

The First Touch of CSO: The Role of Sant'Egidio, Humanitarian Dialogue, and Muhammadiyah on Conflict Resolution

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Abstrak

Keterlibatan Organisasi Masyarakat Sipil (Civil Society Organization/CSO) dalam menangani konflik masih sangat dibutuhkan. Berdasarkan pada penelitian kualitatif pada tiga CSO ketika pertama kali menangani konflik menunjukkan bahwa mereka memiliki kreativitas dalam upaya penyelesaian konflik lewat proteksi masyarakat dari kekerasan, menciptakan kohesi antara pihak yang berkonflik sampai dengan mengadakan dialog pada level lokal maupun nasional. CSO berupaya memaksimalkan potensi dan jaringan yang mereka miliki agar negosiasi dapat menghasilkan sebuah perjanjian damai. Hanya saja tidak semua CSO mampu melaksanakan misi tersebut karena keterbatasan sumber daya maupun kemampuan CSO itu sendiri. Tulisan ini memperlihatkan bahwa keberhasilan CSO dalam penyelesaian konflik masih membutuhkan peran serta negara sebagai pressure pada pihak yang berkonflik serta dukungan yang mengakar dari masyarakat sipil yang menjadi korban konflik.

Kata kunci: CSO, resolusi konflik, San'tEgidio, dialog kemanusiaan, Muhammadiyah

Abstract

Civil Society Organization (CSO) involvement in conflict resolution remains necessary. According to the qualitative research on three CSOs, when they first dealt with conflict, they were creative in resolving conflicts by sheltering communities from violence, fostering cohesion between competing parties, and having dialogue at the local and national levels. CSOs have attempted to maximize their potential and networks for negotiations to end in a peace treaty. Unfortunately, not all CSOs could carry out this mission due to restricted resources and competencies. This study unveiled that the success of CSOs in conflict resolution still required the state's involvement as a source of pressure on the disputing parties and rooted support from civil society.

Keywords: CSO, conflict resolution, San'tEgidio, humanitarian dialogue, Muhammadiyah

INTRODUCTION

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have become increasingly essential in conflict resolution. In numerous conflicts, civil society consistently suffers a high number of victims. In 2021, Action on Armed Violence recorded 19,473 deaths and injuries caused by the utilization of explosive weapons globally, with 11,102 civilians accounting for 59% of the total. In 2022, 20,793 civilians were among the 31,273 fatalities and injuries caused by explosive weapons, representing 66% of the total (AOAV, 2023). Moreover, according to the records of Khorram-Manesh et al. (2021), of all the global wars, 87 % of the victims were civilians.

The United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres (2023), warned of the devastating impact of warfare on world order. In his report, he revealed that civilians constituted 94% of war victims. Over 100 million people have been displaced due to conflict, violence, human rights violations, and persecution. The consequences extend to the degradation of health facilities, schools, and the environment (United Nations, 2023).

Since the end of the Cold War, CSOs have actively engaged in conflict resolution (Edwards, 2004). The increasing role of CSOs in conflict resolution is a result of their expanding function in global civil society (Keane,

2003). Their significance is especially evident in democratic nations, where shared perspectives and openness fortify comprehensive conflict resolution (Tocci, 2013).

However, the effectiveness of CSOs has been questioned. Both Reimann (2005) and Debiel & Sticht (2005) criticized the influence of donor countries, particularly Western ones, on the independence of CSOs. Poskitt & Dufranc (2011) also identified weaknesses in CSOs' organizational systems and conflict management competencies. To address these concerns, this study tried to unpack CSOs' role in conflict resolution, focusing on the case studies of Sant'Egidio, Humanitarian Dialogue, and Muhammadiyah.

