

Islam and the Making of a Non-Violent and Peaceful Public Sphere in Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

This article attempts to elaborate on the position of Islam in creating a non-violent and peaceful public sphere in Indonesia. Through a critical review of previous studies and research on the issue, this article aims to answer the following main questions: How does Islam take a particular position in creating a peaceful public sphere in Indonesia? Second, what are the opportunities and challenges involved in making the sufficient role of constructing peaceful democracy and politics in Indonesia? Third, what lessons can be learned from Indonesia's position as the largest Muslim population in strengthening friendly public space? One of the focuses of this paper is to highlight the key role of Islamic civil society, which refers to Islamic organizations that significantly contribute to developing a peaceful public space in Indonesia.

Keywords: Indonesia, Islam, Democracy, Peace, Public Sphere, Social-political change.

INTRODUCTION

Concerning Indonesia's position in Southeast Asia as one of the new emerging democracies, Islam has been known as one of the dominant factors in social and political discourses and practices. 85% of Indonesia's 240 million people are Muslim. Although Islam is the dominant religious group, Indonesia still asserts itself as a pluralistic society and a semi-secular nation-state. Therefore, this status is essential for considering Indonesia as the central subject to discuss and understand Islam's position in constructing a peaceful democracy and politics.¹

Of this fact, Islam is not just a social label for justifying Indonesia as the largest Muslim population in the world. This description also connects with the availability of Islam as one of the leading social resources in building and maintaining a non-violent and peaceful public sphere in Indonesia. Moreover, the occurring phenomena among Indonesian Muslims will determine, affect, and influence the socio-political constellation, especially Indonesia's social community and political construction.

The promotion of Islam in the public sphere since the dawn of *Reformasi* has involved a contest between the Islamic orientations of political Islam (Islamism) and cultural Islam, and a battle won mainly by those oriented towards the latter.²

Academically, this article aims to contribute information to previous literature and studies on the relationship between Islam and Indonesia's public sphere.³ Furthermore, based on Indonesia's experience, this study discusses the current problem caused by the practice of democracy and politics

from a concrete level and contestation.⁴ The study also intends to explore the power shifting from the national to the local level in the post-authoritarian regime that reinforces Islam in building a peaceful public space in Indonesia. This study aims to offer some information from Indonesia in the case of Islam, which has a role and position in constructing a peaceful atmosphere.

For past decades and onwards, violence—in its most comprehensive meaning—has been considered a crucial and challenging problem in Indonesian studies. This fact also includes a context and a frame. Some of the most important Islamic intellectuals, including Nurcholish Madjid, Gus Dur, and Ahmad Syafii Maarif represented the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia including Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, have taken significant roles in the context of countering the trend of violence in Indonesia's public sphere.⁵ In its post-authoritarian phase, Indonesia suffers various forms of violence.⁶ The crash of the economic foundation and the collapse of the political order at the end of Suharto's presidency brought Indonesia to be social and political unrest. From the perspective of political power, the Suharto era has been followed by the emergence of tension, conflict, and terrorist attacks. This fact changed and influenced the contour of the Indonesian nation-state. Indonesia became a hazardous space based on the trends of insecurities that arose from this dramatic political change.⁷

When we mention that Indonesia suffers from a high level of violence, this fact carefully addresses the understanding of non-episodic and sporadic violent events.⁸ A series of violence in Indonesia is portrayed as collective, structural, and communal experiences. There are long lists of tragic events from interreligious conflict, intra-faith tension, and ethnic turbulence that murdered and killed thousands of people, and others have left their homes to being displaced peoples in their countries.⁹

Furthermore, Indonesia also surprised regional and global communities when it was moved to the top of the list of terrorist attacks worldwide.¹⁰ Since the Bali bombing in 2002, Indonesia turned to a decade of increasing terrorist operations. This trend put Indonesia on the highest rank of terrorism among fellow Muslim countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

With the status of violence, some scholars discuss the possibility of using the concept of *'the period of anomie'*—introduced by Emile Durkheim—in explaining a tendency of the Indonesian society which shows a breakdown of the regulatory order that secures the institutional order (the rules of the game). As a nation-state, Indonesia experiences anomie in putting a statutory system under the particular interest spread based on political, economic, and religious affiliation and emotion. This phenomenon defines Indonesia's exact position in disrupting its social and political foundations, leading to the emergence of violence.¹¹

