

Why Aceh-Indonesia Conflict Resolution Cannot be Copied-Pasted in the Bangsamoro-Philippines Issue?

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Abstrak

Artikel ini berfokus pada resolusi konflik di Aceh, Indonesia, dan Bangsamoro, Filipina, sebagai studi banding. Dua daerah yang berbeda dan memiliki dua karakteristik yang sama: keduanya diakui oleh pemerintah pusat sebagai provinsi yang sangat otonom dibandingkan dengan provinsi lain, dan keduanya memiliki masalah yang sama dengan kelompok-kelompok revolusioner yang berusaha menarik diri dari pemerintah pusat. Penelitian kualitatif ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji proses dan hasil penyelesaian konflik di kedua pemerintah daerah. Tujuan utamanya adalah untuk mengidentifikasi kesamaan pilihan rasional (kelangsungan hidup, keamanan, ekonomi/kesejahteraan, prestise, dan pengaruh) terutama bagaimana elit politik masih merasa senang melakukan kesepakatan tersebut di kedua wilayah. Temuan menegaskan bahwa baik GAM (Aceh) dan MILF (Bangsamoro) memiliki urutan preferensi politik yang sama, tetapi faksi MNLF (Bangsamoro) tersebut masih melanjutkan gerakan militer mereka. Dikatakan, penyelesaian konflik Aceh-Indonesia tidak serta merta bisa diterapkan dalam persoalan Bangsamoro-Filipina.

Kata Kunci: Aceh, Bangsamoro, perjanjian damai.

Abstract

As a comparative study, this article focuses on conflict resolution in Aceh-Indonesia and Bangsamoro-Philippines. The two different regions possess at least two similar characteristics: both are recognized by the central government as widely autonomous provinces compared to other provinces and encounter the same problems with revolutionary groups that attempt to withdraw from the central government. This qualitative research examined the conflict resolution process and results in local governments. The main objective is to identify similarities in rational choice (survival, security, economy/welfare, prestige, and influence), especially how political elites would enjoy conducting those agreements in both regions. The findings unveiled that the GAM (Aceh) and the MILF (Bangsamoro) possessed similar political preference sequences, but such MNLF factions continued their military movements. It was argued that Aceh-Indonesia conflict resolution could not automatically be applied to the Bangsamoro-Philippines issue.

Keywords: Aceh, Bangsamoro, peace agreement.

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, peace agreements have become the main tool to deal with conflicts by which the government and

its armed opponents are involved in direct negotiations and treated as equals (Bell 2006). Arnson defined a peace agreement as dialogue over time between representatives

of contesting forces, with or without an intermediary, to end hostilities in agreements over issues that transcend a strictly military nature (Harish, 2005). The Helsinki Agreement between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia in 2005 was a concrete example of how peace accords could end armed separatism and impact lasting peace in Aceh—where the insurgency once took place for years.

The GAM has solved the Aceh separatism issue in Indonesia, resulting in the absence of military clashes since the 2006 Helsinki Agreement (14 years). It has contributed to global acceptance of Indonesian success in handling the Aceh insurgency. While Helsinki's peace accord was successfully implemented and has lasted for nearly two decades, the moves to carry out the peace agreement are just commencing in the case of Bangsamoro—the Philippines Government.

However, different conditions happened during the Bangsamoro conflict. Since 1976 (Tripoli Agreement) and 1996 (The Final Peace Agreement), the same measures have been taken by Bangsamoro and the Government of the Philippines to terminate armed secessionism in the southern—Muslim majority area of the Philippines, asking for independence from the country (Taya 2007). It is due to the clash of interests, identities and aspirations between both parties. Bangsamoro's claim to political autonomy and socio-economic development and the removal of discrimination against them is still yet to be properly addressed by the central government. Agreements reached during the peace process have not been properly implemented, and peace negotiations have been stunted due to the refusal of both parties to compromise on their stances (Ruhanas Harun 2017); (Sali and M. Datucali 2021).

In 2020, Bangsamoro began a new step of the peace agreement by which five Muslim-majority provinces in South Philippines were given broad rights to self-govern. However, bloody incidents remained, such as the Jolo Bombing on August 24, 2020, when an insurgent believed to be jihadist Abu Sayyaf detonated two bombs in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines, killing 14 people and wounding 75 others (Nugrahani 2020). Therefore, the

centrality of this research is to compare two cases with different results and analyze why did they happen? However, in spite of the fact that the cases in both countries have similarities, such as the background and quest for independence, there exist several differences emanating a question: Why does Aceh-Indonesia conflict resolution cannot be copied-pasted into the Bangsamoro-Philippines issue?

LITERATURE REVIEW

POLITICAL RATIONALITY OF THE COUNTRY

This theory of political preferences explains the behavior of the political elite in making choices of actions and decisions (Epstein, L., & Mershon 1996). Political preference is the tendency to prioritize a choice of behavior or political decisions by referring to certain rationality carried out by the political elite (Oskarsson 2004) to maximize results and minimize costs in achieving certain political goals.

Friedman and Hechter (1988) proposed the 'framework' model of rational choice theory, which focuses on actors. Actors are seen as human beings with goals, and their actions aim to achieve those goals. This theory considers two main coercion of actors' actions. First, limited resources—actors have different resources and access to other resources. In resources, scarcity is the notion of opportunity cost. In achieving a goal, the actors must pay attention to the costs incurred for the next most crucial action. Actors can select not to pursue the most valuable goal if the resources at their disposal are calculated to be unable to achieve it, making the chances of achieving that goal so slim and jeopardizing the opportunity to achieve other more valuable goals. Actors are seen as always trying to maximize their profits. Second, social institutions—institutional barriers provide both positive and negative sanctions that help encourage actors to take certain actions and avoid others. In general, the political rationality of a country has the following category to evaluate actors' behavior: survival, security, economy or welfare, prestige, and influence (Warsito 2017). Each of these elements is discussed more specifically in the following section.

