

The ‘Expected Leadership’ in Indonesia’s Initiative to Form ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network

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Abstrak

Berbagai literatur dalam ilmu Hubungan Internasional menempatkan Indonesia sebagai salah satu negara pemimpin di Asia Tenggara, baik secara formal maupun informal. Indonesia dianggap mampu menggerakkan berbagai kerja sama kawasan yang berujung pada kemajuan regional. Tulisan ini juga melihat bahwa Indonesia mampu untuk menginisiasi dan mendorong kerja sama dalam bidang penjaga perdamaian. Kerja sama penjaga perdamaian terbilang sensitif di Asia Tenggara mengingat salah satu norma yang disepakati bersama sejak pembentukan ASEAN adalah non-interferensi. Norma ini menghambat kerja sama penjaga perdamaian regional yang mengadopsi norma intervensionisme. Terlepas dari hambatan tersebut, Indonesia sukses menginisiasi kerja sama penjaga perdamaian dalam bentuk ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network (APCN). APCN bertujuan untuk meningkatkan kontribusi negara-negara anggota ASEAN dalam misi penjaga perdamaian PBB. Berdasarkan latar belakang tersebut, tulisan ini berusaha menjelaskan mengapa Indonesia sukses menginisiasi kerja sama APCN ketika ASEAN masih mengadopsi norma non-interferensi. Penjelasan dalam tulisan ini akan mengacu kepada teori peran yang pertama kali disampaikan di ilmu Hubungan Internasional oleh Kaleevi Jakko Holsti. Meskipun pembentukan APCN juga akibat dorongan para perumus kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia, faktor yang berkontribusi lainnya adalah adanya ekspektasi regional agar Indonesia memimpin di bidang penjaga perdamaian. Ekspektasi tersebut sejalan dengan konsep preskripsi peran oleh Holsti. Pemahaman terhadap kepemimpinan yang diekspektasikan diharapkan menjadi sudut pandang alternatif dalam melihat kesuksesan maupun kegagalan kerja sama regional – khususnya di Asia Tenggara – di masa yang akan datang.

Kata Kunci: Indonesia, ASEAN, ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network, kepemimpinan regional.

Abstract

Various International Relations works of literature positioned Indonesia as one of the leading countries in Southeast Asia, both formally and informally. Indonesia is considered a driving force behind various regional cooperations that lead to regional progress. This paper also sees that Indonesia is capable of initiating and pushing for cooperation in the peacekeeping area. Peacekeeping cooperation is sensitive in Southeast Asia, considering that one of the norms that mutually agreed upon since the formation of ASEAN is the norm of non-interference. The non-interference norms hinder regional peacekeeping cooperation due to its adoption of interventionist norms. Despite these organizational obstacles, Indonesia has successfully initiated peacekeeping cooperation that in the form of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network (APCN). The APCN aims to increase the contribution of peacekeeping forces from the ASEAN Member States in the UN Peacekeeping Missions. By looking at the case, this paper aims to explain why Indonesia was successful in initiating the APCN when the regional norm of non-interference is still adopted. This explanation will refer to the role theory, first theorized in International Relations by Kaleevi Jakko Holsti. Although the initiation of the APCN was also driven by foreign policy aspirations from the policymakers, another contributing factor was the regional expectations for Indonesia to lead the regional peacekeeping cooperation. This expectation is in line with Holsti’s concept of role prescription. Further understanding of the expected leadership could be an alternative perspective in seeing the success or failure cases of regional cooperation – especially in Southeast Asia – in the future.

Keywords: Indonesia, ASEAN, ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network, regional leadership.

INTRODUCTION

Most interstate relations in Southeast Asia are carried out through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This association was initially strategic political cooperation to ensure that the region was uninfluenced by the direct consequences of geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold

War (Emmers, 2018). After the end of the Cold War, ASEAN became an organization dealing with broader issues such as economic, socio-cultural, and political security. The deepening and widening of the association have called for sectoral leaders to lead specific fields of cooperation. Sectoral leaders can be defined as countries providing international public goods in several areas of cooperation, but those countries do not have enough resources to provide overall leadership (Emmers, 2014). Emmers (2014) categorized Indonesia as one of the sectoral leaders in Southeast Asia due to its political and security leadership role.