Freek Colombijn provides a framework for explaining what he describes as, [...] *'the wave of violence flooding Indonesia that attracted wider attention and interest from various media, international organizations, funding groups, academics, advocacy groups, and activists'* [...].¹² He mentions three prospective approaches. First, the method that connects to one particular/single conflict. For example, the formula looks at the battle of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Aceh People Movement for Independence, GAM) against the Indonesian central government. Nevertheless, the approach cannot completely answer why so many bloody conflicts, violence, and riots happen continuously and simultaneously across the country.

The second approach deals with the argument that violence has been understood as a legacy of President Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime. Generally, it has been agreed that the central state manages and arranges the security approach via the military institutions applying violent solutions to those separatist actions from the local regions.

The third approach focuses on the continuity of violence and the cultural simplification of production (or reproduction). This approach defines the tendency in a social setting where people (or individuals) express their violent motivations and emotions beyond the common understanding of living peacefully with other people and different communities. This approach should answer why many people and social groups in Indonesia intentionally and voluntarily propose peaceful feelings, opinions, and perspectives into the social sphere.

Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindband¹³ offer a framework for understanding violence in Indonesia and applies the concept of 'the genealogy of violence' introduced and elaborated by Henk Schulte Nordholt. Through this concept, the exploration and explanation of violent tendencies in Indonesia should go back to the colonial era or even before that time. The genealogy of violence points out and illustrates the interrelation between the colonial legacy and the state-sponsored violence that emerged during the time of President Suharto. Destruction is the most influential legacy of colonial rule and Suharto's political power.

Freek Colombijn¹⁴ also elaborates on the 'two types' of the legitimacy of violence in Indonesia. This view is also a prospective standpoint in explaining, understanding, and attracting a mechanism for finding the way out of the tendency. First, in addition to an adequate historical foundation for violence in Indonesia, the state has a monopoly in using power to approach and control 'anomie' and 'disorder' in social and political spaces, led to the accumulation of domination in 'the only one hand'—that belongs to the state apparatus and institutions. What is so-called state-sponsored violence could be a dramatic portrait of this trend. The state creates a new order through the manifestation of a security approach that then threatens and destroys the social order.

Second, social (cultural)—sponsored violence also significantly influences the whole discourse. The status of Indonesia as a pluralistic society also affects the emergence of this second type of justification for violence. A divided nation that turns to the model of 'us' and 'them,' 'in the group and out-group,' and 'insider and outsider' is raised from this context. Freek Colombijn states that the 'social identification with a particular group will come out in prejudice towards others. This trend quickly elevates tension, conflict, and even attacks on others—individuals and groups. We may say that this is a fact of daily life in Indonesian society.

By looking at some studies, this article needs to mention some sources of violence that can specify the Indonesian post-authoritarian regime or the so-called reformation era. First is a conflict based on separatist, ethnic, and religious triggers. In short, for many years, Aceh and Papua were two provinces known as the homes of the separatist movement in Indonesia. *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM, the Free Aceh Movement) and *Operasi Papua Merdeka* (the Free Papua Movement, OPM) have been identified as the sources of the armed conflict in Indonesia. The state has taken the operation through Indonesia's military institution, causing the regions to move into the 'bloody area.'

This first source of violence has been defined as vertical violence in which the state is the violator, and the mass (people) are the victims. This trend also strongly reflects the aggressive approach that provides a peacekeeping model in Indonesia. Religious interest is also a prospective issue of this type. It is based that Aceh is known as an 'Islamic province.' Meanwhile, Papua Island is defined as a 'Christian province.'

Second, the ethnic conflict also presented an essential issue in the study on violence in Indonesia. It is referred to as the Kalimantan conflict in the 2000s, just one year after the fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime. At that time, Kalimantan—the Indigenous-Christian people—forced the Madura ethnic (mainly Islam) to move back to their homeland in Eastern Java. That period was one of the critical

times that determined the future of the Indonesian nation-state. Many opinions and views have been raised from this conflict to explain the motive and trigger. The prevailing opinion links to the experience of economic injustice by the indigenous Kalimantan people under the industrial capacity belonging to the Madura ethnic.