Survival

State survival is a matter of existence, concerned with the basic fact of the existence of the 'things' themselves (Paul 1999). Later, Kadercan (2013) added that the concern for survival animates state behavior and sets interstate relation dynamics (Kadercan 2013). Survival is the first element of the national interest. It is crucial and has become a logical preference for every nation-state. No nation-state is established so that the people and other countries do not recognize it. It is the foremost interest of every nation-state. A nation-state can be defined as an institutional entity consisting of a legitimate government (recognized by its people and other countries), the existence of people or citizens, and a clear territory of authority. In short, a nation-state refers to a union between a government, citizens and a certain territory (Warsito 2017).

Security

Security is a value 'of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater or lesser measure' (Wolfers 1952). Writing during the same period as Wolfers, Bernard Brodie observed that not everyone views security as a matter of degree. He cited a statement by General Jacob L. Devers: National security is a condition that cannot be qualified. We shall either be secure, or we shall be insecure. We cannot have partial security. If we are only half secure, we are not secure (Bernard Brodie 1950). Security is a political issue that falls into high political scope classification. In high politics, the main actors who play a role in state affairs are state officials, both executive, judicial and legislative. The role of the actors is to regulate public relations so that they are orderly, safe, prosperous, and sustainable (Warsito 2017).

Welfare

The economy is among the crucial aspects that contribute to the success of a peace agreement. As asserted, the economy plays a vital role in the success of peace implementation (Woodward 2002). Thus, Wennmann (2009) suggested that economic provision should be defined in the peace agreement. Therefore, it

convinces societies that it is worthwhile to put down arms and benefit from economic opportunities of peace (Wennmann 2009).

Marx has seen the economy as the basis of social structure, and a person's position in this structure is determined primarily by whether he owns the means of production or not. If expanded, the ownership of objects or wealth becomes the basis of stratification. Weber also recognized the importance of economic stratification as a fundamental basis for class. For him, the social class consists of those with the same opportunity to live in the economic field. Members of the same class can become aware of their common interests in the economy and engage in organized economic or political actions to promote them. Whether subjective consciousness of class interests or consciousness exists or does not exist, the class position is determined (according to Max and Weber) by objective criteria concerning the opportunities of life in the economic world (Warsito 2017).

Prestige

Bloom in Wood (2014) described national prestige as the influence that can be exercised or the impression produced under events and images devaluing or enhancing national identity. Further, Kaufman and Zimmer stated that nations with an understanding of prestige possessors are politically influential, pervaded with grandeur, demonstrate artistic, economic, sporting or intellectual achievement, and the land they occupy is attractive (Wood 2014).

People are classified in layers based on honor or prestige, as expressed in the shared lifestyle. The result is the arrangement of people into status groups. Status groups are based on subjective bonds between their members, bound together because of a common lifestyle, values and habits, marriage within the group, feelings of social distance and other status groups. They know each other and refer to each other as 'our people' and struggle to maintain a feeling of superiority over those who do not belong to their social circle. Money alone is not acceptable among high-status groups, but the family background and history are essential. The reason lies in the prestige structure, not solely in the economic class

position. It also applies to those at the lowest prestige layer. They feel bound because of guilt that they are ostracized and despised and because of the necessity to carry out roles demonstrating obedience to their superiors. In other words, they 'know the place' even though they may try to change it (Warsito 2017).

Influence

As Cox and Jacobson defined in Arts and Verschuren (1999), influence is the modification of one actor's behavior by that of another (symbolically: A → B). Thus, actor A, being an individual or collective, modifies the behavior of the decision-maker in the political arena, resulting in a modified decision (Arts and Verschuren 1999).

For Weber, power is the ability to impose one's will despite the challenges of others. People may struggle for power alone or power as a means to improve their economic position or status. A political party is a type of organization in which the struggle to gain or use power is most clearly expressed at the level of rational organization. However, all organizations have a political aspect, the various groups of which they are components compete or counsel with one another for the ability to control the organization and determine its goals and procedures. The social structure does not have to be equivalent to the authority structure. Authority is the probability that a person will be obeyed based on a belief in the legitimacy of his or her right to influence. Power is the ability to overcome resistance from others in achieving one's goals, especially in influencing their behavior (Warsito 2017).

Survival, security, welfare, prestige and influence are included in the elements of the national interest. The order of the elements of national interest is essential and has become a logical preference for every nation-state. After the first element is fulfilled, the nation-state needs security guarantees, a situation where neighboring countries and the international environment guarantee a relationship of mutual trust and respect. Only then did the nation-state seek prosperity, especially in economic terms. After prosperity, the nation-state will be encouraged to appear in excellent prestige, if not

superior. Finally, after the nation-state feels that all the previous elements have been fulfilled, it will be compelled to seek an area of influence to demonstrate its superiority (Warsito 2017).

Each of the five political rationalities was employed to analyze the cases in Aceh and Bangsamoro. The success or failure of this implementation in Aceh and Bangsamoro will be directly proportional to the resolution of the conflict in each case. If almost all of these rationalities are positive in a country, conflict resolution in that country will be successful, and vice versa. The result and analysis section exhibits the findings.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research aims to examine the conflict resolution process and results in local governments. The main objective is to identify similarities and differences, especially how political elites would still enjoy conducting those agreements in both regions. This paper utilized a functional-structural perspective that views conflict as a symptom of social pathology caused by disharmony of the sub-systems in adapting to change. This view states that the source of conflict is an obstacle to social change. Therefore, conflict is a traumatic symptom that must be avoided (Mohtar Mas'oed 1995).