In politics, Indonesia played an essential role in mobilizing various institutional building programs, such as the First and Second Bali Concord in 1976 and 2003. Concerning the security issue, Indonesia has been a respectable actor playing a significant role in regional conflict management and resolving collective problems. As Antuli and Rezasyah (2019) highlighted, Indonesia contributed to implementing shuttle diplomacy to resolve border disputes between Thailand and Cambodia in 2011.

One of the forms of Indonesia's political and security leadership in Southeast Asia is the establishment of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network (APCN). Indonesia and Thailand initiated the APCN at the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting in 2011. It is a framework for collective peacekeeping cooperation for Southeast Asian countries. In contrast to other regional peacekeeping cooperation, cooperation within the APCN is mainly implemented through sharing experiences, networks, and information among peacekeeping centers located in the region. At its formation, those peacekeeping centers were located in Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Following its concept paper, the APCN has short, medium, and long-term projections. In the short term, APCN is expected to encourage the member states to build peacekeeping centers. In the medium term, it is intended to become a platform that standardizes the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of peacekeepers from Southeast Asia. In the long term, it can become the basis for establishing standby arrangements to deal with regional instability (ASEAN, 2011).

The APCN initiative was remarkable because Southeast Asian countries have high sensitivity toward peacekeeping issues. Aksu (2003) argued that Southeast Asian countries are against peacekeeping due to its nature to intervene in various intra-state conflicts. That way, peacekeeping deployment to fellow ASEAN member states is considered a breach of the norm of non-interference (Bellamy & Drummond, 2011). ASEAN has adopted the non-interference norm since its incarnation in 1967, meaning that a member state cannot intervene in the domestic affairs of another member state (ASEAN, 2007). Furthermore, Indonesia also encountered an awful experience in encouraging peacekeeping cooperation in the region. Indonesia proposed the ASEAN Peacekeeping Force in 2003 to deal with various non-traditional security issues such as intra-state conflicts and crimes against humanity (Capie, 2016). It is a form of concern from Jakarta regarding regional instabilities since the end of the Cold War (Wallenstein & Sollenberg, 2001). Unfortunately, the proposal was rejected because other member states worried about Indonesia's intention and aggressiveness (Capie, 2016).

Therefore, the APCN initiative is an interesting case because there has not been any organizational mechanism that succeeded in overcoming the non-interference norm. Furthermore, neither ASEAN nor Indonesia is familiar with forming regional peacekeeping cooperation (von Einsiedel & Yazaki, 2016). This paper further explains the success of Indonesia's leadership in the APCN initiative despite various organizational limitations. It is argued that Indonesia has successfully performed the role of a regional leader in peacekeeping areas. Its role performance was also supported by Indonesia's decision-makers' aspirations and expectations from other ASEAN member states.

The paper is organized into five parts, with the first part being the introduction. This initial section provides a brief overview and a background of Indonesia's leadership and the initiative to form the APCN. Then, the second part displays an in-depth analysis of various academic works of literature on Indonesia's regional

leadership and Southeast Asian views on peacekeeping cooperation. The literature review exposes the research gap in this theme. Subsequently, the third part elaborates more on the research method. This research relies on interviews with key policymakers in Indonesia's initiative to establish the APCN. Furthermore, the theoretical framework is described. This research employs K. J. Holsti's role theory, emphasizing the importance of role performance in foreign policy. The results and analysis section discusses Indonesia's national aspirations and regional expectations in forming its role performance. Furthermore, it also discusses how the expected leadership occurred in the APCN case and what it could mean for Southeast Asia. Finally, the findings are concluded, followed by recommendations for further research.

