be homogeneous.

Of the 102 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups or 73 main ethnic groups in IKN, the Javanese ethnic group is the dominant ethnic group in the villages of IKN, as presented in Figure 3.


Figure 3. Number of Villages by Ethnic Dominance in the IKN Area
Source: Authors' calculation based on field survey data (2023)

The number of villages that the Javanese predominantly populate is 22 (41%); similarly, the Buginese are the majority in 15 villages (28%), while the Banjarese are the dominant group in 10 villages (19%). The Indigenous Paser and Kutai ethnic groups of Kalimantan prevail in numbers only three and one village, respectively (Figure 3).

Ethnic Fractionalization Across Villages

The ethnic fractionalization index (EFI) is calculated using the statistical formula described above to determine the level of ethnic fractionalization in a region. Using the ethnicity dataset in 54 villages in the IKN area, the results of the EFI calculations are presented in Figure 4.


Figure 4. Ethnic Fractionalization Indices Across Villages in the IKN Area
Source: Authors' calculation based on field survey data (2023)

Based on Figure 4, the village with the lowest fractionalization index is Tani Harapan (EFI 0.08), while the village with the highest fractionalization is Binuang (0.88). Meanwhile, villages with a fractionalization level of around 0.5 are Bukit Raya (Sepaku Sub-District), Bumi Harapan, Handil Baru Darat, and so on, which means the fractionalization level is moderate.

Overall, the number of villages whose EFI level ranges from Slightly High to Very High is 32 villages (59%), 8 villages (15%) are Moderate, while those from Slightly Low to Very Low are 14 (26%) (Figure 5). Hence, villages in IKN are dominated by villages whose fractionalization tends to be high.

Figure 5. Number of Villages by EFI Ranks
Source: Authors' calculation based on field survey data (2023)

Ethnic Polarization Across Villages

Using the ethnicity dataset in all IKN areas above, the results of calculating the Ethnic Polarization Index using the EPOI formula can be seen in Figure 6.


Figure 6. Ethnic Polarization Indices by Villages in IKN
Source: Authors' calculation based on field survey data (2023)

Based on Figure 6, the village with the lowest polarization is Tani Harapan (0.16), while the villages with the highest polarization are Muara Sembilang and Kampung Lama (0.88). In ethnopolitical studies, if an area has low polarization, the potential for conflict is low. In contrast, an area with a high level of polarization means the potential for conflict is also high. Meanwhile, villages with a polarization level of around 0.5, such as Bukit Raya (Samboja Sub-District), Muara Jawa Ulu, Argosari, Loaduri Ulu, Karya Jaya, Loaduri Ilir, and so on, are villages with a Moderate level of polarization, which means the potential for conflict is moderate.

Overall, the number of villages with EPOI levels ranging from Slightly High to Very High is 39 villages (72%), 7 villages are Moderate (13%), while those from Slightly Low to Low are 8 (15%) (Figure 7). Hence, the villages in IKN are dominated by villages whose polarization tends to be high.


Figure 7. Number of Villages by EPOI Ranks
Source: Authors' calculation based on field survey data (2023)

Ethnic Fractionalization and Polarization in the New Capital City of Nusantara

Based on the results of ethnic-based field surveys throughout the IKN area, the population of IKN was 201,259 people. The IKN population consists of 102 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups (ethnic categories) or 73 main ethnic groups. Data on the top 10 ethnic groups and their populations are presented in Figure 8.


Figure 8. Number of Population by Ethnicity in IKN
Source: Authors' calculation based on field survey data (2023)

Referring to Figure 8, the largest ethnic group in the IKN region is the Javanese ethnic group, with a population of 61,616 people or 30.62%. In second and third place are the Buginese ethnic group 55,865 (27.76%) and the Banjarese ethnic group 35,678 (17.73%). The Indigenous ethnic groups in East Kalimantan, namely the Kutai, Dayak, and Paser ethnic groups, are in fourth, sixth, and seventh place, respectively. The other ethnic groups in the 10 largest ethnic groups in the IKN

are the Toraja, Sundanese, Madurese, and Batak. Based on the percentage of this largest ethnic group, the IKN population is classified as Almost Heterogeneous.

By using the EFI and EPOI statistical formulas, for 102 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups, the ethnic fractionalization index (EFI) calculation result is 0.79172, and that of the ethnic polarization index (EPOI) is 0.60971. Meanwhile, when using 73 main ethnic groups, the calculation results are 0.79155 for EFI and 0.61026 for EPOI. If rounded, the results are the same, namely 0.79 for EFI and 0.61 for EPOI (Figure 9).