This study employed a qualitative method with both primary and secondary data. On the one hand, primary data were collected through observations or field studies in the Philippines from July to August 2018 and 2019 and in Aceh in March 2019. On the other hand, secondary data were gathered through literature studies, previous literature, official data and documents from the subject countries.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

GAM AND BANGSAMORO CONFLICTS AS INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ISSUES

The insurgency in Aceh lasted for 30 years before being finally resolved in 2005 through the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) mediation. However, the root of conflict could be traced back to the pre-colonial era, when Aceh was an independent sultanate with huge

control in the Malacca Strait. As Indonesia gained independence, the region was incorporated into the state, and thus Aceh sultanate never recovered. The tenacity of Aceh to implement the sharia and establish an independent Islamic state made its relationship with the country problematic. However, Soekarno had promised the region that special autonomy, particularly to apply Islamic law, would be granted to Aceh, which unfortunately did not happen until 2005. Massive oil, gas, and marine usurpation by central authorities and widespread human rights violations were also at the heart of the conflict. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was formed in 1976 under the leadership of Hasan Tiro, seeking independence for the *Veranda of Mecca*.

Jakarta's response toward Aceh had been largely characterized by a militaristic approach. The Indonesian National Armed Force (TNI) has been in a direct armed confrontation with the GAM since the region declared its independence in 1976. The situation worsened in the 1990s when the Soeharto regime implemented the counterinsurgency operation called "*Jaring Merah*" in the region (Schulze 2004). Legal attempts were also taken by Hasan Tiro, who fled to Sweden in 1979. The leader of the GAM sent letters to the United Nations bodies regarding Java's colonialization over Aceh (Damanik 2010). Until the resignation of Soeharto in 1998, there were about 10,000 deaths of human rights violations that drew the attention of international human rights organizations, urging international communities to pressure Indonesian authorities.

Abdurrahman Wahid's administration first initiated the effort for peace negotiation by inviting Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) as a mediator. The work generated a humanitarian pause but soon collapsed due to a lack of trust between the parties. Subsequently, the work was continued by Megawati and brought forth the Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement (COHA). The whole attempt gained international support as international organizations endorsed the process. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the United States, and various European Union countries praised the agreement.

Moreover, international governmental and non-governmental bodies channeled substantial funds to support the agreement. Ambassadors of the US and European countries made a well-publicized visit to Aceh (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). Nevertheless, the accord broke down, and the region was again under the military operation of "Terpadu" with the issue of Presidential decree 28/2003 regarding Martial Law over Aceh, sending 42,000 armed forces to the area. It signifies the attempt of Indonesia to maintain its territory by even sacrificing civilians (Kadir 2012). The establishment of the military operation again drew international attention as the case of human rights abuse escalated. International organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, warned the government regarding the failure to address and seemingly zero attention from the central government toward the abuse happening in Aceh (OCHA, 2000).

The use of the military approach ended with the coming Tsunami in December 2004, leaving hundreds of thousands of deaths and deteriorating the already severe conflict situation. The condition in Aceh compelled the central government to open the region to international aid and NGOs, which, on the other hand, internationalized every movement made by the conflicting actors. The pacifying effect of the Tsunami eventually allowed the Government of Indonesia and the GAM to step into negotiation as both parties realized that continuing the military campaign was impossible, and only in peace was it possible to rebuild Aceh. Negotiations between the GoI and the GAM lasted five rounds from January to July 2005, birthing the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by two parties in August of that year.

Like Aceh, the Moro conflict in the southern part of the Philippines has lasted for decades. The Moro people residing in the Mindanao were previously under several Muslim sultanates and were known for resisting foreign rule, particularly during the Spanish and US colonization. Consequently, after being integrated into the Philippines, the Moros continued their efforts for self-determination. Nevertheless, the pivotal point igniting the perennial insurgency was the *Jabidah*

massacre during the Marcos administration, in which around 60 Tausug Muslim youths, incorporated in the state-sponsored military operation of 'Merdeka' to recover the status of Sabah, were massacred. The murder subsequently drew greater international attention to Muslim Moro. Officials in Kuwait and Malaysia openly criticized the Philippine Government, while Moroccan newspapers wrote details of the Muslim massacre. In mid-1971, Libyan delegates sent a personal letter to President Marcos expressing concern for Colonel Qaddafi regarding the situation, and in November of that year, three Muslim religious leaders from the Soviet Union visited Muslim communities in Mindanao and Muslim leaders in Manila. The pressure given on the authorities of the Philippines did not stop there. In January 1972, Marcos eventually invited Muslim ambassadors from Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to tour the Muslim provinces. In one of its resolutions, the organization of the Islamic Conference requested the Philippines Government to guarantee the lives and properties of Philippine Muslims (Majul 1988).

As great as the grievances expressed by international communities, internal unrest also occurred in the country. Moreover, the incident was followed by another 70 Muslim massacres in Manili, signifying the narrative that Muslims were disregarded in the country. Mass scholar demonstrations took place before the palace, and multiple armed Muslim groups emerged, questing for independence. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and its splinter group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), became the leading organizations among Moro separatists. The government and the MNLF eventually stepped into a dialogue during the Marcos era. However, the failed ceasefire, lack of trust, and different approaches applied toward the rebel groups in every regime prolonged the conflict.