Third, these ethnic conflicts were followed by religious conflicts in some areas. The conflicts in the Ambon and Poso regions can be mentioned as examples. The disputes in the two regions cost many years, with thousands of people killed. During its time of transition, Indonesia experienced many bloody and dramatic moments. Due to the lack of democratic culture in social and political spaces, the conflicts significantly influenced Indonesia's stability when security was considered the highest priority in solving political problems in local regions.

Moreover, at the end of the 1990s, anti-Chinese riots emerged from a local to an intermediate level in Indonesia. The explanation behind these riots is that the Chinese community was categorized as the 'market-dominant minority' across the Asia-Pacific region. This condition was commonly recognized as the source (and trigger) of the violence against them. Many anti-Chinese riots have happened in many areas, such as in the West Kalimantan, the Maluku area, the North Maluku region, the Central Sulawesi area, the Papua region, and other regions. The massive attack and murder of the Chinese in Jakarta in 1998, when Suharto stepped down from his presidency, has been remembered as the climax of the anti-Chinese protest in Indonesia. This tragic event was one of the darkest times in the history of Indonesia. Many Chinese people were killed in that attack, women were raped, and the mob burned their properties.

METHOD

Finding the appropriate methodology was a challenging part of executing this study. This review study mainly used a qualitative approach through critical content analysis. Consequently, this qualitative research answered several questions that seek to investigate the position of Islam in the context and prospects for developing a peaceful and non-violent public space in Indonesia. Not only that, but this literature review also intends to more openly and dynamically understand how Islamic actors and organizations play an important role in peaceful public discourse in Indonesia. Although the information obtained from the qualitative content analysis cannot be measured or displayed in graphs or formulas, this literature study can display analytical power by referring to previous studies and predictions from scholars related to the issues.

Thus, this study relied on secondary sources by referring to previous scientific publications and other supporting sources.¹⁶ With this position, information from these secondary sources was analyzed thematically based on the main focus of this study. Thus, methodologically this study can generate new insights and provide opportunities for further investigations to broaden the scope of the discourse on developing peaceful and non-violent public spaces in Indonesia. This methodology was also supported by studying the role of Islamic organizations and actors, especially Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.¹⁷

Furthermore, a question about the methodology in this research was mainly limited to understanding the intersection between religion, Islam, and the prospect of building a peaceful atmosphere. This article drew on previous studies and anthropological records conducted and published by leading scholars and researchers. This article used previous data to measure common problems in a complementary manner by making a review assessment. However, this study still has methodological limitations, and in-depth research is necessary to fill gaps by adding additional data collection methods,

such as (a) field research and (b) in-depth historical research supporting the development of new knowledge and information about religion and peace.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A discussion about today's Indonesia in the context of political reform since the reign of President Suharto in 1998 is related to the reformation trajectory that defines Indonesia becomes the land of opportunity for many social and political groups in negotiating their position and interest in enjoying the benefits of this legislative change. Thus, democratic change provides participation and competition between political factions and social groups. In a specific issue, Islam, as the dominant group in Indonesia, obtains the same chance to evolve into the complexities and dynamics of social and political changes.¹⁸

Suzanne Brenner, with a similar position to other scholars, argues the intersection between the three main aspects: religious, social, and political movements that influence the shaping and transforming of the public sphere in Indonesia. As she states:

In recent decades, the Indonesian general field has been transformed by a confluence of religious, social, and political movements that initially emerged under the rule of a repressive regime.¹⁹

She categorizes this fact into two sides. First, it links to the position called 'the Islamic movement.' It is proven from the emergence of the study on Islam that it then affects the function of Islam in society and significantly impacts the identification of their status and role in a special meaning. Surprisingly, Islam has played a vital role since the post-Suharto totalitarian regime. This, unfortunately, also gave birth to radicalism and extremism in the Muslims themselves.

Second, the emergence of social actions in guiding democratization and strengthening human rights also requires a clear position of Islam in Indonesia on this particular agenda.²⁰ Supporting democratization and human rights can be said to be a shred of good evidence for Indonesians, not only Muslims, on how they actively join in the nation-state building and the non-violent and peaceful public sphere.

