Measuring Islamic Modernity: Between Positive Alarms or Setbacks for Democracy in Indonesia

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Abstrak

Para peneliti di dunia secara intensif mempelajari tema modernitas Islam sejak gerakan menjadi alat yang cukup efektif dalam memobilisasi massa dan mencari dukungan politik. Hampir 90 persen penduduk Indonesia beragama Islam. Konsep Indonesia dalam membuat kebijakan tentang masalah kenegaraan telah mengakibatkan kebuntuan hubungan antara rakyatnya dan konsep negara yang cenderung ke arah bangsa kolonial Belanda. Islam adalah ciri masyarakat Indonesia; Namun, negara tidak menggunakan konsep tersebut dalam Islam. Oleh karena itu, konsep negara yang tidak sejalan dengan masyarakat telah mengakibatkan masyarakat Indonesia saat ini hidup dalam kemiskinan, meskipun mereka hidup di negara dengan kekayaan bumi, udara, dan air yang melimpah, ditambah dengan laut yang menawan dan unik bagi dunia untuk dilihat. Namun, bagaimana ukuran modern Islam di Indonesia mempengaruhi demokrasi? Dengan menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif – deskriptif dengan pendekatan studi literatur, penulis menemukan bahwa Islam modern di Indonesia memiliki berbagai motif jika dilihat dari berbagai aspek yang digunakan untuk menggambarkan suatu masalah yang terjadi di masa lalu, saat ini, atau memproyeksikan masalah yang akan muncul di masa depan. sebagai saran dan kritik yang membangun. Di satu sisi, ia merupakan bentuk solidaritas masyarakat dalam menggerakkan beragam aspirasi untuk bantuan kemanusiaan; di sisi lain, ia ditunggangi oleh oligarki elit politik untuk mendapatkan suara, tetapi di luar, ia menggeliat aksi radikalisme Islam.
Kata Kunci: demokrasi, modernisasi islam, solidaritas masyarakat, oligarki elit politik, radikalisme islam.

Abstract

Researchers have intensively studied Islamic modernity since the movement has become a reasonably effective tool in mobilizing the masses and seeking political support. Almost 90 percent of Indonesian people are Muslim. The concept of Indonesia in making policies on state issues has resulted in a deadlocked relationship between its people and the concept of a state that tends toward the Dutch colonial nation. Islam is a characteristic of Indonesian society; however, the state does not use the concept in Islam. Hence, the concept of the state not being in line with society has resulted in today's Indonesian people living full of poverty, even though they live in a country with abundant earth, air, and water wealth, coupled with captivating and unique seas for the world to see. However, how does the modern measure of Islam in Indonesia affect democracy? Using qualitative descriptive research methods with a literature study approach, this study discovered that modern Islam in Indonesia has various motives when viewed from multiple aspects used to describe problems occurring in the past, currently, or projecting issues that will arise in the future as suggestions and constructive criticism. On the one hand, it is a form of community solidarity in mobilizing diverse aspirations for humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, on the other hand, it is ridden by the oligarchs of the political elite to gain votes. Moreover, on the outside, it stretches the actions of Islamic radicalism.
Keywords: democracy, islam modernism, social solidarity, elite political oligarchy, islam radicalism.

INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian nation is the incarnation of the archipelago, with a diverse society and extraordinary natural wealth. However, many Indonesian people are living below the poverty line. Even though people from other parts of the archipelago can live prosperous and peaceful, the Indonesian people are still lagging in

governance. How to make a living concern for all Indonesian people, even the world, highlights the problem of poverty in Indonesia today. Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam are examples of countries living in parts of the archipelago. However, these nations can eliminate poverty in society. In contrast, Indonesia, with such a vast territory and abundant natural resources, has been unable to alleviate poverty. Even ironic hunger haunts the people of Indonesia, signifying a flaw within the nation today, resulting in people's poverty worsening every second.