LITERATURE REVIEW

INDONESIA'S REGIONAL LEADERSHIP

Indonesia's regional leadership is influenced by the presidency and regional strategic environment. During Sukarno's reign, Indonesia imposed its hegemony as the most extensive, populous, and influential country in the region. Sukarno did not hesitate to employ coercive measures to achieve Indonesia's—or his—national interests. One of the examples is the *Confrontation*, or aggressive foreign policy toward the Malayan Federation, now known as Singapore and Malaysia (Sukma, 1995). Then, Sukarno was replaced by Suharto after a domestic political crisis. During the New Order, Suharto's era, Indonesia changed its aspirations to be more accommodative. Suharto still perceived Indonesia as the most influential country in the region. However, the power and influence must be balanced to form a neutral and free regional cooperation (Darwis et al., 2020). Suharto—alongside his Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Malik—was actively involved in the incarnation of ASEAN and various pioneering cooperation such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Treaty and the Treaty of Amity Cooperation (TAC) (Wicaksana, 2019). During the New Order, Indonesia desired security cooperation to achieve regional stability amidst the instability in the Indochina region (Smith,

1999). During this era, Indonesia was seen as a more proactive leader with its ability to work closely with neighboring countries with different political backgrounds (Heiduk, 2016).

After the New Order, Indonesia transitioned into the Reform era. Roberts (2015) argued that the transition made Indonesia more introverted and passive in regional cooperation to focus on domestic problems. Because of Indonesia's withdrawal, ASEAN also experienced a transition into a form of collective leadership where several countries do not lead all forms of cooperation but only become leaders of specific issues (Emmers, 2014). Indonesia is often considered a leader in the security sector. According to Heiduk (1996), Indonesia utilized intellectual leadership during the Reform era, especially under President Yudhoyono. Young (1991) defined intellectual leadership as a country using its influence—not merely its power—to direct its followers. The intellectual leadership is similar to the local Indonesian principle called *tut wuri handayani*, or leading from behind (Anwar, 2018).

Furthermore, Capie (2016) viewed Indonesia as a peacekeeping power in Southeast Asia due to its enormous contribution to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Indonesia's peacekeeping agenda is generally used to improve its international reputation and bargaining power (Hutabarat, 2016; Thies & Sari, 2018). At the regional level, the peacekeeping agenda aims to provide the impression that Indonesia is not a self-serving country (Call & Coning, 2017). Indonesia's regional peacekeeping agenda aspirations are exhibited in the rejected proposal of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Force (Borchers, 2014).

However, no literature work discussed Indonesia's leadership in peacekeeping areas as a form of expected leadership in Southeast Asia. It is crucial because the followers' expectations can determine the success of the regional leadership. To address this gap, this paper tries to disclose that Indonesia's leadership, especially in peacekeeping areas, is expected by other ASEAN member states accepting the APCN initiative.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN VIEWS ON PEACEKEEPING

ASEAN adopts the non-interference norm, indicating that each member state cannot intervene in other countries (ASEAN, 2012). The non-interference norm encourages ASEAN countries to strengthen their sovereignty and control over internal conflicts (Dunn et al., 2010). It is complicated for peacekeeping cooperation to develop because it generally adopts the interventionist norm that can violate the countries' sovereignty (Kivimaki, 2015). However, there has been a shift in ASEAN's rigid diplomatic norm since the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). ARF brings cooperation on the principle of inclusivity, allowing discussion on peacekeeping without significant diplomatic consequences. Furthermore, ARF also encourages academic collaborations on the track two-level through the ASEAN Institute of Strategic Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council for Security Cooperation (CSCAP). The collaboration with the academics and think tanks enables ASEAN and its partners to listen to inputs from academics, who often have better open views than diplomats (Caballero-Anthony, 2005).