This research proposed that CSOs require substantial backing from the community and the state to optimize their roles in conflict resolution, particularly during their initial engagements. A unique feature of this study lies in its focus on the early encounters of CSOs with conflict resolution, a topic that has not been extensively investigated. It shed light on the fact that numerous approaches adopted by CSOs often sidestep the heart of the conflict. In providing a deep-dive analysis of the experiences of three specific CSOs—Sant'Egidio, Humanitarian Dialogue, and Muhammadiyah—during their initial interactions with conflict, this study has brought a new understanding to the field. The findings are expected to significantly contribute to both the theoretical and practical perspectives of conflict resolution, enhancing CSOs' strategies and approaches in handling conflicts and informing policy on how the state and community can better support these organizations.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Examining CSOs' roles in conflict resolution has led to the development three distinct scholarly perspectives. The first perspective supports CSOs as vital agents in facilitating peace. Introduced by Fabbro (1978) in "Peaceful Societies: An Introduction," this viewpoint maintains that civil society should actively promote and implement principles of peace. Kaldor (2003) and Spurk (2010) suggested that CSOs can effectively defend

civilians during conflicts and advocate for their development at all stages. This perspective is wholeheartedly endorsed by Annan et al. (2021), who believe that civil society can withstand pressure from conflicting parties. Nath et al. (2022) added to this by stating that CSOs can instil trust in disputing parties regarding the outcomes of legislative agreements.

The second perspective maintains a sceptical stance toward the role of CSOs in conflict resolution. The scepticism arises from the belief that CSOs, even those with religious affiliations, are not devoid of political interests (Reimann, 2019). Furthermore, CSOs often maintain a close relationship with the state, acting as fund recipients and partners, which may compromise their independence during peace negotiations (Debiel & Sticht, 2005). Doubts about their accountability and conflict resolution skills also prevail. Semjonov (2006) emphasized that without precise mechanisms, CSOs may struggle in interactions with the government.

The third perspective recognizes the participation of CSOs in conflict resolution but downplays their impact. This viewpoint considers CSOs primarily as partners, providing feedback to disputing parties but not driving the resolution (Setrana, 2022). Elfversson & Nilsson (2022) and Gomes (2022) support this view, describing CSOs as bridges with limited influence. According to Elayah et al. (2020), the role of CSOs is increasingly shifting toward facilitating dialogue. Despite the diverging views, scholars have agreed on the negative implications of peace agreements without CSO involvement. Wanis (2008) and Assal (2006) argued that such agreements often lack legitimacy and alignment with community expectations, leading to short-lived peace.

Previous studies have analyzed CSO involvement in diverse conflicts, including the Israel-Palestine conflict (von Münster & Veit, 2002), Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement (Doran, 2010), peacekeeping in Romania (Roper, 2004; Barrow, 2009), and conflict resolution in Aceh (Nurpratiwi, 2019; Tjoetra & Askandar, 2014). The role of faith-based CSOs has also been explored, highlighting their ability to influence state power structures (Chaney, 2016) and contribute to sociopolitical transformations (Blair, 2012).

CSOs' engagement in conflict resolution has evolved over different global social and political phases. They played a role in conflict resolution during the Cold War (Leeuwen, 2016), the post-Cold War period of ethnic and identity disputes (Stavenhagen, 1991), the wave of democratic transitions (Kissane, 2000), and post 9/11 era characterized by identity and religious disputes (Bolleyer & Gauja, 2017; Brass, 2021). In the COVID-19 era, changes in conflict models and priorities have been observed, with health access overshadowing core conflict issues (Abou-Zahr, 2020; Alberti & Clark, 2020). Paffenholz (2010) identified seven roles CSOs can play in conflict resolution, stressing their potential for significant yet supportive contributions to peacebuilding.

The existing literature on CSOs has extensively addressed their roles in conflict resolution across different time frames, case studies, and stages of conflict. It covers a broad spectrum, including their roles as protectors of citizens, peace advocates, and dialogue facilitators. However, the studies have largely overlooked the initial encounters CSOs have with conflict situations. It is a critical gap given that these initial engagements often set the stage for future interactions, strategies, and potential impacts. Moreover, there is a significant deficiency in comparative analyses of the roles and functions of different CSOs in their inaugural conflict resolution cases. Such comparative analyses can illuminate unique strategies and approaches of each CSO and provide insights into how various factors, including CSO structure, philosophy, and external environment, influence their roles and effectiveness in conflict resolution.