Islam always directs life intelligently in carrying out policies by looking at the conditions of society in making a country or establishing state policies. The people of Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam can escape poverty and live prosperously. Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, with a population of mostly Muslims, utilize a state Islamic perspective in an Islamic way to eradicate this issue. Singapore set up the concept of a nation following the character of its people and nation to create mutually beneficial relationships with each other. A nation can achieve prosperity and public welfare by building a country in the archipelago. Meanwhile, the relationship between the Indonesian people and the state built by the predecessors has experienced enormous obstacles, indicating that they are not in line. This discrepancy has triggered damage in the government body, resulting in irregularities and poverty for the Indonesian people. Islam tries to overcome the issue by making the relationship between the state and society interrelated to create a complementary state. If the state and society are not in line, it will inevitably result in destructiveness in people's lives. Indeed, poverty will continue to exist and attack the Indonesian people.

Almost 90 percent of Indonesian people are Muslim. The concept of Indonesia in making policies on state issues has resulted in a deadlocked relationship between its people and the concept of a state that tends toward the Dutch colonial nation. Islam is a characteristic of Indonesian society; however, the state does not use the concept in Islam. Hence, the concept of the state not being in line with society has resulted in today's Indonesian people living full of poverty, even though they live in a country with abundant earth, air, and water wealth, coupled with captivating and unique seas for the world to see. It is expected that the Indonesian people will one day be able to change the perspective of the state following theirs to create a state with the concept of Islam and Islamic society. Therefore, awareness is highly required in today's modernization.

Public awareness of implementing sharia principles is an unresolved problem. It is demonstrated by the number of Muslims in Indonesia being apathetic toward worship activities and many putting prayer a formality yet do not change their daily behavior. Ironically, people pray diligently, but their prayer practices do not affect their behavior. Moreover, nowadays, many people do not pray. That is the problem—Muslims consider worship only a formality, just as fasting only holds thirst and hunger.

In other words, these Muslims do not maintain attitudes and passions. One should not be in a hurry or lazy when praying. The bad behavior of some Muslims sometimes makes prayer solely a tool to seek popularity or mere riya', whereas the essence of prayer can change human behavior for the better. Democracy is part of the livelihoods of Indonesian citizens, and various activities also evidence it, both in behavior and character. Indeed, it will impact the revival of Islamic modernity in terms of democracy and threats.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The public has increasingly discussed Islamic modernity in Indonesia in line with the remarkable statement from the Minister of Religion, Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, determined to prevent the spread of Islamic modernity in society as a spice for conflict. He believes that Islamic modernity raises the seeds of radicalism. Parties who disagree with him are considered enemies and must be repealed on Sunday, December 27, 2020. Inevitably, this statement triggered many people to respond. The LIPI-Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Professor of Sociology Endang Turmudzi, stated that the minister's information regarding Islamic modernity was misplaced. Islamic modernity is not a form of radicalism but ideas that articulate the political interests of Islamic

society on Monday, December 28, 2020. Even politician and member of the Indonesian House of Representatives, Fadli Zon, openly, on his Twitter account, challenged Gus Yaqut to argue about the meaning of Islamic modernity because he considered it not the authority of the Minister of Religion on Monday, December 29, 2020.

This economic crisis demands the emergence of influential individuals to solve community problems. On the other hand, authoritarian and semi-authoritarian countries have become a reference for building a country's prosperity without ignoring the structure of capitalism that can run in every government regime. The People's Republic of China and Singapore are the references (Thung-hong, 2017). The term in the United States is a reflective phenomenon instead of a conscious propaganda plan. In this way, the word is part of a historical process that seeks to eliminate history, resulting in disruption, the dulling of critical power, and the swaying of liberalism in the United States. In the Indonesian context, before the emergence of social media and internet users developed massively, disinformation was carried out by the New Order regime, precisely in the events of 1965-1966 (Umar, 2010). By purging the left, the communists, and those affiliated and sympathizing with, either through assassinations, arrests without trial, and exile on the island of Buru, the New Order regime erased the history of the contributions of leftists and communists in Indonesia (Lamya et al., 2020).