Since then, ASEAN has begun to develop peacekeeping cooperation, although its form is not a regional peacekeeping force. ASEAN emphasizes the aspect of conflict prevention in peacekeeping because its conflict resolution mechanisms do not yet support the peacekeeping force (Sukma, 2012). Conflict prevention cooperation is considered quite successful in maintaining regional peace and stability. For ASEAN, the challenge is to develop its conflict resolution mechanisms to be more responsive to realize a more comprehensive conflict management program. In the long term, ASEAN also needs to develop collaborative cooperation between ASEAN, its external partners, and the UN as the primary distributor of peacekeeping forces (Caballero-Anthony, 2002).

Within the scope of ASEAN, peacekeeping cooperation can be an option for non-traditional security cooperation developed after the Cold War. However, ASEAN member states have not viewed human security as necessary as state security, causing underdeveloped

non-traditional security cooperation (Caballero-Anthony, 2005). Nonetheless, there is optimism that peacekeeping cooperation in the form of a regional peacekeeping force is still an open possibility. ASEAN has begun to welcome peacekeeping cooperation and be more receptive to sending peacekeepers to UN Peacekeeping Operations. However, its role in peacekeeping is still limited as a peacebuilder (Einsiedel and Yazaki, 2016).

The literature review unveils a few works discussing the APCN, only mentioned as a collaborative framework for peacekeeping cooperation. Its formation can be traced and related to Indonesia's regional leadership in peacekeeping. Following the existing literature gap, this paper explains that Indonesia's leadership played a major role in forming the APCN and determining the trajectory of peacekeeping cooperation in Southeast Asia.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research employed a qualitative approach to proving that Indonesia played a major role in initiating the establishment of the APCN and elaborating on the more profound impact of Indonesia's regional leadership. In this case, the more profound impact is elaborated in the concept of expected leadership.

In the previous section, much literature discuss Indonesian leadership, especially in Southeast Asia. However, some focus on Indonesia's leadership in peacekeeping areas, especially on how it impacts ASEAN regional mechanism. Therefore, this research seeks to fill this gap and offer broader knowledge of how Indonesia's leadership in peacekeeping areas could shape the regional mechanism.

This research utilized the logic of deductive research thinking, guided by a theory, to obtain a conclusion. This research applied the role theory as its guide. Role theory refers to a theoretical framework first published in International Relations by Kaleevi Jakko Holsti in 1970. The role theory assumes that the state—like a social actor—performs a role within an international system (Holsti, 1970). Role theory examines how internal conceptions and external prescriptions can form role performance. In this case, Indonesia's role as a regional leader in peacekeeping areas when initiating the APCN

was formed by its key policymakers' conceptions and regional preferences.

This research utilized both primary and secondary data. The primary data were the interviews with key policymakers, such as the ministers in charge and several high-ranking officials. Furthermore, the research also employed the annual statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the statement of the President of Indonesia as the primary references due to their significance in shaping Indonesia's foreign policy direction. Meanwhile, the secondary data included ASEAN documents, APCN documents, and complementary literature and news sources.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

ROLE THEORY

As Holsti (1970) asserted, role theory aims to identify the factors behind a country's role performance in the international system. The role performance is formed from ideas and notions from the country and its external environment. This theory was employed because of its advantages in looking at the factors from the agency and structural level. At the agency level, role theory sees the significance of the thoughts and perceptions of foreign policymakers. Meanwhile, at the structural level, the global and regional systems play a significant role in determining foreign policy.

Two main concepts are explored in role theory. To begin, national role conceptions refer to perceptions of foreign policymakers regarding positions and policies they should take in the international system. Conceptions between one policymaker and other policymakers can differ due to different cognitive biases concerning foreign policy issues (Breuning, 2011). If there is a difference, the most impactful conception belongs to the highest policymaker. National role conceptions can be influenced by several factors, such as capability, identity, ideology, location, public opinion, and political interests (Holsti, 1970). Furthermore, the alter's role prescriptions also influence national role conceptions. In this paper, Indonesian foreign policymakers perceived their country as a regional leader.