However, the problem is not 'as easy as'; it is seen in academic discourse and discussion. When we consider the study and the project of making a non-violent and peaceful public sphere based on Indonesia's Islamic perspective and capacity, we should consider the presence of Indonesia's context itself. Making a non-violent and peaceful public space is one of the most challenging movements and efforts when considering Indonesia a pluralist society.²¹

This means that an inclusive standpoint should frame every step of Indonesian Islam in developing and strengthening a non-violent and peaceful public sphere. Indonesian Islam should manage the so-called—'public-private division' to achieve a friendly atmosphere. Accepting others' presence outside Islam with a wide range of differences guarantees the prospective achievement made by the Islamic group in building a non-violent and peaceful public daily life.²² In this discussion, Indonesia has two of the largest Islamic organizations, including Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, actively promoting a peaceful sphere.²³

A discourse on the public sphere in current-day Indonesia has also been significantly affected by the interlinking of Islam and democracy.²⁴ It is commonly known that Indonesia has the largest Muslim population globally on the one hand and one of the most fragile transitional democracies on the other. This article addresses the changing public sphere influenced by shifting power and authority. This event deals with the pattern of those shifting from the authoritarian regime to the transitional democratic model. The public sphere has been determined by competition between political groups, clans, and families.

Woodward critically argues that Suharto's New Order authoritarian regime effectively did such 'de-politicization and 'domestication' of Islam.²⁵ However, Islam still successfully contributed to the democratic movement against Suharto's power and his cronies. One thing that can be decisively stated is that emerging Muslim scholars and activists also played a crucial role in guiding the democratization process. They generally represent Islamic civil society organizations, especially those affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, such as the Wahid Institute, Maarif Institute, and Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL). From another view, Islam claims their constructive involvement in nation-state building after the era of President Suharto.

One of the essential discourses in the changing public sphere in which Islam and democracy are interlinked at the practical level is about increasing what Woodward calls again—the 'identity politics and the 'primordial loyalties.'²⁶ Although this phenomenon is not a new issue, it was already involved in the 1955 election; it still stimulates political struggles between political parties affiliated with religious interests (mostly Islam). In 1999, the first election in the post-Suharto political line, the primordial consideration influenced the vote. Smith explains that the interconnection between a public sphere and a peace-building process has been considered a challenging issue in the present status of the contested transitional states. This mainly moves from the mainstream approach that applies the perspective of the international liberal process and the policies agenda followed through the cost, the result, and the level of beneficiaries of the process to the so-called 'non-liberal processes of peace-building' that are currently taken and conducted by the national states and governments.²⁷

This new approach addresses reflection and interpretation of what is going on with the status of violence in the context, dynamics, and problems of democratizing states. It is mainly connected to the fluctuation of the socio-political discourses and experiences of those new emerging democratic states. It is well said that non-conventional parts of the dynamics related to democratizing countries, such as cultural and religious institutions play critical roles in reducing violent tendencies in social and political landscapes.

Smith defines Indonesia as a 'hybrid political order.'²⁸ Her view refers to the political changes from an authoritarian rule under President Suharto to a democratic transition, which is close to applying the institutionalization of democracy. As a hybrid political order, Indonesia shows many forms of tension, conflict, clashes between groups, and local-center tension in managing its development strategy. In Indonesia, some regions should renegotiate their position against the central state while the central government fails to control violence and other forms of brutality in society.

At this point, Indonesia needs to formulate its approach to 'rethinking' and 'rebuilding' the public sphere. Moreover, Indonesia must consider its sources for constructing an experienced non-violent open area. Establishing a robust policy framework supporting a peace-building process can be considered one of the most severe challenges in one of the essential new democracies in Asia. More importantly, this should be an entry point for using domestic capacities and sources to rebuild a peaceful atmosphere in a social space and a political order.²⁹