In two separate but related events, the government under Suharto made the 30 September Movement of 1965 a scapegoat for PKI as the mastermind behind the coup. This excuse had implications for the destruction of these leftists and communists in two extremely dark years, the events of 1965-1966. Through fictional stories, this authoritarian regime then recounts the atrocities of the PKI and its affiliated organizations that have killed the generals (Othman & Okpe, 2021). The single narrative of the New Order's version of the 30 September Movement later became the collective memory of the Indonesian people through three rites: commemoration through ceremonies, education through curriculum and narration, and the Pancasila Sakti monument at Lubang Buaya. The undisclosed truth about past events caused two events (the 30 September Movement and the PKI Massacre) chaotic after the New Order regime. On the other hand, verbal violence occurred against PKI followers, triggering the agrarian reform plan and tension in public.

The Split Truth: Islamic Populism and Electoral Political Disinformation in various regions before 1965 became the collective memory of Islamic groups linked to these two events. The absence of efforts to break the disinformation chain has resulted in a wild communist discourse, which anyone can use to carry out the process of stigma and control over political interests (Halim, 2016). In the context of electoral politics, communist discourse continuously corners its political opponents by developing anti-Islamic and anti-Ulama narratives and embellishments. This lack of completion of past events makes previously reproduced fiction a reality.

As a result, the strengthening of oral traditions (talking culture) for a long time in Indonesia makes it extremely easy for most people to accept hoaxes as truth (Lai, 2017). The sophistication of intelligent cell phone technology and its applications allowing everyone to access information from anywhere and anytime, as long as they have internet access, make people just become users. Hooks entering personal messages through the grip of the telephone are no longer seen as something coming from outside but become part of the consumption of people's daily realities. On the other hand, political choices, with the presence of buzzers on social media, reinforce assumptions previously still theses, whether true or false. It is easy for people to accept hoaxes without a critical process for checking them just because they are circulated by friends, family, and those sharing the same political opinion. This condition becomes an easy target for the pegging, reinforced by the pockets of the algorithm, making the information received as desired on social media or Google searches (Erubami et al., 2021), although initially, this algorithm reads the consumption pattern tendencies of users.

RESEARCH METHOD

This paper applied a qualitative method with a descriptive approach to describe a problem that occurred in the past, currently, or project issues that will arise in the future as suggestions and constructive criticism. This study utilized library research data to develop a theoretical basis. Data were collected by browsing books, journals, papers, news, and information based on the issues discussed—the extent to which Islamic modernity in Indonesia moves toward positive developments or causes setbacks.

This research belongs to a case study employing descriptive and qualitative methods. A case study is identical to a deeper study of a social phenomenon, especially a case. It is a form of research based on the philosophy of postpositivism used to examine the condition of natural objects (as opposed to experiments). The researchers in a case study serve as the key instrument of data collection carried out by triangulation (combined) with inductive or qualitative data analysis. Qualitative research results emphasize meaning rather than generalization. Qualitative descriptive research aims to describe, explain, and answer in more detail the problems by studying an individual, a group, or an event as much as possible.

In qualitative research, humans are the instruments, and the results are words or statements following the actual situation. In this study, data were gathered using library research—a type of research used in in-depth information and data collection through various kinds of literature, books, notes, magazines, and other references, as well as relevant previous research results, to obtain answers and foundations. Several reasons underlie the use of this library research.

To begin with, data are sourced not only from the field but also from libraries or other written documents, such as journals, books, and other literature. In addition, a literature study needs to understand new symptoms to prevent them from occurring.

This research aims to analyze problems in everyday life actualized by the issue of social media and how the media has now become a part of citizens' lives. In addition to having a good impact, it also has a destructive impact on every step of thinking, such as loss of religious spirit, roles and functions of family members, and attitudes and behavior according to religion. Religion serves as a guide for life, not a standard in life.

The writing of this article underwent the following three steps.

1. The basic phenomenon has existed and been running

Figure 1. Research Framework (compiled by athours)

as it should. However, as time flies, it moves toward modernization. It is depicted in blue representing self-protection.

2. Field conditions where social phenomena occur, such as many cases within the Ministry of Religion, and former governors dealing with religion, are displayed in yellow as part of vigilance.

3. Evaluation is part of the alarm for the rise or decline of democracy. It is a natural target and can happen not only today but also the next day, represented in green as part of prosperity. This cycle continues, as illustrated in the following figure.

