



Figure 4. China's First Runway in the Spratlys

Source: <http://www.janes.com/article/50714/china-s-first-runway-in-spratlys-under-construction>

2010, Secretary of State Clinton laid out seven principles guiding the US government's policy toward the South China Sea. All of these principles are known to provide a foundation, though not the sum total, of US interests in the region; these are: (1) freedom of navigation, (2) freedom of over flight, (3) unimpeded commerce, (4) peaceful resolution of disputes and abstaining from coercion, (5) conforming claims to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, (6) a collaborative diplomatic process to resolve territorial disputes, and (7) negotiation of a Code of Conduct. (Bader, 2014). Clinton's statement depicts a strong message that even if the U.S. does not declare themselves as a claimant in the disputed area, they do have interests at stake specifically when it comes to the notion of freedom of navigation. As explained above, the U.S. needs to reassure its energy supply crossing the South China Sea. If the areas are dominated by China, the U.S. will surely face a security dilemma as it needs to ensure its regional allies' security, and secondly maintain roles as regional power for the sake of their national interests.

Moreover, despite the 'ASEAN Way' which emphasizes peaceful conflict resolution, some ASEAN states

seemingly show their security dilemma by strengthening the notion of self-help through building up armaments, as seen in the increasing number of routine patrols made by the Malaysian air force aircraft and navy vessels across the expanse of the South China Sea since the early 1990 (Cunha, 2000). Consensus-building is an ASEAN priority in settling any disputes, including the one in the South China Sea. Both Track One and informal Track Two diplomacy efforts have been conducted in order to solve the dispute through an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and a discussion of the Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN, in spite of Chinese participation; while the Track Two Workshop was initiated by Indonesia to develop dialogue, confidence building, concrete cooperative efforts and networking in the South China Sea (Djalal, *Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: Lessons Learned*, 2001). Despite ASEAN's principle of non-interference when it comes to other internal affairs (Severino, 2000), the embarrassing silence with a six-point consensus in the recent standoff between China and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea during the Cambodian chairmanship of the foreign ministers' meeting, has raised

the Indonesian sense of rescue to hammer out these points (Emmerson D. K., 2012). In fact, the latest images taken in March, showed a paved section of runway 503 m by 53 m on the northeastern side of Fiery Cross Reef which China began to turn into an island in late 2014 and an apron installation which could become a second airstrip-capable island on Subi Reef (Hardy, 2015).

Even though China shows a growing assertiveness by establishing artificial land in Spratly Islands, it still indicates a commitment to bring about this issue in a peaceful settlement. According to a senior PLA official interviewed by UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance Amitav Acharya in 2002, there are three factors which influence China to reduce their tensions in the South China Sea: (1) a desire to maintain good relations with ASEAN; (2) a need to focus on other priorities of the government such as Taiwan issue; and (3) a desire to prevent intervention by 'third parties' (read the U.S.) taking advantage of the conflict (Acharya, 2009). By having agreed upon a peaceful means in resolving territorial and jurisdictional dispute in the Declaration of Conduct, ideally China should have not reclaimed the Spratly Islands.

MARITIME VISION BASED COOPERATION

It might be a blessing for the Asia Pacific region to be given abundant amounts of resources such as those in the sea for their livelihood. A vast maritime boundary could bring either benefit or challenge to the states surrounding. In fact, the anarchical world politics, where friends and adversaries could change based on their own interests has led states to face a situation in which they need to make sure that they are safe from other states' intentions. Formulating maritime vision is therefore seen as one of the impacts of the security dilemma situation that Asia Pacific countries face at the moment. Led by the uncertainty in international affairs, both groups and individuals living such a constellation are therefore driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others (Herz, 1950). In response to the

security dilemma, Jervis (1978) wrote that states often seek to control resources or land outside their own territory in order to protect their possessions. However, the post Cold War era suggested that no state is justified to possess expansionist policy. Jervis further believed that the most probable attempts which country can make to protect themselves would be to seek control, or at least to neutralise areas on their borders (Jervis, 1978). Given the Asia Pacific region is a vast and diverse area which holds abundant amounts of potential resources, it is critical to preserve its regional security stability. Maritime vision which stresses connecting regional interdependence through advancing cooperation could be such an effective tool for regulating the way the state should behave in any sort of regional affairs. Minimizing conflict and increasing potential opportunities would be the prominent goals to achieve on this basis.