Several negotiations took place both abroad and within the Philippines. Tripoli Agreement in 1976 laid out the concept of an autonomous Muslim region in Mindanao consisting of 13 provinces, realized during the Corazon Aquino administration. Afterward, Jeddah and Jakarta Accords passed, eventually forming the

Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) under the Organic Act 6734. However, the experiment failed and was replaced with the new autonomous political entity called Bangsamoro. In 2012, under the Aquino III administration, the conflicting parties agreed on the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) that created the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), superseding the ARMM and plans to address structural reform. The FAB has particularly been praised by multiple countries, including Australia, the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, Turkey, Thailand, and Indonesia. Finally, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), the final version of the FAB, was signed in Manila in 2014. The CAB consisted of twelve points giving Bangsamoro greater political and economic powers. The Government of Bangsamoro was established in 2016, and the state gained greater revenue sharing. The MILF would remain a social movement, while a political party as a vehicle for its member would soon be formed (Rosauro 2014).

THE DYNAMICS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE POLITICAL PREFERENCE OF ACEHNESE ELITES

The peace negotiations between the Government of Indonesia and the GAM in Helsinki finally ended the longstanding war between the two. It brought forth the MoU signed by the delegates of conflicting actors and the former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari. The MoU consisted of five points outlining broad aspects from arms decommissioning, former combatant reintegration, governance of Aceh, including economic provisions and formation of local political parties, security arrangements, human rights, and Aceh Monitoring Mission.

The following section aims to break down the dynamics in the implementation of the peace agreement and its progress in the post-conflict era using the political preference order and subsequently discuss the political preference of Acehnese using the GAM's ideological approach of political preference proposed by Mukti (Mukti 2019).

Survival

In this aspect, what the GAM aspired to in the past was to exist as a sole nation, neither to be a part of nor an autonomous region within the Indonesian unitary system. It sought liberty from Dutch and Javanese domination, causing agony for the Acehnese (Mukti 2019). In doing so, the GAM was involved in an enduring war with the Government of Indonesia. However, this idea could not be pursued as the GAM signed the peace accord in 2005 and incorporated it as the self-governed region within the Republic of Indonesia.

Security

Previously, in the pre-peace era, the GAM confronted the government with open wars causing many casualties from national forces, GAM guerrillas, and civil societies. Nevertheless, it was changed after the signing of the Helsinki peace accord by which GAM fighters dissolved, and in exchange, Aceh was given the right to form local political parties to transform yet continue the GAM's struggle to secure the region.

Local political parties formed were considered a breakthrough in the peace process. Through the MoU, the Government of Indonesia allowed Aceh to form local political parties that could participate in local, gubernatorial, and legislative elections. During the peace negotiation, the GAM representatives believed that forming local parties was crucial since the existing national parties were mostly under the control of Jakarta; thus, they could not represent the Acehnese (Ansori 2012). Opening up political participation was a medium to continue the GAM struggle more peacefully and democratically. "Partai Aceh" was established in 2008 under the GAM leadership, which then participated in the legislative election in the following year.

The first elections held in Aceh were local elections in December 2006 to elect both governor and heads of districts. The gubernatorial elections were won by the former prominent GAM members, Irwandi Yusuf dan Nazar Abdullah, assigning them as the new governor and vice governor of the region. In the local elections, the GAM won almost in every district where the movement

had candidates running, and by late 2007, almost half of Aceh was being administered by individuals with GAM affiliations at the district level (Wandi and Zunzer 2008). The elections achieved huge success with high voter turnouts (80%) and were largely free from violence, far from what was feared (Thorburn 2012).

In the 2009 legislative elections, six local parties, encompassing Partai Aceh (PA), Partai Daulat Aceh (PDA)—dominated by santri, Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera (PAAS), Partai Rakyat Aceh (PRA)—dominated by youth and scholars, Partai Bersatu Aceh (PBA), and Partai Suara Independent Rakyat Aceh (SIRA)—previously vocal in promoting referendum agenda, participated. The issue raised by each party was different; the implementation of sharia, the anti-corruption issue, and the emphasis on universal values of Islam—to counter the strict application of sharia proposed by the opponent (Affan 2009). It indicates the growing democracy through establishing political parties representing different Acehnese interests, from former combatants to youth. The subsequent elections were held in 2014 and 2019. However, only several parties succeeded in registering for the next elections as some entered the parliamentary threshold (Amirulkamar and Ismail 2019). On the other hand, a new party, Partai Nasional Aceh (PNA)—which later changed its name to Partai Nanggroe Aceh, emerged and participated in both elections. PNA won in the two elections, indicating the continued primacy of the GAM in post-war Aceh, even though it lost several seats later.

Welfare

In this aspect, the agreement clearly outlines that Aceh would receive 70% of its profits from the current and future hydrocarbon and other natural resources deposited in its territorial and surrounding sea. The region has also been given the right to administer seaports and airports, seek foreign direct investment in Aceh, and enjoy free trade with unhindered access to other regions in Indonesia and foreign countries (Wandi and Zunzer 2008).

After the signing of the accord, the Acehnese Government was aggressively promoting the region's advantages from the side of both natural resources and its

strategic position in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand growth triangle. From 2006 to 2008, 42 foreign and six domestic investors intended to invest in Aceh, which would provide jobs for approximately 22 foreign and 4,021 domestic workers if all the investments reached fruition. Local investment and small to medium-scale credit allocation also increased steadily since the end of the conflict (Thorburn 2012). In addition, LoGA mandated that Aceh would receive the Special Autonomy Fund (Dana Otonomi Khusus) for 20 years, amounting to a 2% share of the national General Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum) for fifteen years and 1% for the next five years. This windfall accounted for more than half of provincial government revenue by 2008, impacting the increasing regional gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank 2010).