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Islam and Violence

When we intend to consider the role of Islam in making a non-violent and peaceful public sphere discourse in Indonesia, we should clarify the position of Islam concerning the whole story of violence in the country. Considering Islam's future work and role in initiating and establishing a non-violent and peaceful public sphere takes a unique undertaking to interlink Islam with the wave of violence and

communal violence in Indonesia.³⁰

In building a peaceful atmosphere in Indonesia, Islam faces an internal challenge. This is mainly related to the emerging views that concern the connection of certain Islamic groups with the global terrorist movement and groups such as the Al-Qaida network. In Indonesia, this specifically emerged on 'October 12, 2002' known as the 'Bali Bombing.' Since then, before putting their strategic role in building a non-violent peaceful social atmosphere, Indonesian Islam needs to consider the presence of many radical and violent groups.³¹

Those groups include Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam (The Islamic Defender Front, FPI). Those are supporters of continuous violent propaganda in Indonesia. However, several relatively small but conspicuously violent radical Islamic movements are also seen. They actively *jihad* in places like the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi or act as vigilante squads raiding nightclubs, discotheques, and other dens of inequity. Unfortunately, several militias maintain close relations with the military or political elite.

After the terrorist attack in New York on 9/11/2001, Indonesia suffered due to the country's massive spread of terrorist cells. It is well agreed that since the Bali bombing, Indonesia has been marked as one of the countries most strongly attached to global terrorism.³² Many previous studies have concluded that terrorism is connected to several Islamic groups, such as the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI/the Islamic Congregation). This group devoted violence to the central concern of their ideological standpoint. Those studies noted many existing groups that openly and directly supported the attacks.

Moreover, an important fact is that some Islamic scholars look back on Islam itself as a source of violence. Understanding these phenomena is becoming such an 'honest academic' effort for placing Islam in the context of building a non-violent and peaceful public sphere in Indonesia. Assyaukanie—one of the Muslim scholars in Indonesia—reminds us of the application of Sharia law over local regions in Indonesia that potentially raises violent attitudes in people's daily lives. In his view, since Indonesia has not implemented an 'Islamic state' as its political foundation—based on religious pluralism—the application of Sharia law into the regulatory system possibly influences the relationship in society. It even triggers tension and attacks on other minority groups.³³

Furthermore, Assyaukanie also argues that Fatwa can be seen as a source of violence. He has a different view by placing these two elements of the Islamic position in a discourse of force in contemporary Indonesia. While some Muslim elites state that Fatwa cannot be considered a trigger for violence and discrimination in the public sphere, he dares to consider the interconnection between Fatwa and violence. He concludes that the emergence of intolerant attitudes in society is linked closely with the presence of Fatwa itself.³⁴

The trend is based on the position of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, the Council of Indonesian Muslim Scholars). MUI is the only Islamic institution that has a role in arranging and declaring Fatwa.³⁵ Although Fatwa is only a guideline for Muslim people, it still influences many aspects of Indonesia's public life. For example, in their National Conference, MUI proclaimed a particular 'anti-secularism, liberalism, and pluralism Fatwa' in 2005. At the same time, they also declared Fatwa, which stated that the Ahmadiyya group was an infidel and outside of the official teaching of Islam. Radical groups have used these Fatwas to legitimize conducting violent attacks to pressure other religious minority groups in Indonesia.

Among many factors that cause violent actions performed by radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, Fatwa is essential as an 'energy' for affecting and pushing some parts of Islam to show violent control over other religious minority groups. Assyaukanie also states:

"...Fatwa is an idea. It is a word or a saying that bears messages. A fatwa that instructs people to do a good thing is good. On the contrary, a fatwa that asks people to kill other people is a killing fatwa...."³⁷

As a trigger for violent action, Fatwa can be considered a prospective point of view for understanding Islam's perspective and challenging role in building a non-violent and peaceful public sphere in Indonesia.

Van Bruinessen (2007) also asks: *is Indonesia losing its peaceful portrait of Islam?*³⁸ This question refers to the massive discrimination faced by minority groups among Muslims like Ahmadiyya and Shia groups. Some religious minority groups live in scary and risky situations when the Islamic radical groups who promote violence and intimidation in the public space are affiliated with Islamic sentiment. The public is trapped in hate speeches and attitudes in daily life. The radical groups that have caused violence in the public sphere and against Islamic minorities may be a part of the violent clash within Indonesia.³⁹

Islam and the Making of a Non-Violent Public Sphere in Indonesia

This article moves to its central focus by looking at the prospective role of Islam in making a non-violent and peaceful public sphere in Indonesia. The author should say that this process lies on two sides of one fact. The fact shows that Islam has been linked to continuous violence and its capacity as cultural capital in energizing the making of a non-violent and peaceful public sphere.