Beckman (2015) argued that the only other viable prospects for resolving the maritime boundary disputes in the South China Sea would be for the Claimant States to enter into Joint Development Agreements (JDAs) which spell out the right of the claimant states to exercise rights to resources in the areas subject to the JDAs. The basic principle is the countries' agreement on a legal framework for exploration and production, including sharing fiscal revenues, while shelving their disputes over who actually owns the islands, rocks, shoals, and reefs in the area and the seabed mineral rights that come with sovereign ownership (Kemp, 2014). Establishing development agreement could be seen as the most delicate strategies to put the dispute aside and promote a mutually beneficial relation among claimants in the South China Sea. The concept of "setting aside dispute and pursuing joint development", introduced by China's former Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in 1978, suggested their country's concern to enhance mutual understanding through cooperation and the creation of the eventual resolution of territorial ownership without simply giving up sovereignty (PRC, 2014).

Accordingly, China iterated their ambition to pioneer the two-pronged strategy by emphasizing land

and maritime routes. First, "The Silk Road Economic Belt" concept which was firstly introduced by Chinese President Xi Jinping on his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013 envisaging China's focus on infrastructure development through Central Asia (Xinhua, 2013). Second, it described China's vision to construct stronger maritime cooperation with Southeast Asian countries by highlighting people exchange and cooperation. In order to integrate these concepts with regional architecture; the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China with State Council authorization, issued the "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" in March 2015. Its background highlighted that this concept is designed to uphold the global free trade regime and open world economy in the spirit of open regional cooperation (PRC t. N., 2015).

This situation brings a potential opportunity towards the development of China-ASEAN trade and investments, as stated by He Lifeng, Deputy Director of National Development and Reform Commission at the Summit and Plenary Meeting of the International Seminar on the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative in Quanzhou City on February 12, 2015:

"We will begin building China-ASEAN information ports to construct an information silk road... Fifth, we must expand financial cooperation through various mechanisms such as China-ASEAN Interbank Association, Asia Infrastructure Development and the Silk Road Fund which will finance infrastructure construction, resource exploitation, industrial cooperation, and other projects in countries along the route" (Lifeng, 2015)

ASEAN countries will benefit from the maritime cooperations if the maritime vision is fully integrated into the shared opportunities on maritime-based trade and investments. One of the most prominent events which Indonesia will soon engage is their chairmanship role at the IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) in 2015. As Till argued in his historical at-

tributes of the sea that transportation and information need to be taken into account in order to enhance maritime cooperation, therefore Indonesia through its chairmanship in the IORA will promote advanced economic diplomacy through sea power. The Indian Ocean will then be projected as the pearl for benefiting surrounding countries. There are some significant points proposed in the National Workshop on the Preparation for Indonesia's Chairmanship in IORA which was held on February 25 2015 at the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; such as the issues on security and maritime safety, disaster risk management, trade facilitation and investment, fisheries management, academic and science exchange, as well as tourism and cultural exchange (Marsudi, 2015). All of these points are important in strengthening maritime vision and therefore alleviating the number of cooperations among countries in the region.

The Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, further argued that as a middle power country, Indonesia's membership in the IORA is not just about what it gets, but rather to make a contribution to the organization and the world. Furthermore, the ASEAN Economic Community implemented in 2015 will become the platform for enhancing cooperation as well as investment in ASEAN members. The implementation of the Roadmap towards an Integrated and Competitive Maritime Transport in ASEAN will strongly be suggested to benefit its members (ASEAN, 2008). Thus, the argument as to how maritime vision could become a strategy to enhance unity among ASEAN members suggests situations where all members agree on sharing the same concerns with regard to the South China Sea dispute. As a consequence, the regional architecture would be stronger and subsequently be expected to diminish the potential rivalry of great power in the region.

ASPECTS OF MARITIME VISION ON INDONESIA'S "GLOBAL MARITIME NEXUS" POLITICAL

Given Indonesia's geostrategic position as the



Figure 5. Indonesia archipelago map

Source: <http://www.lemhannas.go.id/portal/in/peta-resmi-nkri.html>

world's largest archipelago with 13, 466 islands, land area of 1,922,570 km² and 3,257,483 km² vast waters, it is critical to maintain their sustainability (Agency, 2013). Below is Indonesia archipelago map which is surrounded by two big oceans; Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean (Lemhanas, 2013).