Figure 9. Ethnic Fractionalization and Polarization Indices in IKN
Source: Authors' calculation based on field survey data (2023)

Referring to the results of these calculations, ethnic fractionalization in IKN is high, while ethnic polarization is slightly high. Because the potential for conflict is more related to ethnic polarization (Esteban & Ray, 2008; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2002), the results found that the potential for ethnic conflict is slightly high in IKN.

Underlying "Mechanism" of Fractionalization and Polarization: Path Analysis

The outcomes of ethnic fractionalization and polarization are not consistent or vary from one place to another. There are areas where both high fractionalization and high polarization exist, as well as areas with low fractionalization and low polarization. Additionally, some places have low fractionalization but higher polarization and vice versa. Moreover, out of the 54 villages that have been analyzed, 59% of them have levels of ethnic fractionalization (EFI) that range from slightly high to very high. Similarly, 72% of these villages have levels of ethnic polarization (EPOI) that range from slightly high to very high. This phenomenon raises questions about the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization and the underlying "mechanism" between them. To gain a more comprehensive understanding, other related variables, such as population, ethnic groups, and homogeneity, are also taken into account.

By using data on the number of populations, the number of ethnic groups, homogeneity/heterogeneity (percentage of the largest ethnic group, where original percentages with two decimal places are used) (Table 3), ethnic fractionalization index (Figure 4), and ethnic polarization index (Figure 6), the correlation results of these variables can be seen in Figure 10. The results of this correlation show that:

a) Population size has a positive and significant relationship with the number of ethnic groups (0.497) and ethnic fractionalization (0.287).
b) Population size has a negative and significant relationship with homogeneity (-0.310) and a negative and insignificant relationship with polarization (-0.130).
c) The number of ethnic groups has a positive and significant relationship with fractionalization (0.474) and a positive but not significant relationship with polarization (0.003).
d) The number of ethnic groups has a negative and significant relationship with homogeneity (-0.471).
e) Homogeneity has a negative and significant relationship with fractionalization (-0.978) and has a negative and significant relationship with polarization (-0.355)
f) Ethnic fractionalization has a positive and significant relationship with ethnic polarization (0.456).

		Population	Ethnic Groups	Homogeneity	Fractionalization	Polarization
Population	Pearson Correlation	1	.497**	-.310*	.287*	-.130
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.022	.035	.350
	N	54	54	54	54	54
Ethnic Groups	Pearson Correlation	.497**	1	-.471**	.474**	.003
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000	.983
	N	54	54	54	54	54
Homogeneity	Pearson Correlation	-.310*	-.471**	1	-.978**	-.355**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.022	.000		.000	.009
	N	54	54	54	54	54
Fractionalization	Pearson Correlation	.287*	.474**	-.978**	1	.456**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.035	.000	.000		.001
	N	54	54	54	54	54
Polarization	Pearson Correlation	-.130	.003	-.355**	.456**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.350	.983	.009	.001	
	N	54	54	54	54	54

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Figure 10. Bivariate Correlation of Related Variables
Source: SPSS Results (2023)

The study focused on ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization, and the correlation results can be summarized as follows: first, fractionalization has a significant relationship with population, ethnic groups, homogeneity, and polarization; second, polarization only has a significant relationship with homogeneity and fractionalization.

Correlation only shows the existence of a relationship between two variables. Regression analysis is carried out to determine whether the existing correlation is a causal relationship or not. The regression analysis, in this case, involves four stages. First, the dependent variable is ethnic polarization, while the independent variables are population, ethnic groups, homogeneity, and ethnic fractionalization. Second, the dependent variable is ethnic fractionalization, while the independent variables are population, ethnic groups, and homogeneity. Third, the dependent variable is homogeneity, while the independent variables are population and ethnic groups. Fourth, the dependent variable is ethnic groups, while the independent variable is population.

After performing a regression analysis on SPSS, it was found that five standardized coefficients are significant while the other five are not. A Path Analysis model was created based on these standardized regression coefficients, as illustrated in Figure 11.