The presence of Islam in the public sphere over the last decade demands attention. Islam has been associated with various occurrences of violence and radicalism, and terrorism. The presence of Islam has surged at a time when democracy in Indonesia is gaining momentum. Islam appears in the public sphere with a variety of expressions and orientations.⁴⁰

In the ongoing process of making a non-violent and peaceful public sphere, the public still believes that a Muslim group can propose its presence as a prospective source for these unfinished and incomplete political, social, and cultural efforts in Indonesia. It is worth keeping in mind that Indonesia needs to start and refresh its social and political consciences for demanding Islam to give a high-level concern to re-create a non-violent and peaceful public space.⁴¹

The two largest Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, as the main source of the peace-building movement in Indonesia, offer inspiration for other religious organizations. These two largest Islamic organizations have become influential actors (institutions) because they also have strong institutional networks in the academic and research domains, such as universities and the socio-political realm. Thus, the consistency of these two largest Islamic organizations will show a significant and sustainable impact on developing non-violent public spaces in Indonesia.⁴²

Considering that Indonesia is also affected by global trends is a practical step. At the international level, the 'nine-eleven [9/11] tragedy has been understood as one of the main starting times and pathways to reconsidering the importance of peace-building projects worldwide. Since many attacks are referred to as the emergence of Islamic terrorists, many projects have been financed to develop various and continuous future research and policy tools to strengthen the peace-building agenda.⁴³

For example, Smock and ul-Huda introduced a new peace-building study and research pattern. They argued the strategic position of the Islamic leaders in supporting a peace-building process—of course, besides the general elements of Islam itself. Both referred to the potential of Muslim leaders to offer effective responses to a series of violent actions and terrorist operations in the field. For example, Muslim leaders—or what Smock and ul-Huda mentioned as the 'most critical Muslim leaders—have

strongly condemned the 'nine-eleven (September 11), 2001 attacks in the World Trade Center, New York City, USA. Besides those Muslim leaders, many Islamic organizations have also openly declared war on terrorism based on the tragic attack that happened at that time.⁴³

Moreover, fundamental peacemaking based on the Islamic point of view needs to look at those structural elements. Those should be included in the whole peacemaking process. Those elements can potentially strengthen and enlighten the peacemaking process in light of the Islamic perspective and values. Some of the principles are stated as follows:

The pursuit of justice, doing good, the universality and dignity of humanity, the sacredness of human life, equality, the quest for peace (individual, interpersonal, communal, regional, and international), peacemaking via reason, knowledge, and understanding, creativity, forgiveness, proper deeds and actions, responsibility, patience, collaborative actions and solidarity, inclusivity, diversity, pluralism, and tolerance.⁴⁴

In an ideal scene, Islam needs to apply these elements to the framework for making a non-violent and peaceful public sphere. Islam also has to internalize and articulate the elements. The interconnectivity of these two sides provides a more concrete achievement of making a non-violent and peaceful public sphere. From this fact, the involvement of the Islamic elements in making the non-violent and peaceful general area can be applied based on personal and institutional engagement. The first aspect is connected to the presence of Muslim leaders. The second aspect links with various organizations intending to support making a non-violent and peaceful public sphere.

One of the main targets of Islamic actors' and institutions' involvement in arranging and managing substantial interfaith dialogues is to promote peace among people. However, interfaith dialogues should focus on strengthening the tolerant attitude in society. It is based on the distinct argumentation that tolerance is viewed as one of the main achievements of interfaith dialogue. This point refers to 'the 2008 Annual Doha Conference on Interfaith Dialogue' that states: "...Interfaith dialogue is a necessity at every level: international, regional, and local; working groups on different levels . . . should be established with an emphasis on issues such as education, peace-building and the promotion of solidarity and understanding among different communities and cultures...."