"Jalasveva Jayamahe" (in the ocean we triumph), the slogan of the Indonesian navy, was reiterated by Indonesian President Joko Widodo in his first presidential speech on October 20, 2014. This vision is strengthened by choosing Tedjo Edy Purdijatno, a navy man, in order to be Coordinating Minister for Security of the Republic of Indonesia in Widodo's government and also the establishment of a new ministry called the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs. The Global Maritime Nexus strategy, announced by President Jokowi in his speech in East Asia Summit in Naypyidaw in 2014, will be undertaken through five key actions covering maritime diplomacy to solve border disputes, safeguarding Indonesian maritime sovereignty and security, securing Indonesian natural resources, intensifying defence diplomacy, and reducing maritime rivalries between major powers through the resolution of regional territorial disputes (Neary, 2014). Indonesian vision

under President Widodo will run under the principle of "Trisakti" or the Three Power Principles: to make Indonesia sovereign in its politics, independent in its economy, and distinct in its cultural character. In her 2015 Annual Press Statement, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi stated that in order to adhere to an independent and active foreign policy, Indonesia's diplomacy will be to achieve the goal of showing its character as a maritime nation and will take advantage of its strategic position between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans (Indonesia, 2015). Indonesia's ambition for pushing maritime connectivity through making the most of existing sea lanes could be interpreted as a strategy to leverage their roles in regional geopolitics architecture because of its ambition to be the region's middle power amidst the global power projection of the U.S. and China. Moreover, it is argued by member of the Indonesian House of Representative, Hanafi Rais that Indonesia needs to show their power in a peaceful manner by being an active peace broker in the South China Sea dispute and regional integration through GMN platform (Rais, 2015).

ECONOMY

Being surrounded by six choke points notably known as Strait of Malacca, the Singapore Strait, the Sunda Strait, the Lombok Strait, the Ombai Strait, and the Wetar Strait all used for international navigations, appears fortunate for Indonesia. Indonesia is therefore aware of the importance of prioritising the maritime sector as a strategy to alleviate the nations' power through its economic capacity. Moreover, one-third of the world's liquefied gas passes through the Straits of Malacca and into the South China Sea which is the shortest sea route between African and Persian Gulf suppliers and Asian consumers. The U.S. Energy Information Administration reported that by the end of 2011, trade through Malacca was greater than 15 million bbl/d or about one-third of all seaborne oil (EIA, 2013). In order to pursue this goal domestically, the government of Indonesia decided to foster "Blue Economy" strategy, which rests on establishing the maritime industry through fishery industrial capacity, ecotourism, sea conservation, sea transportation, and sea resources supervision (DFW, 2014).

SECURITY

In the midst of great power projections, Indonesia is facing a security dilemma which has led to formulating GMN as the means to reduce vulnerability and escape the impact of the power of others as Herz (1950) asserts point of striving security attainment from any plausible attack. Despite all the challenges, GMN offers potential solution to the better opportunities for surrounding countries to cooperate. One of the driving forces of Indonesia's geographic awareness is China's assertion in Natuna Island. Indonesia as a country does not follow the principle of "the use of force", but prefers to maintain a benign relationship with China in order to discuss peacefully. However, as a sovereign country who realises the importance of self-defense in an unpredictable world situation, Indonesia has begun to increase their country's defense budget. Moreover, the Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR) announced on 28 April that

Indonesia will increase its defense budget to IDR200 trillion (USD15 billion) by 2020 as it becomes a commitment to reduce its part dependency on sourcing military procurement funds from foreign military aid (Grevatt, 2015). In 2014 the Indonesian Minister of Defence Purnomo Yusgiantoro said that the government was planning to build a combat helicopter base on Natuna Island to strengthen Indonesia's military power in the territory that borders the South China Sea (Tempo, 2014). It displays Indonesia's willingness to increase their self-defence strategy amidst uncertainty in international affairs more importantly in the South China Sea dispute. In addition, one of the most important points of the GMN concept concerning the South China Sea dispute is stated by The Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, who signalled the intention of Indonesia to make more of a contribution through a bilaterally driven and self-interested approach to diplomacy. It will be applied through continual pressure on the completion of the code of conduct in South China Sea between China and ASEAN (Kemlu, 2015). This vision can be considered as Indonesia's strategy to play a more active role in regional basis, while pursuing national interests at the same time. As ASEAN leaders, Indonesia is a strategic place for any sort of international commerce. In order to apply this policy, there have to be coordinating policies from ministries to articulate the grand design of GMN, for instance the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Ministry of Transportation, and the Indonesian Navy. Nevertheless, 9 months since inauguration, none of the ministries involved in that vision have released any official blueprint in regard to GMN implementation. In order to respond to the challenges, four broad tiers of decision-making are particularly important: policy making at the level of grand strategy, grand strategy making, military policy and strategy making, naval policy and strategy making (Till, 2015).