Nevertheless, a recent study revealed that Aceh's income from the transfer funds (GAF and SAF) has exceeded regional income. Aceh public spending has relied on the transfer funds more than its locally-generated revenue, called *flypaper effects* (Zulfan and Maulana 2019). Data from the Central Bureau of Statistics of Aceh also indicates that the province has experienced a decline in the gross regional domestic product (GRDP) in the past two years. The economy in Aceh has been dominated by the agricultural sector (Biro Humas dan Protokol Sekretariat Daerah Aceh 2019). However, a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) was established in the Lhokseumawe district in 2017. SEZ is specific boundaries determined to carry out economic functions and obtain certain facilities. Arun Lhokseumawe SEZ focuses on the energy, petrochemicals, and agro-industry sectors supporting food security, logistics, and kraft paper. In particular, the SEZ has been projected to absorb up to 40,000 labors by 2027 (Dewan Nasional Kawasan Ekonomi Khusus Indonesia 2021).

In terms of economic convenience for ex-guerrillas, many former combatants have faced difficulties finding jobs and earning money, though others have succeeded in business and politics. However, it is understandable given the low educational background of most ex-combatants. Subsequently, land distribution for ex-combatants has not been realized to date, although it

has been mandated in the MoU. As the Chief of Aceh Transitional Committee argued, this matter is among the cause of the low economic level of former soldiers (Fajar 2020).

Prestige

In the MoU signed by Indonesia and the GAM, the *prestige* aspect lies in the re-establishment of the *Wali Nanggroe* institution and the use of regional symbols such as the flag. *Wali Nanggroe*, in literal, means guardian of the state. The history of the institution can be traced back to the early colonial era by which the Dutch came to the archipelago. It consisted of several customary groups led by *Wali Nanggroe*. In contrast, the term was used particularly in the sultanate era to refer to the person *who ran the country for a specific duration as the legitimate sultan was still too young to take the role*. After the peace accord, the term of *Wali Nanggroe* was re-used, and the institution was re-established, but at the moment is within the unitary state of Indonesia. Nevertheless, the function is different, as current *Wali Nanggroe* is the unifier of customs (Nurmalia 2016).

The existence of *Wali Nanggroe* is intended to be an alternate force when the formal leadership is incapable of enforcing, especially in dealing with the negative effects of inevitable globalization in the region; thus, modern Aceh will always be based on the noble values growing in the society (Ghulsyani 2017). However, matters emerged regarding the authority of *Wali Nanggroe* considered to exceed the power of the executive (Irmayani and Haikal 2016). Qanun No. 9 of 2013 Article 29 states that *Wali Nanggroe* has the rights to (a) manage the assets of Aceh located both inside and outside Aceh (outside of the province and overseas), (b) conduct cooperation with various parties, both domestic and international, for the advancement of Aceh civilization, and (c) maintain Aceh's peace and participate in settling world peace. This matter changes the function of *Wali Nanggroe* from being symbolic-cultural to having actual power in paradiplomacy, violating the provisions in LoGA. A previous study by Mukti (2019) disclosed that even though the expanding authority on paradiplomacy has been opposed by the central government, Jakarta has not

yet taken a step to deal with this concern. While Aceh's side also has not yet been willing to amend the law. Mukti later concluded that Aceh chose to stay in its position because of the still-living and rooted GAM's ideology based on the undisputed history that Aceh was once a great sultanate and the international legal norm that Aceh has the right to be an independent nation (Mukti 2019).

Influence

In this instance, it is Aceh's capacity to influence other states' behavior. Decisions vanished after the sultanate was included in the territory of Indonesia. Accordingly, as its idea of being an independent nation is unachieved, as an autonomous region in Indonesia, Aceh does not influence other states' behavior.

THE DYNAMICS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BANGSAMORO AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

The final draft of the peace agreement between the Government of the Philippines and Bangsamoro was summed in the Comprehensive Agreement of Bangsamoro (CAB) signed in 2014, with the BARMM officially inaugurated in March 2019. The CAB covers extensive features comprising four annexes on the transitional arrangements, revenue generation and wealth sharing, power-sharing and normalization, and an addendum on Bangsamoro waters. The following section discusses the agreement using political rationality and identifies which part of the pact is given the most pressure.

Survival

Republic Act No. 11054, commonly known as Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), clearly states that "...Bangsamoro Autonomous Region has jurisdiction, which shall always be an integral, indivisible, and inseparable part of the national territory of the Republic of the Philippines...". It indicates that Bangsamoro, *de jure* and *de facto*, is a region within the Philippines; thereby, the term survival in this instance refers to an autonomous region of a country given the right to self-govern.

Previously, the Moro people in Mindanao were involved in four decades of war to seek independence from the national government. The region was later granted autonomy in 1990, called the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Nevertheless, several clashes still took place in the area. The current Bangsamoro autonomous region (BARMM) replaced the previous ARMM established during the Aquino administration.

Security

Regarding security, the relationship between the central government and the Bangsamoro Government is asymmetric, mainly to recognize the aspiration of self-determination of the Moro people. The peace pact also mandates the establishment of the Bangsamoro assembly (elected by voters), consisting of at least 50 members encompassing a representative from Bangsamoro and non-Moro indigenous communities, women, settler communities, and other sectors. The assembly later elects the Chief Minister, who will choose Deputy Chief Minister to form the cabinet. In addition, a Philippine-Bangsamoro Congress Assembly will be formed to cooperate and coordinate legislative initiatives (UN Peacemaker 2013).