Abu Nimer introduced the integration of three main elements: authentic, indigenous, and local cultural methods of conflict analysis and intervention that scholars and policymakers have applied to the peace-building agenda worldwide. One of the main concerns is finding Islam's position in this integration model. While the Western perspective shows their position primarily views the Islamic culture as an incompatible factor with the mechanism of peace-building, this new peacemaking model aims to introduce the Islamic standpoint as a natural and potential resource in strengthening the making of the non-violent and peaceful public sphere. This is a significant shift in a peace-building project that gives a broader space for Islamic views to make a non-violent and peaceful public space.

The application of the liberal perspective as a dominant foundation in peace-building projects—according to Smith—emerged after the end of the Cold War. Within these few decades, peace intervention projects in many regions have been referred to as the liberal perspective, such as in Namibia and South Sudan. In addition to this information—under this perspective—more than 20 multilateral projects of peace intervention operations have been taken globally.⁴⁵

The most critical to this approach is based on its narrow interest in the national context, needs, and interests. Since the liberal manner of peace-building project monopolizes a discourse and mechanism, all national states (governments) that are involved in this peace-building model do not fit the requirement based on the modern Western democratic standards or incorporate and apply other

methods and approaches are considered merely as a 'failing' and 'fragile states/governments.

Therefore, it is noteworthy to thank Indonesian Islam for its various interpretations and organizations closely linked to Islamic teaching. It is well said that the so-called 'radical Islamic movement' has never been a single force in Indonesian Islam as the leading Islamic raised. So many streams, leaders, individuals, actors, and institutions have a 'peaceful mindset' in understanding society's complexity and dynamics and how they could approach the active form of the Islamic interpretation and movement. Indonesian Islam deals with many 'internal clashes' between groups and affiliations related to various problems.

As noted by Islamic scholar Seyyed Hossein Nasr in his study, the tools to counter Muslim extremism, particularly with pious Muslims: "...today, hope is manifested in Muslim intellectuals who are intelligent, pious and who are in the process of rethinking Islam in the face of the challenges of modernity. They look at the question from the opposite direction than those Muslim intellectuals who are fascinated by secularism and attempt to bring Western solutions to Muslim problems....".⁴⁶

It is also essential to consider the presence of young Muslim scholars in Indonesia. Various moderate figures from this group focus on making a non-violent and peaceful public sphere. They have been accounted as active participants in supporting the making of a non-violent and peaceful public space. Besides having intellectual resources, these scholar groups have a connection to multicultural patterns of religious activities. They actively promote Indonesian values beyond the Islamic interpretation—for some radical groups, Islamic interpretation should be seen as a 'single reference' in constructing public space. These young Muslim scholars reject the application of Shariah or Fatwa as a single foundation for managing religious plurality in Indonesia's society. The Indonesian public generally believes that this new generation of Muslim scholars can be seen as a guarantee of experiencing a peaceful life in Indonesia.

We can also see that the violent radical movement is becoming a hegemonic pattern in Indonesia today. So, it is right to propose an 'anti-hegemony' of those radical movements and violent actions conducted by the extremist groups at the top of other moderate groups' concerns.

[...] 'Anti-hegemony' is also about the participant resistance to the hegemony, but it does not aim to replace hegemony with its hegemony. In other words, while the counter-hegemonic powers also envision their hegemony, anti-hegemony pursue a non-hegemonic order, such as a utopian deliberative democracy. The process should spread into many elements, such as large operations and movement [...].⁴⁷

In this respect, the instrumentalization of a peaceful Islam needs to be more transparent and move straight to the public sphere. The basis for this process should be handled directly by the leaders, individuals, young scholars, academia, and organizations who are so-called 'moderate Muslims.' This can be influential in defending humanistic attitudes, pro-democracy actions, and the prospect of human rights.

To strengthen the positive achievement of making a non-violent and peaceful public space, Islamic actors and organizations that affiliate with the peace-building process need to comprehensively understand the 'triangle relationship' between religion, state, and society. In Indonesia, the relationship between these three elements has been a crucial and problematic issue for many years. This is one of Indonesia's 'unresolved' and 'unfinished' problems. Unfortunately, this relationship erupts into tension between groups and violence against vulnerable (religious) minority groups and ethnic groups.