Figure 11. Path Analysis Model
Note: The standardized regression coefficients highlighted in green are significant, while others are insignificant

According to Figure 11, ethnic fractionalization is negatively impacted by population and homogeneity. Although the population size has an insignificant impact on fractionalization, the negative effect of the percentage of the largest ethnic group (homogeneity) on ethnic fractionalization is significant. In contrast, the ethnic group variable has a positive but insignificant

effect on ethnic fractionalization. The direct effect of population on fractionalization is -0.030, while its indirect effect through ethnic group and homogeneity is 0.204 (0.497 x -0.421 x -0.973). Since the indirect effect is greater than the direct effect, this suggests the significance of ethnic group and homogeneity variables in the causal association of population on ethnic fractionalization.

When it comes to ethnic polarization, it is negatively and insignificantly influenced by population and ethnic groups but positively and significantly influenced by homogeneity and ethnic fractionalization. The impact of fractionalization on polarization is greater than the impact of homogeneity on polarization. The direct effect is 1.974, while the indirect effect is 2.450 (0.973 x 2.518; the negative coefficient refers to a direction). With the larger effect of indirect causality, this emphasizes the significant role of ethnic fractionalization in this relationship.

Path analysis has the advantage of understanding both direct and indirect effects, as well as the causal mechanisms of the variables (Murti, 2016). In this process, insignificant paths can be eliminated better to understand the underlying mechanisms of the causal relationships. By eliminating the insignificant paths, the pathway mechanism works as follows: In a multi-ethnic region, an increase in population size leads to a higher number of ethnic groups (positive effect: 0.497). This increase then results in a decrease in the percentage of the largest ethnic group, promoting heterogeneity (negative effect: -0.421). The decrease in the percentage of the largest ethnic group will increase fractionalization (negative effect: -0.973), while the polarization follows the decrease (positive effect: 2.518). As the population grows and becomes more ethnically diverse, the number of ethnic groups also increases. This diversity leads to a higher level of ethnic fractionalization, which in turn affects ethnic polarization. The degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity in the population, determined by the population size and number of ethnic groups, plays a significant role in this process. Essentially, changes in population size and the number of ethnic groups can either escalate or mitigate ethnic polarization, depending on the level of homogeneity and fractionalization. In simpler terms, ethnic polarization is not static and can fluctuate based on various factors. In other words, ethnic polarization is dynamic and liable to change under different circumstances.

Discussion

This study has mapped ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization in all IKN areas through the measurement of ethnic fractionalization index (EFI) and ethnic polarization index (EPOI). At the village level, EFI varies widely from very low to very high, while EPOI from low to very high. Overall, at the IKN level, its fractionalization index is 0.79, while its polarization index is 0.61. The polarization score of 0.61 is categorized as slightly high, or its potential conflict is slightly high. With a slightly high risk of conflict, is this ethnic condition still conducive to the current and future development of IKN? Statistically, considering that a "Moderate" or conducive ethnic polarization is in the index range of 0.46-0.54 while "High" is in the range of 0.75-0.84, then the 0.61 index is closer to the Moderate than the High index figure, so it can be said that ethnic demography in IKN is relatively conducive to supporting IKN development.

Politically, the biggest and dominant ethnic group in IKN, Javanese, is well known in East Kalimantan as a low-profile ethnic group that likes to give in and strives to avoid confrontation. With its size, population dominance in most villages, and profile, it is expected that it can play a considerable role in moderating any ethnic-based conflicts. Furthermore, it is also well known that government leaders and the communication forum of all ethnic organizations in East Kalimantan are strongly committed to peace; in fact, they have indeed played a significant role in preventing the spread of the Central Kalimantan conflict to East Kalimantan (de Jonge & Nooteboom, 2006) and in mediating the Tarakan, West Kutai, and PPU conflicts. With the existence of similar ethnic-based forums in the IKN area (e.g., in the Sepaku sub-district), all of these could contribute to establishing a more conducive situation for supporting IKN development. Thus, from an ethnopolitical point of view, the ethnopolitics in IKN areas appear favorable in supporting the IKN development.

In certain IKN areas, villages with high or very high ethnic polarization exist. The question is, why are no conflicts observed? First, ethnic polarization refers to the potential or risks of conflict. With the potential or risk of conflict, conflict may or may not occur. In fact, in the IKN area so far, the potential or risk of conflict does not transform into conflict occurrence. In this regard,

researchers have emphasized that ethnic polarization only shows the potential or risks of conflict (Ananta et al., 2016). Second, the "no conflicts" is the current situation. The possibility of ethnic conflict occurrence in the future is open to discussion. One way to understand its possibility or potential is through historical and cultural perspectives.