RESULT AND ANALYSIS

The issue of blasphemy by Ahok dragged him to court, and the mobilization of the masses became an actual manifestation of Islamic modernity capable of overthrowing the established political order (Setijadi, 2017). There was a movement until the 212 mass actions at Monas, gathering around 500,000 Muslims to voice their opinions and bring Ahok to justice (Setijadi, 2017). The difference in discourse between GNPF-Ulama and Nahdatul Ulama (NU) lies in the different narrative forms; GNPF-Ulama only emphasizes the Islamic aspect, while NU uses Islam and nationalism as the dominant discourse (Elareshi, Habes, Ali, & Ziani, 2021).

Indeed, in the last two decades, Islamic modernity has taken action in many Islamic countries, as studied by Vedi R Hadiz, comparing modernity in Indonesia, Turkey, and Egypt. The modernization movement in Indonesia began in the era of colonialism, the unity of Muslims to fight against Dutch colonialism. Islamic modernity in Indonesia is a failure due to its infirm strength, dividing the power of Islam into several groups. Hadiz defined Islamic modernity as an effort to form articulations to transform various Islamic social and political identities into one semi-universal identity called Ummah. In contrast to what took place in Turkey and Egypt, he considered it a success because it could control the civil society movement (Saputra, 2019).

Islamic modernity also has specific characteristics in its formation and movement, following the context that influences it both socially and culturally. However, the modern Islamic approach emphasizes the flexibility of "Islam" that can be constructed from various interests, aspirations, and complaints from the intersection of the equal social class, from the lower to the middle class, and the oppressed and marginalized ruling groups (Umar, 2010). More remarkably, Islamic modernity is a danger of igniting radicalism in Indonesia. Islam is learned and practiced without subjugation to each other. It thrives as a blessing, "Rahmatan Lil Alamin". In contrast, Islam in Indonesia is present in polite da'wah, elaborating Islamic traditions that align with Indonesian cultural diversity and local wisdom (Jayanto, 2019).

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF MODERN ISLAM IN INDONESIA

It is undeniable that Islamic modernity, as previously described, emerged long before Indonesia's independence. It arose as solidarity between Muslims to fight injustice, colonialism, and all forms of oppression in the economic, social and political fields by the Dutch or Japanese army. Even under Hadratusyeckh Hasyim Asy'ari, Rais Akbar of NU, a Jihad Resolution was issued, calling on all Muslims in Indonesia, especially NU members, to fight and wage jihad against NICA allied troops in Surabaya. A terrible battle in Surabaya took place on November 10, 1945. Later, this event was commemorated as Heroes' Day (Arifin, 2019).

On the other hand, revivalist groups did not recognize Indonesia's independence struggle to establish an Islamic state. Although the leading Islamic groups (NU and Muhammadiyah) recognized the sovereignty of Indonesia as an independent country, the political power of Islam was still marginal. Some carried out underground propaganda with armed struggle. Others diverted da'wah activities. Then, various small organizations appeared and became splinter groups of the movement to form an Islamic state. Further developments emerged with DI/TII after fighting and losing to the Indonesian army in the 1960s. Subsequent religious conflict movements in Poso and Ambon were none other than networks of the radical and extreme Islamic understanding of the DI/TII group.

In its development, the new form of Islamic modernity in the post-modern era is inseparable from negative sentiments for the absence of changes in Indonesia's socio-economic and political life. The state often sided with the oppressive capitalists and monopolized the economy, weakening the people's bargaining power. In addition, the elite's corruption and weak law enforcement betrayed Islamic groups. At its peak, the nation and state development process mandated the people's most significant interests and welfare. Here, Islamic modernity began to shape a movement established on an identical religious identity, namely Muslim. It manifests the protest and alternative solutions to economic injustice by gathering people's power. The presence of large masses aims to seize resources and state power (Rami et al., 2021).