In regard to the dispute, Indonesia has been an active actor in promoting resolution towards a peaceful settlement and maritime cooperation such as in

The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. It consists of 10 points of agreements signed by ten ASEAN members' foreign ministers and Special Envoy and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi represented countries' willingness to seek a more peaceful settlement without undermining the state's sovereignty. The fourth point of the agreement declared that:

"The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional dispute by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea." (ASEAN, 2002)

However, challenge comes from the split among ASEAN members. Indonesia, which believes in the principle of "free and active" tried to be an honest broker after Indonesian former Foreign Minister Natalegawa successfully persuaded Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong to read the six-point consensus reaffirming all ASEAN foreign ministers' commitment to observe the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and follow the guidelines for its implementation. Moreover, all ASEAN members also need to work together towards an early adoption of a Code of Conduct to strengthen the 2002 Declaration; to exercise self-restraint and avoid threatening or using of force; and to uphold the peaceful settlement of disputes in keeping with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS (Emmerson D. K., 2012). A split within its members is seen in Cambodia seemingly succumbing to China while U.S. supports the Philippines through a defense partnership. It may help both the U.S. and the Philippines enhance national interests. Meanwhile Malaysia, despite its status as a claimant state, and Brunei, agreed to maintain some sort of cooperation with China. In June 2013 Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak called for South China Sea claimant states to develop resources in order to protect the freedom of navigation and the safe passage of shipping,

while Brunei and China agreed to carry out joint exploration and exploitation of maritime oil and gas resources (IISS, 2013). Prime Minister Razak's statement depicts the fact that the South China Sea could become a test for ASEAN unity in the regional architecture. If this fuzzy situation remains stagnant, ASEAN could end up abdicating responsibility for managing its own regional problems to big external problems (Baviera, 2012). Consensus which becomes "ASEAN's way" of settling disputes can sometimes be difficult to achieve as some countries seemingly satisfy their own interests. For a consensus to be absolute, however, all parties must share the same concerns and be willing to sacrifice part, or all of their interests for the common cause (Nguyen, 2012).

Trust deficit, which leads to security dilemma, remains the unfolding challenge for countries in the Asia Pacific region while nations strive for peace, stability, and prosperity for the sake of their long-standing position within global uncertainty. The South China Sea, as one of the areas most prone to conflict, gets global attentions in regard to the considerable security arrangements in the region, at least to those who have interests there. Great power projections seem to be inevitable in international relations. Given the power disparity of states, their responses towards the possibility of great power projections may also be different. Southeast Asia as a region unmo- lested by external great powers such as United States and China has witnessed a longstanding influence from both sides. Indonesia, as one of Southeast Asia's most influential leaders, is trying to turn the security dilemma into a more beneficial relations thereby growing dispute over the South China Sea might be slightly reduced. To some extent, Southeast Asia states show reluctance to balance against the U.S. while aligning with China is also not an option.

GLOBAL MARITIME NEXUS (GMN) AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE

Thus, this research finds that, despite Indonesia's status as a non-claimant state with interests at stake in Natuna Island, Indonesia prefers to act contributively

in regional order amidst the highly escalated tensions of great power projection in the South China Sea. This will further be elaborated in the following explanation.