In many parts of East Kalimantan, ethnic conflicts have prominently occurred between indigenous ethnic groups and migrant ethnic groups. In IKN, three indigenous ethnic groups of East Kalimantan reside in its area, namely Paser, Kutai, and Dayak. Kutai is the biggest native tribe in IKN in terms of its population. Although the Paser ethnic group is in the spotlight due to its residential areas being in the center of the IKN areas, its total population in IKN is slightly smaller than the Dayak (Figure 8).

The IKN region has a historical connection with the Sultanate of Paser and the Sultanate of Kutai Kartanegara. The Kingdom of Sadurengas, later known as the Sultanate of Paser, was founded in 1516. Its territory included the present-day Paser district, North Penajam Paser district, and some parts of the South Kalimantan province. Following Indonesia's independence, the Sultanate of Paser was incorporated into the South Kalimantan province as a *Kawedanan*. In 1961, it became part of the East Kalimantan province as an autonomous district (*Swatantra Tingkat II*). After Law 5/1974, it was renamed Pasir District. In 1987, one sub-district of Balikpapan Municipality (*Kotamadya*), namely Balikpapan Seberang sub-district, was included in the Pasir District and became known as the Penajam sub-district. In the 2002 jurisdictive boundary realignment (*pemekaran*), Pasir District was split into two parts, Pasir District and North Penajam Paser District. The North Penajam Paser District was comprised of four sub-districts: Babulu, Waru, Penajam, and Sepaku. Pasir District changed its name to Paser District in 2007, and in 2013, the name of its capital city was changed from Tanah Grogot to Tana Paser (Pemkab Paser, 2016).

The IKN administrative areas include the Sepaku sub-district, which consists of 15 villages, and one village from the Penajam sub-district, called Kelurahan Riko. These 16 villages are home to the Paser people and are located in Rings 1 and 2, at the center of IKN. The other 38 villages in Ring 3 belong to the Kutai Kartanegara Districts and are scattered across the development areas of IKN. The Kutai and Dayak ethnic groups are concentrated in Ring 3. Although the Paser people live in different administrative government areas, they share the same ethnicity as those in Paser District and North Penajam Paser District. They have strong ethnic ties, cultural traditions, ways of life, and customary laws. Their ethnic solidarity is strong, similar to other indigenous ethnic groups in the IKN area, such as Kutai and Dayak.

In the course of conflict history, ethnic conflict occurred in the Penajam sub-district in 2019 in the form of devastating ethnic riots triggered by the death of Paser youth by Buginese youth. Ethnic mobilization occurred, including some Paser people in Sepaku (IKN area). Public facilities in the Penajam Ferry Port, private houses, shops, small boats, small bridges, and one religious school were burned down. Due to these riots, total losses amounted to IDR 7.3 billion. Women and children were also traumatized by this occurrence since 352 people were displaced (Kompas, 2019). Eleven years earlier, in 2008, ethnic conflict occurred in its parent district, Paser District. A misunderstanding triggered the conflict between Paser and Madurese during the celebration of Indonesia's Independence Day, which led to Madurese threatening a Paser person with Madurese sickle (*clurit*) he brought. Seen as a challenge to the Paser people, ethnic mobilization occurred in the Paser District to face the challenge. Fortunately, there was no resistance from the Madurese community. The perpetrator later received an *adat* fine of one buffalo and the costs of an *adat* peace ceremony (Jafar & Hakim, 2020).

While there are no reported ethnic conflicts involving indigenous Kutai people, ethnic conflicts involving Dayak people occurred in West Kutai. West Kutai, a stronghold of the Dayaks, used to be part of the Kutai District before the 1999 jurisdictive boundary realignment (*pemekaran*) of Kutai District into Kutai District, West Kutai District, East Kutai District, and Bontang City. By Government Regulation No.8/2022, the name Kutai District was changed to Kutai Kartanegara District. The current Dayak people in the IKN areas used to be the people of Kutai District, and they have strong ethnic ties with the Dayak people in West Kutai. The first conflict in West Kutai was the 2012 devastating conflict between the Dayak people and the Buginese. In this conflict, there occurred ethnic riots where a petrol station was vandalized, a private shophouse and 400 kiosks/shops were burned down, and 860 Buginese fled and took refuge at the police and military headquarters. The second ethnic friction occurred in 2021, triggered by the killing of a

Dayak girl by a Madurese youth. Ethnic solidarity among the Dayak people is similar to that of the Paser people. Ethnic mobilization occurred to search for the perpetrator with the slogan "debt from life is paid by life." The intense situation made many Madurese flee to Samarinda and other areas. An *adat* trial was later carried out to reduce tension, and the perpetrator was punished with an *adat* fine of 4.120 *antangs* (urns) and costs of the death ritual, which was equal to IDR 1.89 billion in total (BBC Indonesia, 2021).