In addition, alter's role prescriptions can be defined as systemic factors—from the international system—influencing a country's foreign policy (Holsti, 1970). These perceptions determine what limits foreign policymakers must pay attention to in formulating policies. Alter's role prescriptions may or may not support the national role conceptions (Sekhri, 2009). Furthermore, this paper argues that role prescriptions directly determine role performance's success, not only through national role conceptions. Several external factors can be determined as alter's role prescriptions, such as recognized universal values, general legal principles, expectations from other countries, commitment to international agreements and treaties, and informal agreements between countries (Holsti, 1970). In this paper, ASEAN member states—as a regional environment—have high expectations of Indonesia's regional leadership, as President Yudhoyono mentioned during the 50th Anniversary of ASEAN.

Holsti argued that national role conceptions primarily form role performance due to indirect external influence. However, this research argues that the alter's role prescriptions—or, in this case, ASEAN member states' expectations—are essential in the APCN initiative. National role conceptions without sufficient role prescriptions will result in a self-proclaimed foreign policy. In terms of peacekeeping cooperation, Indonesia had an unsuccessful experience when it came to proposing unilateral peacekeeping cooperation. Furthermore, the national role conceptions alongside the alter's role prescriptions would shape the country's status within the international system. The leadership status was formed by Indonesia's foreign policy aspirations and other ASEAN member states' acceptance of Jakarta's leadership.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS AS A REGIONAL LEADER

The discourse on Indonesia's regional leadership was not only circulated among various academic works but also influenced national foreign policy processes. This research believes that most Indonesian key foreign

policymakers involved in the APCN initiative perceived their country as a regional leader in peacekeeping areas. This paper identified five key foreign policymakers during the APCN initiative: President Yudhoyono, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa, Minister of Defence Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Director of ASEAN Cooperation Ade Padmo Sarwono, and Director of International Defence Cooperation Jan Pieter Ate. They expressed that their version of regional leadership primarily aligned with the aspirations to lead peacekeeping cooperation.

Yudhoyono was the President of Indonesia when the country became the Chairman of ASEAN in 2011. Yudhoyono's government was also involved directly in the APCN initiative. After his reign, Yudhoyono stated that Indonesian leadership during his tenure was achieved by trying to build mutual benefits through unity and solidarity. He further mentioned that Indonesia exercised its regional leadership through ASEAN statecraft and Jakarta's diplomatic capabilities to build mutual trust between member states. Specifically, Indonesia's regional leadership during the Yudhoyono administration tried to bridge regional and global affairs. Indonesia wanted ASEAN to participate extensively in global affairs, especially in conflict resolution processes. Yudhoyono believed that Indonesia could strengthen UN-ASEAN cooperation due to its long-standing commitment to UN Peacekeeping Operations.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa was Yudhoyono's right hand in foreign policymaking during his tenure. Natalegawa stated in his annual speech (2011) that Indonesia chose to exercise intellectual leadership in regional architecture building to ensure peace and a stable region. He asserted that Indonesia would lead the discussion on the region's participation in efforts to maintain global peace. Subsequently, he proposed multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding cooperation based on ASEAN's perspective built under the already-formed peacekeeping centers across Southeast Asia. It was the beginning of the APCN initiative under Indonesia's leadership.

Indonesia's Ministry of Defence participated in the discussion by having Minister of Defence Yusgiantoro, with no military background, lead most of the regional

defense diplomacy. During the interview, the former minister asserted that Indonesia deserved to lead regional peacekeeping cooperation due to its capabilities and experience in global peacekeeping. Indonesia wanted to generate momentum on the then-newly built Indonesia Peace and Security Center (IPSC) in Bogor Regency. The ministry wanted IPSC to become the central hub of peacekeeping centers within Southeast Asia. Yusgiantoro mentioned that the IPSC was somehow connected to Indonesian leadership, highlighting the country's openness to increasing the peacekeeping capacity of ASEAN member states and their external partners.