To address these gaps, this research focuses on three CSOs: Muhammadiyah, Sant'Egidio, and the Humanitarian Dialogue, examining their first engagement in conflict resolution. The selection of these three organizations provides a rich and diverse basis for comparative analysis, given their distinct backgrounds and areas of operation. Muhammadiyah, as a prominent Islamic organization in Indonesia, provides a unique perspective on how religious-based CSOs can utilize their moral authority and deep community ties in conflict resolution. It allows researchers to examine the potential and challenges of faith-based CSOs in their initial

conflict resolution efforts. On the other hand, Sant'Egidio, a Catholic organization based in Italy, is renowned for its international peace-brokering efforts. Studying its initial engagement in conflict resolution would reveal how an organization with a religious ethos can navigate international politics and conflicts.

Muhammadiyah is a non-governmental organization established on the principles of the Islamic faith. Ahmad Dahlan established Muhammadiyah in 1912 in Yogyakarta. Up to this point, Muhammadiyah has been actively engaged in education, feeding, and healthcare (Qodir et al., 2021). The involvement of Muhammadiyah in conflict resolution is intricately linked to internal and external circumstances. Internally, Muhammadiyah recognizes the significance of globalizing the movement, as viewed by the outcomes of the 2005 conference. Externally, Muhammadiyah's interactions with other countries and other civil societies have been considerably enhanced due to globalization reasons propelled by technological advancements (Mahdi & Chusnul, 2022).

The Sant'Egidio Community, meanwhile, is a Christian-based civic organization. Andrea Riccardi established this community in 1968 in the Vatican in Rome. Sant'Egidio is dedicated to assisting individuals who face various disadvantages (Raharjo, 2022). The primary emphasis lies on prayer, poverty, and peace. Prayer is seen as a crucial resource for individuals in navigating life.

Meanwhile, the impoverished individuals are acquaintances and family members who require assistance. The ultimate objective is to achieve peace, ensuring that individuals are not confronted with any danger or peril during their lifetimes. Sant'Egidio currently operates in nearly 70 countries. Since the 1990s, the Sant'Egidio community has engaged in diverse dispute resolution initiatives. This phenomenon occurs due to the intensification of intra-state conflicts, prompting more civil society engagement in addressing these issues (Lehti, 2021).

Humanitarian Dialogue is a non-governmental organization that adheres to the principles of humanity, impartiality, and independence. This civil society was established in 1999, although it was formerly known as

the Henry Dunant Centre (Warner, 2013). The headquarters of this organization are located in Switzerland. Humanitarian Dialogue is committed to mitigating and resolving diverse conflicts in multiple nations. Humanitarian Dialogue facilitates mediation between parties involved in conflicts, whether between states or conflicts inside a single state (Leary, 2004). The disagreement can be resolved by encouraging and enabling the conflicting parties to engage in respectful and constructive discussions. Discussions are conducted with mutual regard and deference between the conflicting parties.

By focusing on these three organizations and their inaugural engagements in conflict resolution, this research will provide valuable insights into how different CSOs respond to their first encounters with conflict, deployment strategies, and challenges. Such understanding will enrich the discourse on the role of CSOs in conflict resolution, and it will have practical implications for the planning and execution of future CSO involvement in conflicts.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research employed a qualitative method to explore conflict management practices by three CSOs: Sant'Egidio, Humanitarian Dialogue, and Muhammadiyah, focusing specifically on their official roles and actions. This study examined Sant'Egidio's involvement in the Mozambique peace process in 1990, Humanitarian Dialogue's (formerly known as the Henry Dunant Centre) engagement in the Aceh peace talks in 2001, and Muhammadiyah's efforts to resolve the conflict between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) beginning in 2009.