The conflict occurrences that have taken place in the past have led to trauma, bad collective memories, and unexpressed hostility. In the greed-grievance model of conflict theory, grievance factors exist in the above conflicts. Thus, such occurrences confirm grievance-driven conflict theory. The greed-driven conflict is, however, not observed. The Paser people living in IKN have deep ethnic ties with the Paser people living in Paser and North Penajam Paser Districts.

Similarly, the current Dayak people in IKN were originally from the Kutai District and had strong ethnic links with the Dayak people in West Kutai. If an incident similar to the past happens in IKN, ethnic mobilization will likely occur due to strong ethnic solidarity, and this could lead to ethnic conflicts. So, this is an example of the possibility of conflict occurrence. The possibility of conflict occurring would depend on the presence of conflict triggers and whether these triggers would attract ethnic solidarity and prompt collective action through ethnic mobilization. Therefore, it is essential to consider the ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization index to gauge the current state of potential ethnic conflict.

It is important to note that ethnic fractionalization and polarization are dynamic; they can increase, decrease, or stagnate. With such a dynamic nature of ethnic polarization in particular, can ethnic polarization be controlled? It is necessary to examine ethnic dynamics to comprehend the nature of ethnic polarization and answer this question.

Population dynamics is the study of birth, death, and migration, while ethnic dynamics encompasses the increase or decrease of ethnic groups and their populations due to natural causes or migration. It also deals with the cultural dynamics of ethnic groups, which includes the evolution of their culture, tradition, views, and way of life over time for various reasons.

In East Kalimantan history, there are two views concerning the origin of the indigenous people of East Kalimantan, particularly the Dayak people. The first perspective claims that the Proto-Malay (Mongoloid race) migrated from Yunan Province, Southern China, between 2500 BC to 1500 BC. This migration was followed by the Deutro Malay, who migrated to Borneo around 500 BC. They were considered the ancestors of native tribes of Kalimantan, particularly the Dayak people. This view is supported by the fact that many Dayak people have faces similar to the Chinese or Mongoloid race, such as Dayak Kenyah, Dayak Lundayeh, Dayak Kadazan, and others. The second perspective suggests that there were already indigenous people in (East) Kalimantan before the Proto and Deutro Malays migrated to Borneo. According to Hakim, the Negrito Race, which is the evolutionary result of the first generation of homo sapiens found in Java, already existed in (East) Kalimantan before the migration. This population spread to the East and Aborigines in Australia (Hakim, 2017). Recent archaeological findings in the form of figurative cave paintings in a limestone cave in East Kalimantan support this perspective. The well-known scientific journal *Nature* reported that these paintings date back to around 40,000 years ago (40 ka), which makes them the oldest figurative artwork in the world (Aubert et al., 2018). Furthermore, not all Dayak ethnic groups have faces like the Chinese or Mongoloid race. Hence, the second perspective argues that not all Dayak people are descendants of immigrants from Southern China.

Regardless of such arguments, the population resulting from such migrations should—at least—be used as a starting point in counting or examining the ethnic and population dynamics of East Kalimantan. The other factor contributing to the ethnic and population dynamics was the establishment of Kingdoms along the Mahakam River, East Kalimantan. The oldest one was the Hindu kingdom of Martapura in Muara Kaman, in the upper Mahakam River, which existed from around 400 to 1635. Another Hindu Kingdom emerged in the estuary of the Mahakam River in Jahitan Layar, Kutai Lama (Anggana sub-district) in the year 1300. This kingdom later relocated to Jembayan (Loa Kulu sub-district), then to Tenggarong, the capital of the current Kutai Kartanegara District. In 1575, this kingdom turned into an Islamic Kingdom known as the Sultanate of Kutai Kertanegara. The ongoing wars between the Kingdom of Martapura and the Sultanate of Kutai Kertanegara affected the population dynamics, and the biggest war causing many casualties

occurred in 1635 when Kingdom Martapura was eventually defeated and then incorporated into the Sultanate of Kutai Kertanegara ing Martapura (Sarip, 2020). In addition, as mentioned, the establishment of the Kingdom of Sadurengas, which later became the Sultanate of Paser in 1516, also affected the population dynamics in the region.