The aspirations of Indonesian leadership were also demonstrated at the director level. In other words, this aspiration was deeply rooted even on an organizational scale. The Director of ASEAN Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ade Padmo Sarwono, stated during an interview that Indonesia exercised its intellectual leadership in the APCN initiative. He elaborated that Indonesia did not force other member states to have peacekeeping centers in their countries. The APCN presents to ensure that those countries—that do not yet have peacekeeping centers—take advantage of the existing peacekeeping centers. The APCN ensures that all member states can obtain the same benefits without having to build their peacekeeping centers.

The Director of International Cooperation of the Ministry of Defence, Jan Pieter Ate, asserted it was encouraging for Indonesia. He specifically mentioned that the APCN initiative enjoyed the momentum of a positive trajectory in regional peacekeeping cooperation. Technically, Indonesia wanted to lead capacity-building efforts in peacekeeping to encourage ASEAN member states to participate in global peacekeeping operations.

Those statements highlight Indonesia's regional leadership in peacekeeping areas. Apparently, it is a common conception among Indonesian policymakers that *Indonesia has a non-coercive leadership* in regional peacekeeping cooperation, initiating the APCN to encourage ASEAN member states to contribute more effectively to UN Peacekeeping Cooperations. Indonesia also has a desire to become a regional peacekeeping center hub. Capacity-building in peacekeeping will

indirectly contribute to regional peace, as Indonesia desired. It is similar to what Naomi Bailin Wish discovered in 1980: leaders who believed their countries had a significant influence tended to play a more active role in international cooperation (Wish, 1980).

However, all policymakers ignored Jakarta's lack of material capabilities in peacekeeping cooperation. As exhibited in their statements, they neglected their armed forces' capability but continued to reinstate the role of Indonesia's intellectual leadership within ASEAN. In 2009—two years before the APCN initiative, the United States fully funded Indonesian peacekeeping operations in Lebanon through the Global Peace Operations Initiative. Even so, the initiative also financed the construction of IPSC (Laksmana, 2018). The policymakers believed Indonesia was a peacekeeping power due to its long history in UN Peacekeeping Operations. Even though the policymakers believed so, this research argues that Jakarta's diplomatic skills and commitment are much more critical than actual capabilities in regional cooperation. Indonesia's proactive role formed the regional expectations toward Jakarta's leadership, an essential part of the APCN initiative.

THE EXPECTED LEADERSHIP: SOUTHEAST ASIA'S EXPECTATIONS TOWARD INDONESIA

Southeast Asia's expectation of Indonesia was not always nice, primarily because of historical experiences. This expectation was depicted in the failed ASEAN Peacekeeping Force initiative. The regional peacekeeping force initiative failed because many ASEAN member states, mainly Malaysia, were worried about Indonesia's aggressiveness.

For them, it was dangerous because Indonesia has been widely known for possessing the most considerable military power despite not being a part of any alliance. In the past, Indonesia also intervened in other countries' sovereignty, in the Malayan Federation and East Timor during the Cold War, for instance. Unfortunately, the non-interference norm was on their side, making building a regional peacekeeping force impossible.

However, they implicitly acknowledged Indonesia as an immense peacekeeping power in Southeast Asia. Therefore, Indonesia was expected to lead some form of peacekeeping cooperation other than a peacekeeping force. This aligned understanding led to the inclusion of peacekeeping cooperation during the ASEAN Concord II, hosted and chaired by Indonesia. Furthermore, peacekeeping cooperation was included in the Vientiane Action Program (VAP) in 2004. The VAP was significant because it was the implementation roadmap for the then-proposed ASEAN Community. The idea of a joint peacekeeping network was also laid out during the year. ASEAN expected peacekeeping cooperation to create a safe, peaceful, and stable region due to increased understanding and experience in peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes.