The BARMM was formally inaugurated in March 2019 in the presence of President Duterte. Currently, it is the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), led by Al-Hajj Murad Ebrahim, previously Chairperson of the MILF, that exercises executive and legislative powers as the interim government of the BARMM (Taniguchi 2020). The transition from the ARMM to the BARMM has been set to reach completion in June 2022, after the first group of legislators consisted of 80 members. The seats in the Parliament are classified into representatives of political parties (50%), Parliamentary districts (40%), and reserved and sectoral representatives (10%) (Vina 2019). However, challenges exist since, within the Bangsamoro jurisdiction, there are non-Moro indigenous groups. Therefore, adequate representatives in the parliament and participation in drafting the codes of the Bangsamoro region are necessary.

Additionally, the separation of powers in the Bangsamoro region has been ruled. On the one hand, the central government retains *reserved power* over which authority is retained, including foreign policy, monetary and coinage, citizenship, immigration, custom and tariff, global trade, and intellectual property rights. On the other hand, *exclusive power* refers to the authority that pertains to the Bangsamoro Government, ranging from education, history and culture, trade, investments, manufacturing and public utilities, labor and employment, to environmental management. Furthermore, concurrent power or shared power between the central government and the Bangsamoro Government includes pollution control, disaster risk reduction and management, coastguard, and public order and safety.

Welfare

The CAB signed by the MILF and the Government of the Philippines outlines revenue and wealth sharing, emphasizing tax and natural resources revenues. The Bangsamoro Government has the power to levy capital gain tax, documentary stamp tax, and donor and estate tax where the taxable elements are within the Bangsamoro. Other taxes, fees, and charges collected in Bangsamoro, other than tariff and customs duties, 75% of which would be shared with the Bangsamoro, and the remaining 25% would pertain to the central government. Moreover, Bangsamoro would enjoy authority, control, and income from the previously government-owned and -controlled corporations and financial institutions operating exclusively in the Bangsamoro territory. Lastly, the BARMM would receive block grants or annual financial assistance from the central government, alike another region, and should not be less than the last budget received by the ARMM before the BTA establishment (Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines 2013).

In terms of income from natural resources, Bangsamoro retains revenues from non-metallic minerals. Concerning metallic minerals, Bangsamoro would receive 75% of the total revenue, while in terms of fossil fuels and uranium, Bangsamoro and the central

government would receive an equal share of 50%. The agreement also mandates the formation of Bangsamoro development plans consistent with national development goals (UN Peacemaker 2013).

Among the significant strides taken by the Bangsamoro Government is the approval annual block grant of the Php 65 billion budget for the 2020 fiscal year of Bangsamoro. The BARMM also held Tourism Stakeholders' Summit to promote and advance the tourism industry in the region, by which the BARMM tourist department spearheaded the promotion of halal and sustainable tourism and the Bangsamoro Energy Forum to develop sustainable energy sources. Moreover, the government sets a high investment record. By 2019, five investments were registered in the BARMM by the Regional Board of Investment (RBOI) (Fernandez 2019). The RBOI has also registered a total of Php 4,153 billion worth of investment and recorded 2,724 employments in 2019. The government has also set Bangsamoro online job portal and the BARMM Full Disclosure Policy Portal to enable societies to understand government financial transactions and how the local government budget is spent and managed (Bureau of Public Information Bangsamoro Government 2019).

Prestige

Previously, the sharia justice system and *sharia* courts were already applicable in the ARMM. Since the BARMM replaced the previous system, the power over the *sharia* courts and system was transferred to the current Bangsamoro Government. *Sharia* law has its root in the *Quran* and *Sunnah*, and in this matter, *Sharia* law applies only to Muslims, although non-muslim can voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the *sharia* courts. The *sharia* courts resolve disputes relating to marriage, divorce, betrothal or breach of contract to marry, customary dower, disposition of property upon divorce, maintenance and support, consolatory gift, and restitution of marital rights. Currently, five *sharia* courts exist within the jurisdiction of Bangsamoro.

In addition to being the only region implementing *sharia* law within the Philippines, the BARMM also enjoys other privileges, including authority over the *hajj*

and *umrah*, affecting pilgrims from Bangsamoro. The BARMM Government would work closely with the central government regarding this matter. The central government is responsible for pilgrims from outside Bangsamoro. Bangsamoro also has a Wali, selected by the Bangsamoro Parliament and a term of six years. Wali's role is as the ceremonial head of Bangsamoro and administers the oath of office of all parliament members, including the Chief Minister, dissolving parliament and subsequently calling for a new parliament election (Gavilan 2019). Moreover, the first law passed by the Bangsamoro Parliament was an act adopting the BARMM official flag, which embodies its people's identity, history, heritage, struggles, and aspirations (Paris 2019).

Influence

Referring to the concept of (A → B) of influence toward other nations' behavior, Bangsamoro has no control of influence. As the BARMM officially replaced the ARMM as an autonomous region within the Republic of the Philippines in 2014, it has no weight, in the capacity of an independent nation, to influence other states' decisions. Consequently, there have been bloody accidents in the Southern Philippines. For example, the Jolo bombing on August 24, 2020, when an insurgent believed to be jihadist Abu Sayyaf detonated two bombs in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines, killing 14 people and wounding 75 others (Nugrahani 2020).

COMPARISON ANALYSIS OF THE PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN ACEH AND BANGSAMORO

Based on discoveries related to the implementation of peace agreements in Aceh and Bangsamoro, some points are considered, particularly the attention given to political rationality order. Ideology preference, in this matter, is among the most dominant factors influencing political preference. This part of the study compares the political preference of Aceh based on Tiroism proposed by Mukti (2019) to the political preference of Bangsamoro based on Islamism and whether or not the Aceh-Indonesia conflict resolution can be copied-pasted in the Bangsamoro-Philippines issue.