Since the 1970s, natural forests in Sepaku (IKN area) and its surroundings have been exploited by ITCI forest companies (ITCI-KU forest concessionaire and ITCI-HM/IHM industrial timber estate), which became a hub for people from various islands, including Sulawesi and Java, to seek better economic opportunities. Later, as a result of transmigration programs, the expansion of industrial timber estates, oil palm plantations, and coal mining extraction, the areas became attractive destinations for people from diverse ethnic backgrounds. With IKN, independent migrants from Sulawesi, Java, Madura, and other islands flocked to the IKN areas, leading to a significant increase in the population and number of ethnic groups.

Today, the population of IKN stands at around 200 thousand people, and it is estimated to increase to 2 million people by 2045, which is a tenfold increase. This population will consist of people from various ethnic backgrounds, which will lead to greater heterogeneity and ethnic fractionalization. Unfortunately, this may also lead to an increase in ethnic polarization, which refers to the risk of conflict or conflict potential in many parts (villages) of the IKN areas. As a result, there are concerns about controlling ethnic polarization and the risks of ethnic conflict.

. Theoretically, ethnic polarization can be controlled by managing the number of ethnic groups and their populations in certain areas. For instance, the population is welcomed to increase, but only selected ethnic groups can be prioritized for migration to a particular region. Similarly, certain tribes can be brought into a specified village to reduce polarization, while others can be restricted from bringing in new migrants. However, implementing this strategy is difficult—if not impossible—in practice. First, IKN is intended to be an inclusive area for everyone, irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds. Second, selecting which ethnic groups can enter or not would violate human rights.

The measures that can be taken in this regard include carrying out periodic measurements of ethnic fractionalization and polarization, which can help assess the current state of ethnicity in a region, given the challenges of implementing such a strategy because the polarization index serves as a reminder and a warning to take prompt anticipatory or mitigative steps. Having a map of ethnic fractionalization and polarization in the area can help decision-makers formulate better socio-economic, socio-cultural, and socio-political policies.

Nevertheless, there is hope for ethnic dynamics from a cultural perspective in dealing with the potential conflict or the risks of conflict. First, as aforementioned, ethnic conflict in East Kalimantan mostly occurred between indigenous people and migrant ethnic groups. Second, conflict occurrence is less likely to happen unless there are conflict triggers, ethnic solidarity, and ethnic mobilization, especially among indigenous people. While conflict triggers can vary and happen unexpectedly, ethnic solidarity and mobilization are deeply rooted in culture, offering hope for resolving potential conflicts through cultural dynamics.

Cultural dynamics is a universal phenomenon. It is widely accepted that culture will change or adjust itself over time, and this will impact ethnic dynamics. One important proof of cultural change is the change in the headhunting tradition. Among the influences of the ancestral migration, it is believed that the Proto-Malay and Deutro-Malay races and their descendants brought such headhunting traditions, as seen in the headhunting tradition along the routes of migration, such as in Formosa (Taiwan), Myanmar, the Philippines, Malaysia, Sumatra, Nias, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and others. This issue resulted in ethnic conflicts in the past, leading to the killing of members of their ethnic groups. It is why, for hundreds—if not thousands—of years, the population of (East) Kalimantan had been low, particularly among Dayak people.

Due to widespread practices of headhunting in Kalimantan, in 1894, the Dutch administration called upon all ethnic groups in Borneo to gather in Tumbang Anoi village, Central Kalimantan. The gatherings resulted in a consensus to end the headhunting tradition and its related practices across all of the Kalimantan regions. This Tumbang Anoi Peace Accord is regarded as "The End of The Jungle Law in Kalimantan." Although the Dayak people later discovered that the peace accord was a colonial strategy to weaken the resistance of Dayak people against the Dutch, they were eventually united and aware of their economic condition, their future, and the importance of education to advance their community (Sulang, 2019; Susanto et al., 2022).

The agreement also brought about population growth among the Dayak ethnic groups as they were no longer enemies of each other. The most significant change that emerged from the Tumbang Anoi agreement was the cultural shift in viewing other ethnic groups. They were no longer seen as enemies but rather as brothers, sisters, and friends. This cultural change led to the end of the headhunting tradition in East Kalimantan.