Furthermore, the expectation toward Indonesia was higher during the 2011 Chairmanship. The early 2010s was the period of doubt in ASEAN, with Thailand and Vietnam failing to conduct most regional cooperation. Thailand's ASEAN Summit in Pattaya was canceled due to massive protests, and it severely impacted the association since the mandate of the ASEAN Summit was extremely high. Meanwhile, Vietnam failed to convene the member states on the Code of Conduct issue. (Phuangketkeow & Ganjanakhundee, 2020). Indonesia promoted the theme "ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations" for its chairmanship. Accordingly, Indonesia was expected to deepen and realize previous ASEAN agreements and promote the association's role in global affairs (Weatherbee, 2012). The failure of previous ASEAN Chairs has pushed Indonesia to maximize its leadership (Weatherbee, 2012).

All those factors mentioned—the implicit agreement, the agreed mechanism, and the failure of previous chairs—made it possible for Indonesia to push the APCN agreement. Director Ate asserted that as a sectoral leader, Indonesia was expected to mobilize its support and resources to push the implementation of ASEAN cooperation. Director Sarwono also voiced it by revealing an expectation for Indonesia to immediately realize the peacekeeping cooperation included in the VAP for being

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the only peacekeeping power with enough resources and political will. President Yudhoyono was also expected to play a more active regional role because he was considered more internationally active than his three predecessors in the Reform era (Yudhoyono, 2017; Capie, 2016).

APCN came as Jakarta's answer to those expectations. APCN directly answered the member states' demand for Indonesia to realize the peacekeeping cooperation stated in the VAP (Sarwono, 2021). It was also one of Indonesia's actions in actuating its status as regional peacekeeping cooperation. APCN, a realized regional cooperation mechanism, was also Jakarta's answer to enhance regional security cooperation after the failure of Vietnam and Thailand. Without Southeast Asia's expectations, it is quite impossible to establish APCN. If compared directly to the failed peacekeeping force initiative, Indonesian leaders still perceived their country as a regional leader in both cases. The only difference in the APCN case is that Indonesia paid attention to what other member states expected. Most member states did not want to sacrifice their sovereignty in peacekeeping cooperation. Thus, Indonesia adjusted its aspirations to formulate a common ground in the form of APCN, where peacekeeping cooperation is voluntary and 'only' aimed to train peacekeepers, not to deploy them within the region.

It is regional leadership, the "expected leadership." Southeast Asia is often called a distinct region in academic writing because its leadership is mainly worked out through the informal mechanism (Wicaksana, 2019). However, it is distinct because the consensus mechanism within ASEAN implies that the group's leader must navigate the border between national foreign policy aspirations and regional expectations. On the one hand, foreign policy aspirations determine each international politics course and national interest. On the other hand, realizing foreign policy aspirations fully without the neighbors' support will only result in failure. It is essential to gather regional support if the leader wants to push for a sensitive topic or failed regional cooperation.

To complement the role theory by Holsti, the term "expected leadership" was determined to emphasize the influence of alter's role prescriptions on the success of

role performance. The alter's role prescriptions should be considered an equal forming factor affecting role performance directly. This article contradicts Holsti, who argued that national role conceptions are the only main factor in shaping role performance. In this case, the dominant national role conceptions alone were not enough to lead the regional cooperation in sensitive areas, let alone initiate the APCN. It demonstrates that a country—no matter how big or strong—could not push for unilateral actions in a Southeast Asia setting.

The APCN initiative also reaffirmed Indonesia's status as a regional leader. Status becomes one of the essential components of role theory because a country is socially assigned a status and occupies it concerning other states. Holsti (1970) asserted that when a country puts the rights and duties constituting the status into effect, it performs a role. Thus, countries with status as regional leaders will hold roles and responsibilities. As a regional sectoral leader, Indonesia performed its role by initiating APCN. However, this study disproves Holsti in how he emphasized role performance and status based on the country's perspective. He stated that "a country is socially a status [...]" (Holsti, 1970). Therefore, it is necessary to identify how the international system assigns a status to certain countries. In this case, Southeast Asian countries also perceived Indonesia as a regional leader. Therefore, it is aligned with Indonesia's aspirations as a regional leader; thus, Jakarta succeeded in initiating APCN.