Fortunately, Indonesia also proves itself as the land of the success story of the peace-building project. In this context, Al-Qurtuby examines the prospective role of Indonesian Islam in initiating and enhancing the peace-building project.⁴⁸ His study reflects the situation of post-intergroup violence in Ambon, Eastern Indonesia [1999 – 2004]. After the 'bloody conflict and clash' in this region, peacemaking and reconciliation at the social level—influencing the political aspect—have been considered an essential target in the field. After the dark phase treated the region, peace-building has attracted concerns and interest from many actors and institutions.

Al-Qurtuby uses two interfaith peace-building groups, including 'Tim 20 Wayame' and 'Provokator Perdamaian' [Peace Provocateurs]. Islam also played a crucial role in supporting the Ambon region's post-conflict reconciliation and peace-building process. In the process, Islam participated in 'bridging' various and diverse social groups that previously tended to turn into tension and conflict. They involved the leaders from local and national levels in finding the best way to manage the making of a non-violent and peaceful public sphere.

Al-Qurtuby's view has been linked with the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic State University, Jakarta, and Jakarta Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) research project. They have recommended that Indonesia consider the uniqueness of its culture, identity, and plurality elements to create a peaceful atmosphere in social life (public life). Indonesia should dig up its sources in developing a non-violent and peaceful public sphere.

Talking about these different "Worlds" not only means talking about religious concepts but even more about political cultures and ways of organizing the coexistence of one or all of the peoples who form a nation and, in consequence, of all peoples and nations worldwide.⁴⁹

Indonesia itself requires more constructive participation of Islamic groups in supporting all efforts to maintain peaceful inter-group relationships and a peaceful public sphere.

For these few years, education has been considered a strategic tool in spreading peaceful thought within the 'Islamic worldview' in Indonesia. As radicalism can be embedded through an education platform, the so-called moderate Muslims in Indonesia need to rethink their educational curriculum's effectiveness in developing an open and inclusive social consciousness in day-to-day public life.

The popular press frequently characterizes madrassas as hotbeds of Islamic radicalism, and some madrassas have been the source of particular religious, social, political, and militant exploitation.⁵⁰

The teaching scheme in the education media should be constructed based on a solid standpoint of the peacemaking intention. These are referred to as internal and external focuses. Internally, Islam can reduce its violent energy linked to the radical movement; externally, it could remake its face under solid performance to others.

CONCLUSION

It is still a long way to reach and enjoy the peaceful atmosphere in Indonesia. Islam should inclusively work with other religious groups or faith-based organizations to establish peaceful settlements after violating humanity and their property in Indonesia. Concerning the pluralistic character of the society, Indonesian Islam needs to be more actively involved in articulating peaceful messages of their foundational teachings into peacemaking, peace-building, and strengthening of non-violent space.

Throughout the process, the urgency of initiating and supporting interreligious and interfaith peacemaking should be part of the Indonesian Islamic concern. One of the most substantive pathways is linking with the action that should be more related to a better understanding of the critical and crucial relationship between religion and politics.

This still needs further exploration and elaboration by placing the issue in the context of Indonesia as a pluralistic society. Islam can be a potential driving force in linking and connecting various groups and communities to be involved in the peacemaking project and process. Thus, it is also hoped that the interreligious and interfaith peacemaking where Islam presents itself as the central meeting point of those processes will cover various perspectives and issues of view in constructing the scientific solidity that brings an alternative pattern for developing a positive relationship between religion and politics—on the one side—and reducing the negative impact of the link—on the other side.

Through this platform, Indonesia can achieve the prospective peaceful atmosphere that the making of peaceful space is not a static academic and social project but rather a movement in educating potential actors in the various and different landscapes such as scholars, religious leaders, educators, politicians, activists, students, and related actors.

Islamic civil society in Indonesia, represented by the 2 largest Islamic organizations, including Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, plays a key role in building a peaceful and non-violent public space. These Islamic organizations have made significant achievements in supporting peace-building in Indonesia. By doing so, they affirm their presence as potential partners and resources to support the continuation of peaceful public spaces in Indonesia.

At this point, they must expand their network of cooperation with other religious organizations, civil society in general, academic institutions, and state actors to broaden the dissemination of their common intention of building a non-violent public space. This idea will become one of the inspirations for further research related to the consolidation of inter-faith and between stakeholders in building a peaceful public space in Indonesia.

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