The narrative of the unity of Muslims, the hallmark of modern Islam, has become integral to various patterns of political parties in Indonesia with Islamic identity. The campaign forms a narrative concern that Muslims in Indonesia have always been oppressed and marginalized throughout history, whether gradually or structurally. It is as if Muslims have no space for freedom, triggering them to fight the oligarchy of power. When framed with a particular case, this narrative of the backwardness of Muslims provides considerable potential for the masses. The people's anger is a force quite frightening for the power elite, as depicted in Ahok's blasphemy case (Dhiba, 2019).

In politics, Islamic modernity in Indonesia has become a profitable commodity for people with power, and smoothing out their economic interests cannot be separated from the imbalance in the neoliberal and global economic structure. It is ample space for oligarchic groups or political economy elites to organize the mainstream of Islamic modernity. It also boosts electability to achieve leadership and control over access to resources in Indonesia. The emergence of Islamic modernity in the digital era is increasingly massive with the development of information technology. Coupled with the increasing number of young Muslims being media literate with a high scientific base, no organization can channel their aspirations and interests (Jati, 2018).

MEASURING THE MODERNITY OF ISLAM AS A MANIFESTATION OF THE UNITY OF MUSLIMS IN INDONESIA

Before leading to Islamic modernity as a manifestation of the unity of Muslims in Indonesia, it should be emphasized that Muslims' politics on the national history stage has a mass base and collective power. However, they differ in schools of thought. Before the independence era, Sarekat Islam—as an extension of the Sarekat Dagang Islam— was founded, trying to unite and challenge the political will of Muslims as a reaction to oppose all forms of Western colonialism. Muhammadiyah also established a group of Muslims fostering reformism and renewal in carrying out religion as a progressive spirit. Likewise, the birth of NU serves as a forum for scholars and their followers to maintain the Ahlussunnahwaljamaah tradition from infiltrating the new heretical schools of thought, especially the Wahhabi teachings that rule in Haramain and the Shia in Iran. These various Islamic associations have different schools, visions, and directions. Nevertheless, in the end, they agreed that establishing the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia was a blessing from Allah, uniting the ideals of independence, prosperity, and freedom of worship for Muslims in Indonesia.

Indeed, a small group disagrees and does not accept the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as a democratic system. They are trying to form a fully Islamic state, mobilizing all efforts to undermine the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia. The Darul Islam/Indonesian Army of Islam (DI/TII) movement is an underground organization wanting to promote Islamic modernity. As other Islamic groups do not support its movement, is it appropriate for it to be called Islamic modernity? Or is it a form of failure to radically frame politics in the name of Islam? In the Soekarno era, Islamic modernity in the political arena was present by the Masjumi Party's presence, a forum for the solidity of Muslims from various organizations that had gathered into one. Hence, the traditional-nationalist Muslim stronghold, NU, established its party.

Furthermore, during the Soeharto era, 'pseudo' Islamic modernity was formed by merging various Islamic parties into one, the United Development Party (PPP).

The PPP, a form of unifying Muslim political voice, has lost momentum. However, the PPP's voice is only a camouflage behind the authoritarian power of the New Order rulers because, in every election, the winner is Golkar. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and the PPP can be political losers. It has been argued that Suharto established the PPP as a form of division to avoid the actual Islamic modernity movement, provoke significant mass action against the ruling government, and consider Muslims weak until they hit rock bottom in the Indonesian political situation. The Muslim economy is limited; Suharto's cronies hold all big business circles, deterring Muslims from having the power to voice their political will.

In the Suharto regime, Islamic modernity was just a dream and an outspoken discourse among academics that did not turn into mass action. The discourse of Islamic modernity, in the end, padded into the world of da'wah and education. The establishment of the Muslim Students' Association (HMI) became a driving force to revitalize Islamic modernity among students. Then, NU came with the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII), and Muhammadiyah possessed the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI). These three Islamic student organizations became the driving force of Islamic modernity discourse with different visions and directions. However, at the end of the New Order, they agreed to take to the streets for the anti-Suharto demonstrations in 1998 to voice their anger at the authoritarian and corrupt New Order government.