WHAT THE EXPECTED LEADERSHIP MEANS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

The previous section has discussed the expected leadership as an essential tool for Indonesia to establish the APCN initiative. However, it is also an essential finding to map out the current regional architecture. The leaders of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia should have the expected leadership. It is crucial because the region emphasizes consensus decision-making, meaning that hard power alone—material capabilities—will not be enough to influence other member states.

The expected leadership is aligned with the concept of regional leadership. Normann (2013) mentioned that a regional leader is a country that can manage its power

with the different characteristics of the members of its grouping. Regional leaders are not always the countries with the most incredible material capabilities in the region. Furthermore, Destradi (2010) defined a leading country as a leader who can direct a group to become its followers to fulfill a common purpose and mutually beneficial cooperation. Regional leadership will bring a particular set of behaviors in which regional leaders must be able to manage their material capabilities and influence in a balanced way. These two arguments are solid. However, they lack the perspective of the followers, especially how crucial the member states are in decision-making procedures in Southeast Asia.

On that note, a country leader in Southeast Asia should balance its material and immaterial capabilities and foreign policy aspirations according to regional expectations. It is mainly due to the decision-making mechanism within Southeast Asia. Consensus can be one of the decision-making mechanisms providing each country a stance against a greater power. Consensus offers the country a right to veto cooperation if it disagrees with the initiator. Consensus is ultimately more powerful than voting, where the leading countries can attract and manage their allies. Therefore, future expected leadership cases will likely occur in the ASEAN-led mechanism as long as the decision-making still relies on consensus.

Fortunately, the expected leadership fits the kinds of leadership in ASEAN, non-aggressive. A country leader can only influence the member states to accept their proposal, not force them to follow. In other words, a country leader should create a sense of agreement between their aspirations and followers. The non-coercive approach is vital because ASEAN was founded to reconcile the member states after the *Confrontation* era (Wey, 2021).

The expected leadership could explain what happened during failed regional cooperation. The mismatch between national foreign policy aspirations and regional expectations is a standard explanation of a failed cooperation. For instance, the multiple disagreements between China and Southeast Asia on the Code of Conduct could be explained from this

perspective. China's assertiveness—and somehow aggressiveness—in the South China Sea was a threatening action by maritime Southeast Asia countries. Therefore, they had different expectations, resulting in failed cooperation. The same mismatch also happened with the US, where the regional bloc was severely sidelined during the Trump era.

CONCLUSION

The paper concludes that Indonesia's expected leadership played an essential role in the success of its role performance in the APCN initiative. Indonesia exercised its regional leadership after the foreign policymakers perceived their country as a regional leader. Those aspirations were supported by other member states' expectations of Indonesia's leadership. The APCN initiative demonstrates that even sensitive topics can be agreed upon if there is a common ground between the national role conceptions and regional role prescriptions. Furthermore, this paper also explains the overview of Southeast Asia's regional cooperation and what expected leadership meant for it.

While the concept of expected leadership might be too premature to conclude all of Indonesia's regional leadership, it could be the beginning of new perspectives to see it. Most literature still views Indonesia as a *primus inter pares*—first among equals—in Southeast Asia through already established arguments, such as its intellectual leadership and material capabilities. The concept of expected leadership offers something new by highlighting the role of the followers in shaping a country's international leadership. It should be noted, however, that the argument on expected leadership does not negate the already established arguments.

However, this research has several limitations that can be addressed in the future. To begin, more research highlighting the followers' expectations of the leader is highly required. This research laid the ground on followers' perspectives more than Holsti did. Moreover, contemporary role theorists should address the impact of alter's role prescriptions in other case studies. Hopefully, a clear framework can be obtained for altering role prescriptions once other case studies have been

conducted. Lastly, more research is necessary to indicate that cooperation in Southeast Asia will possibly rely on expected leadership. Scholars need to consider other case studies with other regional leaders and possibly other areas of cooperation.

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