Regarding political rationality order, Acehese elites possess distinct political rationality order compared to the commonly used preference. Tiroism as an ideology plays a vital role in sequencing the order. Tiroism was built on two main foundations; an undisputed history that Aceh was the great and sole sultanate in Sumatra recognized by western countries, and international law that Aceh is a legal successor state of the past sultanate, given the fact that Aceh sultanate had never surrendered to the Dutch. The Dutch, in this case, violated the law by submitting Aceh to the new Indonesia-Java colonial (Mukti 2019). Mukti (2019) asserted that the current Acehese political rationality is prestige, security, welfare, justice, and survival. The biggest portion is prestige, given that Aceh is the only region implementing Islamic law, portraying its adherence to Islam. In addition, Aceh has its flag and *Wali Nanggroe*, which strongly represent the identity of the Acehese, even back to the era when Aceh was an independent sultanate. The second sequence is security, as Aceh local parties, particularly Partai Aceh, driven by former GAM leaders, are still dominating the political sphere in the region. It demonstrates the GAM leadership in the post-agreement era. *Welfare* ranks third in the political preference of Acehese elites. As given in the findings, slow economic growth depicts the dependence of Aceh on transfer funds, indicating that the region has not yet sturdy economically. Influence is non-existence in Aceh's case since the region has no authority, in the capacity of a state, to influence other nations' decisions.

Mukti stated that justice is the fourth sequence of political preference. The justice aspect of the MoU lies in the "Human Rights" point that covers several matters, including establishing the Human Rights Court and Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) in Aceh to deal with past human rights abuse in the region. However, the establishment of the TRC took a while before finally established in 2016 (Wahyuningroem 2017). It also achieves political and economic support from the government (Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi 2019). Survival ranks last since the current Aceh existence is an autonomous region within the unitary system of Indonesia.

However, staying in the agreement with the central government provides satisfaction to the Acehese elites since it still accommodates the political preference of the GAM. Besides, the region is allowed to apply sharia law, establish the *Wali Nanggroe* institution, gain substantial funds from Jakarta, and have the privilege to form local political parties within its territory. Thus, it is the rational decision taken by the Acehese elites with low cost and great benefit.

In the case of Bangsamoro, Liow (2006) stated that the ideology of the MILF, the leading separatist group signing the agreement with the Government of the Philippines, is Islamism. Citing *The Bangsamoro Mujahid* written by Hashim Salamat, the late MILF leader and founder, Liow, noted that the ultimate objective of the resistance is to make the supreme word of Allah, meaning the establishment of the Muslim community and Islamic system of government, and the application of Islamic way in all aspects of life. Furthermore, this ideal would be achieved through *jihad* and *dakwah*. It is further strengthened by Salama's statement, "The MILF adopts the Islamic ideology and way of life (and) believes in the Islamic concept of state and government...and one has not perfected his worship if whom he owes obedience and allegiance does not recognize the supremacy of the Law of God" (Liow 2006).

As officially inaugurated in March 2019, the length of implementation of the peace agreement by the Bangsamoro Government is quite small compared to the Acehese. Nevertheless, on its face, the emphasis is particularly on the *privilege* by which the BARMM officials passed the first law regulating the adoption of the Bangsamoro flag. Moreover, Bangsamoro is the single region applying sharia law and currently possesses five sharia courts; its flag reflects people's identity, history, and struggle. It complies with the Salamat statement that the Islamic system of government is required to perfect one's worship. Security ranks second in the order, as the region is at the moment enjoying a self-governance system with private parliament and cabinet led by a Chief Minister. However, the parliament would also consist of non-Moro, including indigenous and settler communities; thus, it should reflect the diversity within Bangsamoro.

Moreover, the Bangsamoro Government has enjoyed exclusive powers ranging from education (in which Islamic subjects are inserted) to environmental management. The subsequent preference is *welfare*. The law regulates revenue sharing within the BARMM jurisdiction, particularly taxes, fees, and natural resources. In addition, the region would receive block grants. Concerning *influence*, the BARMM is similar to Aceh as the region does not possess the capacity of a state to influence other nations' behavior and decisions. However, it is crucial to note that Bangsamoro prioritizes human rights enforcement. Bangsamoro Basic Law, also known as RA 11054, outlines the establishment of the Bangsamoro Human Rights Commission (BHRC), realized in December 2019 after the parliament unanimously approved The Bangsamoro Human Rights Act of 2019. Until recently, the BHRC has held several discussions and works on human rights cases (Anon 2020). Survival ranks last since the entity of Bangsamoro exists as an autonomous region within the Republic of the Philippines.

Despite having similar cases, both similarities and differences occurred in achieving peace in Aceh and Bangsamoro. The following table describes the similarities and differences of the peace process.

Table 1. Comparison Table between the Similarity and Differences of the Peace Process of Aceh and Bangsamoro

		Similarity	Difference	
			Aceh	Bangsamoro
External Aspect	Third-Party as the Mediator	Both have involved a third party, while the Aceh-Indonesia case has involved a Norwegian NGO. Bangsamoro-Philippines has involved the Libyan State and the OIC.	Because NGOs do not have real political power like nation-states, their power is relatively stable (not fluctuating). Thus, their position can be trusted by both parties negotiating, resulting in a relatively stable peace process in Aceh.	In the case of Bangsamoro, Libya, as a mediator, is a nation-state that has experienced internal conflict and a decline in power. It caused Bangsamoro's bargaining position to weaken.
	Accelerator	The conflict between Aceh and Bangsamoro has caused a large scale of death and economic casualties.	In the case of Aceh, the Tsunami as a natural disaster causing more than 100,000 deaths has accelerated Acehnese combatants to accept the peace process.	In Bangsamoro, no natural disasters accelerate.
Internal Aspect	Combatant	Both have combatants with all factions	After the peace in Aceh, ex-combatants are channeled through a democratic mechanism into three local parties: Partai Damai	In Bangsamoro, there was a shift of power. The MILF, initially weak, has strengthened after the peace process, making it willing to continue the