1.) Indonesia will maintain good relations with all claimant and non-claimant states involved in the dispute in order to pursue national interests at stake

Indonesia has declared its position as a non-claimant state in regards to the South China Sea dispute. It is stated in Indonesian President Widodo statement in an interview with the Yomiuri newspaper:

“One of China’s claims to the majority of the South China Sea has no legal basis in international law, but Jakarta wants to remain an “honest broker” there. We need peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. It is important to have political and security stability to build up out economic growth. So we support the Code of Conduct (of the South China Sea) and dialogue between China and Japan; and China and ASEAN.” (MarEX, 2015)

However, this does not mean that Indonesia has no interests at stake in the region as according to Lloyd national interests are the wellspring from which national objectives and a grand strategy flow (Lloyd cited in Sumakul, 2013). In order to prosper the nation, it is important for a country to safeguard their national interests which implies on the formulation of integrated defense and foreign policies. Indonesia has been playing an active role as honest broker during the dispute. The recent nine dashed line published by China has alarmed Indonesia as it overlaps with Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and Continental Shelf. Indonesia’s vulnerable position was tested after China’s nine dashed line claim overlapping Natuna Island. On 10 July 2015, the Head of Indonesian State Ministry of Development Planning Andrinof Chaniago and Indonesian Ministry of Defense agreed upon the establishment of a military base in Natuna Island as the means to safeguard Indonesia territory from any plausible threats due to maritime boundary disputes in the South China Sea

(KOMPAS, 2015). This shows Indonesia’s effort to assert its naval roles to ensure its safety from the danger of power dominion at sea.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets out what the maritime zones which may be claimed from land territory, as well as the rights and jurisdictions of states in such maritime zones (Beckman, 2015). Indonesia has been actively contributing towards a dispute settlement through its role as a third party. In her annual press statement, the Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, emphasised that through ASEAN, Indonesia will continue actively to engage in the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), as well as the early conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (Indonesia, 2015). In spite of Indonesia’s status as non-claimant states, national interests which are always detached in every country’s policy action, drive Indonesia to be concerned about their challenges and opportunities in the South China Sea. When states are a facing security dilemma, a condition in which they are unsure of other’s intentions while at some points need to reassure their position, they formulate some sort of policy which involves all resources to safeguard national interests. Indonesia, however, hopes to maintain good relations with two great powers as they benefit from this bilateral partnership. There are three layers of benefit which Indonesia will get: (1) In the South China Sea, (2) Indonesia-U.S. partnership, and (3) Indonesia-China partnership.

First, the South China Sea as a semi-enclosed zone holds many potential resources. Being on a line where four Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) meet, makes Indonesia fortunate. It would benefit the country if the government could maximize effectively all the potential, whether geographic, economic, or political, as has been enunciated in maritime vision through GMN. The rapid economic growth which increases in demands for gas and oil has increased the need for new resources for sustaining economic development (Sukma, 2010). Not surprisingly, the

South China Sea has become one of the most contested areas due to the strategic position of chokepoints which become a critical part of global energy security, because 63% of petroleum and the world's oil production are transported through maritime routes (EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, 2014). Apart from that, one of the biggest straits called Lombok Strait located in Indonesia is notably known as the wider, deeper, and less congested route than Strait of Malacca so that it will be beneficial for any trade routes. About 3,900 ships transit the Lombok Strait annually; the total tonnage carried by the Lombok Strait is 140 million metric tons worth a total of \$40 billion (Ho, 2006). It is further argued that tankers which exceed 200,000 DWT have to divert to the Lombok Strait due to the depth constraints of the Strait of Malacca.

The second layer which involves the Indonesia-U.S. partnership as it is reported in the fourth Joint Commission Meeting of the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership on 17 February 2014, will cover three pillars: political and security; economic and development; and socio-cultural, education, science, and technology (State, 2014). In supporting Indonesia's maritime vision, this partnership agrees upon some points: the selling of Apache helicopters to Indonesia in support of Indonesian Armed Forces modernisation efforts to more than \$1.5 billion; Indonesia's national oil company Pertamina announced a 20 year Liquid Natural Gas agreement with U.S.-based Cheniere Energy that would bring up to 800,000 metric tons per year of abundant the U.S. LNG to Indonesia for the first time; and improving fisheries management. These patterns would surely bring better prospective investments for the U.S. and Indonesia given the economic and security benefits.