This research adopted a case study approach, allowing for a thorough, contextualized analysis of each CSO's initial conflict resolution efforts. As Yin (2003) suggested, case studies are an optimal strategy when seeking to answer 'how' and 'why' questions about a contemporary phenomenon within some real-world context. The analysis explored how and why each CSO navigated their respective conflict environments in their first major engagements, and what these cases can convey

about the strategies and challenges of CSOs in conflict resolution.

Data were generated primarily through document analysis, involving an extensive review of existing literature, official publications, and secondary sources relevant to each CSO and their respective cases. Such data sources might include books, academic articles, official reports, meeting minutes, speeches, press releases, and news reports. This method allowed for a comprehensive understanding of the decisions made by each CSO, the context in which these decisions occurred, and the implications they had on the conflict resolution.

RESULT AND ANALYSIS

The findings and analysis of this research were presented in two key sections. The first delineated the roles and approaches Sant'Egidio, Humanitarian Dialogue, and Muhammadiyah adopted in their initial major conflict resolution cases. The second section undertook a comparative analysis of these roles and practices, utilizing the analytical framework provided by Thania Paffenholz's visual features of peace.

THE ROLE OF SANT'EGIDIO IN MOZAMBIQUE

The Community of Sant'Egidio emerged as a critical mediator in Mozambique's internal conflict between the Frelimo and Renamo factions beginning in 1990, stepping in when initial Kenyan-led mediation efforts in Nairobi did not bear fruit (Serapião, 2004). It was primarily due to the parties' discomfort with the state's role as a mediator, particularly on the part of Renamo.

Moreover, Alden & Simpson (1993) noted that two key factors exacerbated the conflict: the complex roles of prominent external actors, including the Soviet Union, the United States, and South Africa, and the subsequent diminution of their involvement, which ironically, tempered their impact as the parties moved toward a negotiated settlement.

Additionally, Appleby (2006) described Sant'Egidio as a conduit for humanitarian efforts. They sought to disseminate their religious mission by providing food, peace, and tranquillity (Sant'Egidio, 2023). After the Kenyan initiative's collapse, the Archbishop of

Mozambique, Jamie Pedro Goncalves, received an invitation from Renamo's rebel leader, Alfonso Dhlakama. This conversation set the stage for Goncalves to involve the government, representing Frelimo, thus integrating Afonso Dhlakama into the Sant'Egidio-led peace initiative (Barabási, 2003). Goncalves, who had studied in Rome, saw Sant'Egidio as a neutral entity, free of vested interest in the Mozambique case (Smock, 2004). This neutrality extended to their approach to the conflict between Renamo and Frelimo, with Sant'Egidio remaining steadfast in its humanitarian mission.

In this complex scenario, Sant'Egidio confronted two key dilemmas. Firstly, its capacity to control both factions was limited due to the absence of political or economic ties with any party in the conflict. Secondly, according to Bartoli et al. (2010), Sant'Egidio lacked direct contact with the government, which, being the legal power holder, naturally sought higher recognition than the rebels.

Navigating these challenges, Sant'Egidio devised a balanced strategy: offering Renamo the opportunity for dialogues in Rome, thus indirectly acknowledging Renamo's political identity (Chan, 1998), while also including the Italian government in the peace process to cater to Frelimo's interests, given their shared political ideologies. Sant'Egidio successfully coordinated a meeting between Pope John Paul II and President Samora Machel in July 1990. During the meeting, Sant'Egidio expressed its commitment to assisting Mozambique by providing essential supplies and resources.

Throughout the process, Sant'Egidio acted as a facilitator and mediator, hosting peace talks in Rome for nearly two years. Representatives from both parties attended at least three meetings in 1990, where they held steadfast to their positions, viewing the negotiating arena as a non-serious forum. Despite initial challenges and setbacks, including mistrust and communication issues, the third meeting concluded with a limited ceasefire agreement (Bartoli et al., 2010).