It should also be asserted that Suharto was wary of the power of Muslims in Indonesia. The Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) establishment was Suharto's intervention to control Islamic mass organizations and mobilize the masses to oppose them. In the end, the MUI is merely an Islamic religious institution ratifying or stamping the halal stamp on government programs. Likewise, the formation of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI), gathering scientists, academics, and Islamic leaders who were vocal in the Suharto era, was initially expected to manifest as an intellectual way to increase the political and socio-economic status of Muslims. However, it was only a cover to entrap the Muslim community for Islamic academics to speak in the end.

Thus, the modernization of Islam in Indonesia as the embodiment of the unity of Muslims is impossible because they have different schools of thought, political views, and visions. After the fall of the New Order, Muslims united to form single Islamic modernity. Various well-established Islamic organizations competed to set up Islamic political parties, such as the National Unity Party (PKB), founded by Abdurrahman Wahid, the golden child of NU.

The National Mandate Party (PAN), an extension of Muhammadiyah, and the Social Justice Party (PKS) were founded by right-wing Islamic groups in Indonesia. Even though in the 1999 election, the PKB received many votes, in the presidential seat race, it consolidated votes with other Islamic parties and succeeded in appointing Abdurrahman Wahid as president. Nevertheless, in the end, the carriage of Islamic political power was torn down by other Islamic groups until, finally, Abdurrahman Wahid was replaced by Megawati. The PKB's success in raising Abdurrahman Wahid illustrates that modern Islam has significant political power in Indonesia if all Islamic entities are united.

Meanwhile, the modern form of Islam, a series of Islamic Defending Movement at Monas, is an inappropriate claim as a form of unity for Muslims in Indonesia. It would undermine the claim that the mass movement is the people's will. Considering that their movement is only a minor part of Indonesian Muslims, NU rejected this movement, with a population of 90 million Muslims. Likewise, Muhammadiyah, the second-largest Islamic organization, did not participate. In addition, defending Islam does not raise the issue of the people, such as law enforcement for corruptors, which is a substantial problem in Indonesia. Defending Islam does not voice poverty, labor, education, or health issues. Instead, it seems to judge an individual, such as Ahok, for insulting the Qur'an. In short, mass mobilization is highly risky for its direction and purpose and open to be ridden by the oligarchic elite. This group acts as a funder and voices its interests and political will without any element of Islamic struggle (Ibrahim et al., 2020).

However, this study believes that Islamic modernity, which has existed for a long time in Indonesia, is manifested in social care. During natural disasters, such as the Tsunami in Aceh, Palu, and other catastrophes, multiple Islamic organizations united, raised funds, distributed aid, carried out emergency assistance, and sent a team of volunteers responsively to help the victims through various movements organized as a caring Muslim movement. This concern is a form of Islamic modernity that can unite Islamic organizations' different schools and colors in Indonesia. However, this modernity must be improved, especially in addressing corruption in Indonesia by the Muslim political elite. Islamic modernity must be present to punish the corrupt who crowd the media daily. If necessary, the corruptors will have a massive demonstration like what happened in the blasphemy case by Ahok. However, is this just a dream about the authenticity of modern Islam in Indonesia, which is pure without any mounts by unscrupulous persons or political oligarchs and specific funders?

MEASURING ISLAMIC MODERNITY AS A RADICALISM MOVEMENT

When Islamic modernity culminates in mass clashes, it presents negative sentiments threatening social life—considering the various terror bombs in Indonesia. Various demonstrations were ridden by terrorists wanting to cause riots in the community. If mass action as a form of Islamic modernity is continuous in public, it is feared that it will threaten the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. For example, the GNPF-Ulama mass action relates to the flow of foreign funds. It is evident that both the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Hizb ut-Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI)—two organizations banned for endangering the structure of the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia—have a track record of the flow of funds from foreign parties.

Moreover, HTI is, by acclamation, part of an international political affiliation. For example, radical Islamic organizations such as Al-Qaeda to ISIS are always in contact with various underground movements worldwide to recruit new militant members to practice pure Islamic Sharia, and only they are entitled to a plot of heaven. At the same time, other Muslims with different understandings are declared infidels and must be found (Othman & Okpe, 2021).