The third layer involves the mutual benefits due to the Indonesia-China partnership. According to Rizal Sukma, the Indonesian presidential adviser for foreign policy, there are at least three areas where Indonesia's maritime agenda fills in or overlaps with the Maritime Silk Road ideas of Chinese President Xi Jinping namely connectivity, safety, and diplomacy (Gokkon,

2014). In 2013 President Xi Jinping launched the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) which envisages a maritime trade network stretching from Beijing, through Indonesian waters into the Indian Ocean and onto the Middle East and perhaps, as far as Europe where Indonesia would become a major transit point for Chinese trade (Piesse, 2015). It would surely benefit both sides due to its maritime interconnectivity without disrupting the existing SLOC in the region. On 25 March 2015, President Widodo, at the invitation of President Xi Jinping agreed to enhance cooperation in these priority areas: (1) Political, defense, and security, (2) Trade, investment, and economic development, (3) Maritime, aeronautics, science, and technology, (4) Culture and social affairs, and (5) International and regional affairs (Affairs, 2015). Under the China-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation Fund (MCF), Indonesia and China agreed to strengthen practical cooperation in navigation safety, maritime security, maritime search and rescue, maritime scientific research, and environmental protection.

2.) Maritime vision could become a lynchpin to the immersion of regional based cooperation

Haacke (2005) argued that ASEAN has failed to get China to commit explicitly and unequivocally to the principle of restraint despite the fact that they have been fairly successful in delegitimizing the use of force to settle unresolved territorial conflicts. It is true to some extent that ASEAN has failed to push China given China's reluctance to withdraw their military presence in the disputed area. However, ASEAN could become a potential lynchpin to promote regional cooperation in order to maintain a good order at sea. As argued by Mahan (1980) that sea is seen as 'great highway' or 'wide common' which provides nations with a means of transport easier and cheaper, Indonesia through ASEAN aims at promoting the importance of relying on sea transportation to maximize potential benefits from the existing international trade. GMN would act as the platform to bind ASEAN states into a joint consensus on arranging regional based cooperation through maritime means.

It will be conducted through the joint exploration mechanism which would benefit the surrounding countries given the proportional sharing of resources.

The responsibility of states surrounding the sea is stated in Article 123 Part IX of UNCLOS:

“States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights...directly or through an appropriate regional organization: (a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the sea; (b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment; (c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area; (d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested states or international organizations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this article.” (UNCLOS, 1982)

Given the economic and strategic position of the Strait of Malacca, it is therefore seen as an area which holds significant potential for the sake of states’ national interests. Moreover, freedom of navigation could potentially become a conflict-prone zone due to the abundant natural resources in the South China Sea. Thus, it is critical to establish a legally binding agreement or consensus as the ASEAN Way suggests in order to minimise any dangerous dispute. In order to ameliorate security dilemma, Lindley argued states can focus on such steps; increasing transparency and reassurance in order to reduce anarchy-induced uncertainty by sharing information about each side’s interpretation of the other’s actions (Lindley cited in Liff, 2014). However, there is no guarantee that by expanding transparency and reassurance could diminish all possibilities of potential dispute. This strategy works effectively if only all states bound into that sort of formation agreed upon the agreement. There are some regional cooperation in which ASEAN countries have been actively engaging in for instance ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), and ASEAN Plus 3 (ASEAN

Plus Japan, China, and South Korea). Most of them focus on the importance of enhancing finance, economic, and political cooperation in order to prosper the countries bound into the agreement.

3.) Potential shared opportunities through maritime cooperation could lessen the height of global power projection

The security dilemma is inevitable as each country must have their interests at stake. The important point is how these interests do not overlap and harm other countries through dominion which might lead to conflict or competition. The idea of that cooperation should rest on the equal profits enjoyed by all parties involved. Even though it is not a panacea, Indonesia’s maritime vision could become a way to at least reduce the heightened global power projections and to avoid further risk of making the South China Sea an area of contested primacy between the U.S. and China. There are several reasons why Indonesia’s maritime vision matters to provide a “buffer” solution amidst the deteriorated security environment in the South China Sea. First, maritime vision, as Indonesia proposed through GMN, will postulate the idea that economic cooperation would be enhanced in order to bring benefit to all surrounding countries such as those belonging to ASEAN as well as the U.S. and China. Therefore maintaining good relationship among all actors engaged will be prioritised for the sake of mutual benefits. Economic cooperation will lead to interdependence. If one country has dependence on another, and of course this is driven by national interest, they would therefore seek to maintain a good relationship. As Till (2004) argued that dominion is sometimes inevitable when it comes to maritime power at the sea, therefore states need to ensure that they have to agree upon a binding consensus in order to limit states’ overarching power.