Further negotiations were marred by accusations of ceasefire breaches and stalled by demands from Renamo for political recognition. The Italian government took active measures to improve communication links, and the

Portuguese State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Durao Barroso, was brought in to ensure that the Portuguese would not arm or support Renamo, to maintain a conducive environment for peace talks (Bartoli et al., 2010).

By August, Renamo and government officials reached an agreement. Renamo rejected Frelimo's demands for official political party status under the Maputo Law, a legislation governing multi-party elections. Discussions continued until November, when perspectives on election legislation and the post-conflict scenario were agreed upon. It set the stage for three further meetings, leading to the signing of a peace treaty on October 4, 1992, which included a ceasefire agreement, UN troop intervention, a transitional period, and democratic governance (Lundin, 2004).

The connections between Sant'Egidio and the Mozambican administration, led by President Joaquim Chissano, were characterized by easy cooperation during the peace mission. It is evident from the government's readiness to submit to the authority of the Sant'Egidio corporation. The Archbishop of Beira and the government must establish a strong rapport to address religious conflicts effectively (Vines, 2019). This belief is also evident in the government's endeavors to facilitate a multi-party system, allowing Renamo to form a political party. Nevertheless, Sant'Egidio's selection was the alternative option, as the government first favored Kenya and Zimbabwe. However, Renamo expressed scepticism over this preference. Sant'Egidio's success in Mozambique was underpinned by its effective partnership with the Italian government, which sought to enhance relations with Mozambique and provided financial support to Sant'Egidio (Gentili, 2013). It marks an essential milestone in Sant'Egidio's evolution as a CSO active in conflict resolution. As Coleman (2003) suggested, conflict can be addressed constructively, as evidenced by the peace deal ending 16 years of conflict in Mozambique (Stedman, 1991).

THE ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE (HD) IN ACEH

Established in January 1999, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue became a pivotal CSO in Aceh's conflict resolution. Their involvement was initiated by

President Abdurrahman Wahid, who introduced a “humanitarian pause” strategy that granted HD permission to act as a humanitarian agency. Their first test came with their intervention in Aceh just a few months later, in September 1999.

Humanitarian Dialogue’s innovative conflict prevention and resolution approach prioritizes four key factors. Firstly, they advocate for partnerships as collaborative actions that can influence conflict resolution directly and indirectly. Secondly, they emphasize conflict transformation over-reactive responses, to foster lasting change in conflict-impacted communities. Thirdly, they encourage mutual understanding among opposing parties to form solid partnerships. Lastly, they uphold dialogue as the most effective method of dispute resolution (Humanitarian Dialogue, 2003).

Humanitarian Dialogue’s involvement in Aceh was due to the Indonesian government’s apprehension toward state mediators or large multilateral organizations like the United Nations. Indonesia viewed Aceh as a domestic issue and thus felt more comfortable involving an international organization like Humanitarian Dialogue, which had no historical baggage with previous conflict scenarios (Leary, 2004).

Humanitarian Dialogue’s immediate task was facilitating meetings between Indonesian and Free Aceh Movement (GAM) representatives in Switzerland in 2000. The main goal was to develop initiatives to quell violence in Aceh, a strategy GAM initially found appealing given Indonesia’s substantial strength. The negotiations produced the Humanitarian Pause agreement, supervised by Hassan Wirajuda, the permanent Indonesian representative at the United Nations, and Zaini Abdullah, a GAM representative (Sukma, 2004).

As the Humanitarian Pause phase concluded, Humanitarian Dialogue organized another meeting in January 2011, leading to an agreement for ongoing peace talks without time constraints. Humanitarian Dialogue led the Joint Council to monitor agreed progress and ensure compliance from both sides. The talks shifted toward finding political solutions for Aceh, though the

parties had different objectives, with GAM seeking independence and Indonesia opposing this goal (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003).