<p>Aceh, Partai Nasional Aceh/Partai Nanggroe Aceh, and Partai Aceh. Moreover, they have been relatively satisfied with political and economic access distribution after the peace agreement.</p>	<p>peace process because it obtains political and economic access. On the other hand, the MNLF led by Nur Misuari was relatively strong before the peace agreement. However, it experiences a decline in influence after the peace agreement. As a result, its political and economic access has not been fulfilled. Hence, it does not want to continue the peace process, and some factions, such as Abu Sayaf and Maute, continue military violence.</p>
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Note. Data researched by authors in 2021

The table explains that there are similarities in external and internal aspects between Aceh and Bangsamoro. In the external aspect, they both have a third party as a mediator and both caused a large scale of death and economic casualties. As for the internal aspect that they have combatants with all factions. However, they also have differences, both in their external and internal aspects. These differences are explained in each section in the table above.

The following is a table that explains about comparison of rational choice between Aceh and Bangsamoro which contains survival, security, welfare, prestige, and influence.

Table 2. Comparison of Rational Choice of Aceh and Bangsamoro

Aspect	Aceh - Indonesia	Bangsamoro - The Philippines
Application of Agreement (Political Rationality)		
Political Rationality	Ideological approach: Tiroism	Ideological approach: Islamism
1. Survival	Implementation of <i>sharia</i> law, the establishment of <i>Wali Nanggroe</i> institution, Flag of Aceh (Prestige)	Application of <i>sharia</i> law, <i>Wali</i> , Flag of Bangsamoro (Prestige)
2. Security	Establishment of Aceh political parties (Security)	BARMM Parliament and Cabinet (Security)
3. Welfare	Revenue sharing, transfer of funds (SAF and GAF) (Welfare)	Revenue sharing, block grants (Welfare)
4. Prestige	Formation of Aceh Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Justice)	Formation of Bangsamoro Human Rights Commission (Justice)
5. Influence	Autonomous region: Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Survival)	Autonomous region: Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) (Survival)

Note. Data researched by authors in 2021

Table 2 exhibits that although having different ideological approaches, Acehnese and Bangsamoro possess similar sequences of political rationality: prestige, security, welfare, justice, and survival. However, it does not automatically mean that the Aceh-Indonesia way of maintaining a peace agreement can be copied-pasted in the Bangsamoro-Philippines case. There must be a political will from Bangsamoro and the Central

Government of the Philippines to build lasting peace. Besides, the political elites of Bangsamoro must feel that their interest, particularly in cultural, political, and economic articulations, is fulfilled by the peace agreement.

The implementation of the peace agreement based on aspects of rational choice is described in the following table.

Table 3. Comparison of Aspects between Aceh and Bangsamoro

No	Rational Choice (Advantage)	Aspect to Prove Rational Choice	Aceh-Indonesia	Bangsamoro-Phillipines
1	Security (Political Trust) Aceh > Bangsamoro	Religion	Aceh Muslim Ahlussunnah sect – Most Indonesian Muslims prioritize	Bangsamoro is Muslim – the Philippines majority is Catholic. (Prestige)
2	Prestige aceh > Bangsamoro. Before the peace process, the MNLF was dominant; after	Law System	Ahlussunnah Islamic law over the national law system. Aceh's geographic area of influence is	Islam law is equal to the national law system. Bangsamoro's geographic area of

	the peace process, the MNLF is relegated to being a minority.		intact or not reduced.	influence has drastically reduced from 13 to five.
3	Bangsamoro. Explaining why there is still conflict between the Bangsamoro-Philippines and the Bangsamoro continue to be combatants (especially the MNLF) Welfare and Survival	Political System	Local political party - Ex-combatants obtain certainty or guarantee of political access	No local political party. Ex-combatants, especially the MNLF, do not receive certainty or guarantee of political access
4	Aceh > Bangsamoro	Economic Distribution	70 % economic rights to natural resource income	No special treatment

Note. Data researched by authors in 2021

The table above explains that there are certain aspects of the rational choice for both Aceh and Bangsamoro that affect their peace agreement. From the aspect of religion, law system, political system, and economic distribution in Aceh, it is different from what happened in Bangsamoro. That is the reason why the peace agreement in Aceh can work well while in Bangsamoro it does not.

CONCLUSION

The findings uncovered that both the GAM (Aceh) and the MILF (Bangsamoro) have demonstrated a similar political preference sequence. Subsequently, Aceh-Indonesia conflict resolution could not automatically be applied to the Bangsamoro-Philippines issue. The authors recommend conducting further research on more detailed conflict resolution in Bangsamoro post-referendum 2021, in which Bangsamoro accepted special status from the central government of the Philippines.

In other words, two things accelerated the agreement process: NGOs and non-state actors as third parties. Meanwhile, the Bangsamoro did not immediately obtain a peace agreement because it did not experience a disaster, and the third party was determined to be a state actor who might have an act for his interests or not be neutral.

The distribution of political and economic access to former Aceh combatants after the conflict was relatively even through three local parties: Partai Damai Aceh, Partai Nasional Aceh, and Partai Aceh. It was different from Bangsamoro, where the MNLF, Nur Misuari, seemed extremely strong before the conflict but became somewhat unimportant after the conflict. On the contrary, the MILF, previously seen as less crucial, became essential. The MNLF and its factions, such as Abu Sayyaf and Maute, have continued their combatants.

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