Second, maritime security cooperation will provide a space for both great powers and ASEAN members, who are mostly developing states to discuss security threats that they are facing. Considering the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a multilateral forum, it may be able to help create a ‘situation of equilibrium’ among the major powers through the creation of

norms and habits of cooperation as, to some extent, the ARF is more about engaging the U.S. than engaging China (Acharya, 2001). Moreover, space for sharing information through communication would be better established, so the possibility of suspicion that usually leads to conflict or competition can be avoided. One of the principles of GMN is to enhance security cooperations with the great powers in order to secure the Sea Lines of Communication as it is crucial for all countries involved in the trade and investments there. So maritime vision as iterated by Indonesia in Global Maritime Nexus could be helpful in mitigating the risk of heightened great power projections, as all countries share the same burden as well as opportunities through a formal partnership on maritime cooperations.

CONCLUSION

The South China Sea dispute is predicted to be a zone for contested primacy by the great powers such as the United States and China in order to gain their interests at stake in the region given the abundant resources in the sea and its surrounding. This predicament has led Indonesia as one of the regional rising powers who commits to be a non-claimant state to strive for a more cooperative solution in order to reduce the vulnerability of the surrounding countries through maritime vision formulated in Global Maritime Nexus. Despite challenges and opportunities, Global Maritime Nexus could possibly become a “buffer” solution to enhance unity among regional actors given some of them become the claimant states. Moreover, it would be a mutually beneficial solution for all states involved in the South China Sea dispute to possess the shared opportunities through the maritime cooperations that will allow them to have better a transportation and information sharing system to reduce the potential risk of great power dominion. Furthermore, it can avoid the undesirable outcomes such as arms races by powerful states as all surrounding actors will have a more formal space to know other intentions’ through the established cooperation. Cooperation under the maritime platform will

therefore aim to reduce any potential of direct conflict which may occur in the sea. This dissertation set out to examine the extent to which Indonesia as a non-claimant state in the South China Sea dispute could maintain its neutrality despite the challenges on pursuing national interests at stake.

The use of security dilemma as a frame to analyse great power projections suggests a condition where most states in the region such as China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and even the regional actor like the United States have interests at stake in the South China Sea. Whilst most of all states declare the benevolent commitments on maintaining peace and stability in the region, there is no doubt that their national interests come into strong play. In responding the unpredictability in international affairs, states will commonly quest for security by increasing self-defence in order to keep their national interests safe. However, some others might have another response by forging the establishment of cooperation so that suspicion could be reduced and replaced by the sense of unity as proposed by Indonesia through Global Maritime Nexus. Sea power supports an analysis on how maritime vision invigorated by Indonesia could become a lynchpin towards regional unity as long as the equal sharing of opportunities and responsibilities among its members is undertaken. Conversely, failure to address sea power would bring about power competition which may end up in military exercise. However, instead of viewing security dilemma and sea power separately, it is useful to examine the interrelated ways in which they operate in bringing about peace and security order in the South China Sea.

The data analysis identified factors that have contributed to the security dilemma situation in the South China Sea. The existing global power projections which are seemingly inevitable between the United States and China have led to competitions in order to benefit from the potential resources at stakes in the South China Sea. Sea power strategy through Global Maritime Nexus was identified in the literature review as having the potential to minimize conflict and increase potential opportunities for all surround-

ing states. The research question in this dissertation asked to what extent Indonesia through its maritime vision maintains neutrality in the South China Sea dispute while pursuing the national interests at stake.

It finds that while Indonesia benefits from the existing cooperation with the United States and China as the two great powers in the South China Sea, they still strive to achieve the national interests in the South China Sea through a peaceful manner as formulated in the Global Maritime Nexus vision. Moreover, this vision also suggest that as the interdependence among countries through cooperation rises, any potential of great power projection will decrease since all will have to agree upon the idea to keep peace and security order at the sea. Indonesia will remain neutral as they rely on the existing relationships with global powers such as the United States and China. Nonetheless, as Global Maritime Nexus has been identified in this dissertation as the newly established vision proposed by Indonesia, further research should find ways to gain the more insights towards the implementation of the maritime vision. Without the well-established platform which requires an integrated manner among Indonesian ministries as well as regional actors, Global Maritime Vision would not bring any significant progress towards the goals on bringing about peace and security order in the South China Sea.

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