From a sociological perspective, the Islamic modernity movement is almost similar to the ignition of Islamic radicalism. Three factors can trigger radicalism by Muslims. To begin, responding to the reality behind the socio-political and economic conditions that political oligarchs openly control. Here, Islamic modernity began forming a movement based on the same religious identity (Muslim). It is a manifestation of protest and an alternative solution to the ongoing problem of economic injustice by gathering people's power and large masses to seize resources and state power. At the same time, Muslims need a form of rejection and resistance.

The struggle on religion and the upheaval of all their efforts are declared as jihad with Ummah or the Muslim community, even though through radical paths expressed emotionally. Moreover, if a foreign party of a different religion controls the economic sector, it will spark distrust in various public institutions because it is contrary to their beliefs. In addition, after gathering the power to carry out simultaneous resistance, the next step is the form and act of coercion of the will to change the situation to its roots radically. The current political-social and economic order change according to the Islamist perspective they hold and believe. The final factor is an actual claim that only the full enforcement of Islamic law in the life of the nation and state will lead to a much more prosperous life. The enforcement of Islamic values as a correct religion at the end of time answers the existing problems (Lamya et al., 2020).

Several political observers and the Minister of Religion, Cholil Tsaquf, are concerned about the rise of Islamic modernity and radicalism in Indonesia, appearing and dimming like a ticking time bomb. However, seeing Islamic modernity as an attempt at treason or subversive is too much, considering that mass actions in Indonesia by certain political oligarchs only focus on beneficial interests.

Even though the same camp and elements carry Islamic modernity and radicalism, the content is different because the populist direction has turned

radical, whose axis is easy to break and can be anticipated by government security in advance. For the political elite, it means that the mass action of modern Islam in Indonesia does not voice the people's voice. Most people do not want actions that can disrupt people's lives. Even so, modern Islam continues to launch propaganda to implement Islamic law as the justest law to anti-Chinese, anti-Foreign, Anti-Neolib, and other propaganda. Such propaganda only appeared from the two organizations, FPI and HTI, while the significant currents making Islamic modernity possible, NU and Muhammadiyah, ignored it.

Furthermore, the radicalism promoted by young Muslims in Indonesia is often just a show of prestige and self-existence to gain recognition instead of responding to formalities that have harmed the people. Radicalism has even become a tool to dredge material (Jati, 2018).

That way, Islamic modernity becomes a parasite that is easy to move and an effective propaganda tool to weaken the nature of democracy in Indonesia (Ode et al., 2021). Table 1 illustrates the differences between the two.

Table 1 displays that the indicators of increasing positive alarms are physical and non-physical development. Moreover, there is a positive alarm for implementing Islamic modernization, but it will be inappropriate if only part becomes a political role. At the same time, social media has no effect and remains following the field of life.

CONCLUSION

It is undeniable that the emergence of Islamic modernity in Indonesia has numerous interpretations. On the one hand, it can be called solidarity among Muslims to fight injustice, colonialism, and all forms of oppression in the economic, social, and political fields. Academics who see the implications of Islamic modernity as a new form of a healthy democracy in Indonesia should be appreciated. This study also agrees that the Islamic modernity movement will strengthen a democratic system. Islamic modernity should be utilized as a positive signal and an alarm to a knocker for the political elite in power not to run the government arbitrarily. The government must continue to side with the public interest in every policy-making and seek economic, education, and health guarantees. On the other hand, some academics believe that Islamic modernity is driven toward a particular moment to gain support in general elections. Nevertheless, on the other hand, modern Islam in Indonesia is ridden by certain elite oligarchs to gain votes during elections. The modernity of Islam is also related to the spirit of Islamic radicalism growing in Indonesia. However, whatever its motive, Islamic modernity can be a positive alarm for Indonesia's democracy, reminding the government not to act arbitrarily. This study even sees the ideal of Islamic modernity not in politics but in the realm of humanitarian aid.

Table 1. Indicator for positive alarm and refback democracy

Indicator	Positive alarm	Refback democracy
Human resource development	v	x
Infrastructure development	v	x
Social media	v	v
Political will	x	v

Note. Data compiled by authors

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