To further support the peace efforts, Humanitarian Dialogue engaged several prominent figures, including Budimir Loncar, the Ambassador of Yugoslavia to Indonesia; Surin Pitsuwan, a former Thai foreign minister; and Anthony Zinni, a retired US Navy officer. This strategic move, termed the “Wise Men initiative,” was lauded in the media and ushered in more comprehensive talks between the Indonesian government and GAM (Huber, 2004).

Despite some promising steps, the negotiations faced challenges. The Indonesian government insisted on GAM’s agreement to autonomy, which was met with resistance and considered an arrogant stance by American representatives. The talks continued with unexpected turns, such as Indonesia proposing a ceasefire and agreeing to meet with GAM leader Hasan Tiro. It culminated in the Framework Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities on December 9, 2002, establishing peace zones free from military activity.

However, the peace agreement could not be implemented successfully on the ground. Conflict broke out again 12 days after the agreement, with GAM and the Indonesian military both launching attacks. Attempts to resurrect peace talks, such as a summit in Tokyo in May 2003, failed due to irreconcilable differences over GAM’s desired independence and Indonesia’s push for autonomy. As a result, martial law was declared in Aceh (Leary, 2004).

Several factors contributed to Humanitarian Dialogue’s difficulties in resolving Aceh’s issues (Reid, 2010). Among these were a lack of mutual trust between the two parties, internal divisions within each party, and the absence of international guarantees to uphold peace agreements. Humanitarian Dialogue’s limitations also became evident during this process, such as their reliance on a research team with an incomplete understanding of the Aceh situation, their inability to build a unified European front, and their focus on technical aspects over political consequences (Alunaza & Mentari, 2021). The Humanitarian Dialogue engaged with the Indonesian

government under the leadership of Presidents Abdurrahman Wahid and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Under Abdurrahman Wahid's leadership, Humanitarian Dialogue, a non-governmental organization, was granted the role of mediator in resolving the Aceh conflict. During the transitional phase, Abdurrahman Wahid's position was insufficient to exert control over the government's military might in Aceh (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003). Under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Humanitarian Dialogue organization served as a mediator for peace settlement. The administration regards Humanitarian Dialogue as highly innovative in its approach to conducting mediation. The mediation involved direct engagement in Aceh and the organization of multiple dialogues in Helsinki.

Although Humanitarian Dialogue struggled to resolve the conflict in Aceh, its role was instrumental in setting the stage for subsequent successful negotiations. After their intervention, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and the Finnish government successfully pushed for the Helsinki Agreement in 2005. This experience underscores Humanitarian Dialogue's role as an essential foreign CSO involved in the Aceh case, reflecting its evolution and future potential in conflict resolution (Ahtisaari, 2008).

THE ROLE OF MUHAMMADIYAH IN MINDANAO

Since its induction into the International Contact Group (ICG) in 2009, Muhammadiyah has significantly influenced Mindanao's peace and reconciliation efforts. The organization was primarily selected by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) leadership due to their strong relationship with Muhammadiyah's notable figure, Din Syamsuddin. Din's repeated endorsements of Muhammadiyah's support for peaceful resolutions to conflicts, both nationally and internationally, have been widely recognized in numerous global forums, particularly those focused on civilizational and religious dialogue (Surwandono, 2015).

Despite the challenges, including MILF's purported links with jihadist, terrorist, and rebel groups (McKenna, 2002), Muhammadiyah has remained steadfast. It has consistently attended the formal negotiation forums held

in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, contributing to peace talks from the 17th to the 43rd session. Through these endeavours, Muhammadiyah has sought to transform liberation movements like the MILF into civil societies, thereby playing a key role in resolving the conflict between the MILF and the Philippine government.

As an active member of the ICG, Muhammadiyah has endorsed the peace agreement between the MILF and the Philippine government. This declaration was crucial, especially when political uncertainty loomed during the presidential election, prompting a suspension in negotiations. The agreement emphasized several significant elements, such as recognizing Bangsamoro's fundamental rights, respect for ancestral lands, and an agreement on a ceasefire (Mahdi & Chusnul, 2022).