Dealing with ethnic solidarity and ethnic mobilization is, however, not simple. These are the core elements of a community's culture that unite its people and preserve their heritage. To maintain this, communities follow *adat* rules, which can be written or unwritten. Among these rules, the most significant are *adat* obligations and *adat* sanctions. Ethnic solidarity is a response to a call for assistance from the community leader or members, and it remains at the attitude level. Ethnic mobilization is a call for participation that has already taken the form of behavior. Fulfilling these requests is an obligation of the community. Those who fail to comply would face sanctions, such as social exclusion. *Adat* communities aim to avoid such sanctions and preserve the dignity of their community by responding to calls for ethnic solidarity and participation. Sanctions can also be imposed on individuals outside the ethnic group who harm their community. This mechanism prevents revenge or the upholding of the saying "life debt is paid by life." Those who participate in collective action follow both rational choice and collective action mechanisms. In collective action, individuals tend to free-ride, which is why social sanctions are imposed to prevent it. When an individual considers participating, they weigh the costs and benefits. The cost of participating is lower, as they will not receive social sanctions, while not participating will result in social sanctions. Moreover, there are usually no prison sentence sanctions from the state for individuals who participate in mass movements, so the costs are also low. All of these factors motivate members of ethnic groups to accept calls for ethnic solidarity and stage ethnic-based collective action.

These culturally embedded elements could change. There are two entry points in this respect. First, it deals with the mindset of ethnic group members. Having a sense of ethnic solidarity is beneficial when it is used to help economically disadvantaged members of ethnic groups, support community projects, and improve education for underprivileged individuals. Ethnic mobilization can also be useful for carrying out traditional communal works, promoting village development, cultural tourism, and so on. However, in situations of conflict, it is important to change the mindset that always associates the actions of an individual with their ethnic background. Education can play a crucial role in changing the way individuals think and perceive the world. For the elites, intense interaction and communication among ethnic leaders and organizations can have a significant impact. Second, in addition to economic and political approaches, a cultural approach can be taken to deal with ethnic grievances. Regular ethnic interaction through cultural festivals, recognition of cultural heritage, and promotion of cultural products can help improve the self-esteem of ethnic groups.

IKN is designed to be a green, smart, liveable, and technologically advanced capital city. Given the high polarization index in many villages and the influx of new migrants from various ethnic backgrounds, conflict could also occur between ethnic groups other than the ethnic groups discussed above. Therefore, it is necessary for the capital city authority to introduce a new culture that promotes equality and eliminates ethnic bullying, performance assessment based on ethnic identity or primordial network, ethnic sentiments in professional works, and primordial segregation in work assignments and social interaction. However, disadvantaged Indigenous people may require certain exemptions during a transition period, which can be addressed through affirmative policies such as providing scholarships and improving access to employment and economic opportunities. Related research and monitoring of favorable processes that demonstrate increased understanding and harmony in the society within IKN could beneficially serve as a guide for other jurisdictions throughout Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

Ethnic fractionalization index (EFI) and ethnic polarization index (EPOI) at the village level in the IKN area varied widely from (very) low to very high. Overall, the ethnic fractionalization index in IKN is 0.79, which is in the high category, while the polarization index is 0.61, which is slightly high. This fractionalization index is expected to increase due to the increase in the number

of residents with different ethnic backgrounds. Still, there is no need to worry because it is a logical consequence of a democratic country's increasing population diversity and mobility. What needs attention is the slightly higher ethnic polarization because it means the potential for ethnic conflict is also slightly high. What still gives rise to optimism regarding the potential for conflict is that the ethno-demographic conditions of IKN are still relatively conducive to providing supporting capacity for IKN development, and its ethnopolitics appear favorable for the development of IKN.

As the moderate level of ethnic polarization can swing towards either conflict or no conflict, it is recommended to pay attention to areas from moderate level to higher level of ethnic polarization. More attention should be given to areas with high or very high ethnic polarization. Furthermore, the monitoring of ethnic fractionalization and polarization should be carried out regularly to help improve socio-economic, socio-cultural, and socio-political policies to ensure the sustainable development of IKN. Finally, a cultural approach should be adopted in the management of the modern and technologically advanced capital city to minimize ethnic tensions, ethnic grievances, and ethnic frictions.

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