In a bid to foster dialogue and cooperation, Muhammadiyah has facilitated meetings between MILF officials and relevant figures capable of conflict resolution, such as Taufiq Kiemas. During a meeting held on February 23, 2012, in Jakarta, Kiemas underlined the significance of Bangsamoro's fight for fundamental rights, particularly in relation to natural resources, emphasizing the need for peaceful measures during the process (The People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia, 2012). Moreover, Muhammadiyah organized a meeting between the MILF and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Bogor on November 25, 2012. This summit paved the way for discussions on shared agreements and fast-tracking the process of peace in Bangsamoro, among other things (Muhammadiyah Board, 2012).

In April 2013, Muhammadiyah brought together representatives from the MILF, the Philippine government, and Bangsamoro stakeholders to solidify discussions toward achieving lasting peace in the region. Ensuring justice and welfare were recognized as prerequisites for long-term peace and unity in Bangsamoro (Muhammadiyah Board, 2012).

Committed to understanding the conflict in Mindanao firsthand, Muhammadiyah visited the region, meeting with key stakeholders, including MILF leaders, the Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and civil society groups. Throughout

these interactions, Muhammadiyah advocated for a peaceful resolution through negotiation and pledged support for farmers and the establishment of Baitul Maal wa Tamwil (BMT) services (Surwandono, 2015).

While on its peace mission, Muhammadiyah maintained positive relations with the regimes Arroyo and Aquino III headed. Under the Arroyo administration, the government's approval of Muhammadiyah was a requirement set by the MILF (OPAPP, 2015). The government can view Muhammadiyah as an exemplary civil society entity that has the potential to evolve into an international charitable organization. Even during the Aquino III era, Muhammadiyah could convene talks with government officials directly in Manila. It occurred when the Muhammadiyah group, led by Sudibyo Markus, sought a direct journey to Mindanao. During the summit, the Philippine government unequivocally established that achieving a peace agreement is the primary objective of the Aquino III administration. The government also urged Muhammadiyah to contribute significant insights, particularly about the educational function that the MILF can embrace to facilitate the growth of Muslim schools in Mindanao (Democratic Progress Institute, 2014). In collaboration with other ICG members, Muhammadiyah contributed significantly to crafting the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro in 2012 and the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro in 2014. Despite initial hesitations from the Indonesian government, the successful formation of the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro led to its support for Muhammadiyah's ongoing reconciliation initiatives (OPAPP, 2015).

ROLE COMPARISON

The exploration began with the observation that protection of civilians is a cardinal objective for all three CSOs. It is manifested in their commitment to reducing violence and protecting citizens from harm, although their methods and degrees of involvement may vary. Sant'Egidio and Humanitarian Dialogue are not directly involved in conflict regions, yet they maintain robust networks for quick intervention, pointing to the power of diplomacy and indirect intervention in peacekeeping efforts. Despite Muhammadiyah's reliance on other

organizations like the Asia Foundation and IHH (Insani Yardım Vakfı) for protection work, it still demonstrates its dedication to peacekeeping, indicating that practical peace work often involves collaboration and delegation.

Subsequently, the issue of human rights monitoring surfaces as a significant challenge for these organizations. Despite their potential as peace brokers and influential roles, they do not have the authority to monitor human rights violations. It underlines an inherent constraint CSOs face: they operate in a space often dominated by state-centric norms and practices. It underscores the significance of structural changes in global governance that empower CSOs to play more active roles in human rights enforcement.

When turning to the subject of advocacy, the effectiveness of these CSOs becomes apparent. By inspiring nonviolent actions among conflicting parties and their supporters, they capitalize on their unique position to influence public sentiment and political discourse. It exhibits the influential role of civil society in shaping public discourse and setting norms that can aid conflict resolution. Their effective utilization of networks to encourage peaceful approaches points toward the power of collective action and the potential of civil society groups as agents of change.

In addition to serving as advocates for peace, these organizations also function as educators, instilling the values of peace and democracy into the communities they interact with. They bridge gaps between opposing parties, providing guidance on peace initiatives and promoting democratic principles. Their role highlights the crucial interplay between peace, democracy, and respect for human rights, and underscores the potential of CSOs as catalysts for political and social transformation.

Promoting social cohesion, while varied in its success across the three organizations, remains a critical part of their work. Sant'Egidio and Humanitarian Dialogue, through their active facilitation of dialogues between rival factions, have demonstrated the power of sustained interaction and diplomacy. Muhammadiyah's attempts, although less successful, imply that peacebuilding is a complex, context-specific process requiring persistence and strategic planning.

Table 1. A Comparison of the Role of Civil Society Based on Thania Paffenholz's

No	Role	Sant'Egidio	Humanitarian Dialogue	Muhammadiyah
1	Protecting citizens from violence	Middle	Middle	Low
2	Monitoring human rights violations	Low	Low	Low
3	Doing peace advocacy	High	High	High
4	Promoting the values of peace and democracy	High	High	High
5	Creating social cohesion between hostile groups	High	Middle	Middle
6	Facilitating local and national-level dialogue between various actors	High	High	High
7	Providing space for other civil societies to enter one of the six previous functions.	High	High	High

Source: adapted from Paffenholz (2010)

In facilitating dialogues at different levels, all three organizations excel. They demonstrate the fundamental role that CSOs can play in bridging communication gaps between opposing parties. This task of fostering dialogues and promoting peaceful interaction is one of the most critical roles of CSOs, a testament to the power of communication in resolving conflicts.

Thania Paffenholz's approach focuses on the seven roles of CSOs when comparing the three CSOs. The role is divided into three categories: low, indicating less direct involvement; middle, depicting involvement only within the forum; and high, signifying involvement inside and beyond the forum. It can be seen from the following table:

In the final assessment, Sant'Egidio emerged as the most effective of the three CSOs. Its long history of emotional connections with the people and government of Mozambique, its ability to influence powerful political actors, and its resilience in the face of shifting geopolitical currents speak volumes about its strategic approach. Comparatively, Muhammadiyah and Humanitarian

Dialogue, despite their valuable work, have encountered more challenges due to factors like limited grassroots connections, initial lack of government support, and their more specialized conflict management focus.

This analysis highlights the impressive work these CSOs did and areas where further growth is required. The lessons from their strategies provide crucial insight for other CSOs aiming to maximize their conflict management and resolution impact. The discussion underscores the potential of CSOs as significant players in the global peace and security landscape, even as they navigate the challenges and complexities.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the analysis undertaken in this study has validated the substantial role of CSOs, with specific reference to Sant'Egidio, Muhammadiyah, and Humanitarian Dialogue, in conflict management and resolution. Through their distinctive contributions, these organizations have demonstrated the breadth and depth of CSO engagement in peacebuilding. Even while

navigating various challenges, the organizations fortified their efforts by ensuring citizen protection, advocating for nonviolence, and reinforcing peace and democratic values. They also served as potent platforms for dialogue and negotiations. The comparative analysis underscores Sant'Egidio's effectiveness, borne from its strong connections and influence. However, it also highlights the considerable work Muhammadiyah and Humanitarian Dialogue did, notwithstanding their hurdles. These findings provoke thought about the potential spaces CSOs can fill in global governance, specifically regarding human rights enforcement. This study stresses the need for further growth and encourages other CSOs to glean from the analyzed strategies to amplify their role in peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

Given the considerable influence these CSOs exercised in conflict resolution, it would be beneficial for future research to investigate how these organizations influence various stakeholders. Additionally, analytical research could further dissect the negotiations and partnerships inside the organizations and how they assist in shaping their peacekeeping efforts. Lastly, recognizing the shifting dynamics of conflicts, a continued exploration of adaptations in CSO strategies in response to these changing contexts could offer a rich vein for future research.

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