Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Human Security: A Case Study of Armed Violence in Papua during the COVID-19 Pandemic

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INTRODUCTION

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic is a worldwide phenomenon that has profoundly affected every area of society, particularly public health and the global economy. To date (February 2nd, 2022), the COVID-19 pandemic has infected 382,709,507 individuals and killed 5,708,038 people worldwide (Worldometers, 2022). Due to the overwhelming emphasis on containing the virus’s spread, creating vaccines, and minimizing global economic losses, the problem of armed violence and its effect on humanity has gotten less attention. Additionally,
some scholars have discovered that infectious illnesses such as pandemics may significantly influence the likelihood and length of armed violence (Ide, 2020). In response, United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, stated that during the COVID-19 pandemic, a global ceasefire must be implemented to facilitate human rescue assistance, diplomacy, and the prevention of the virus spreading among vulnerable populations, particularly in conflict areas (United Nations, 2020). Unfortunately, the truce did not continue long, lasting just a few days (Rustad et al., 2020).

Several studies reveal that bad economic conditions can trigger conflict intensity and ease insurgency groups to recruit new members. Therefore, the COVID-19 pandemic may indirectly increase armed violence due to its impact on the economy (Mehrl & Thurner, 2021). U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander, Stephen Townsend, has also stated that extremist groups in Sub-Saharan Africa have intensified their violence and increased civil society support using the COVID-19 pandemic as a strategic opportunity to achieve the group's agenda. At least 25 Malian soldiers were killed at a military base on March 19, 2020. Other cases are the kidnapping of opposition leaders by Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the deadliest operations by Boko Haram, which killed 92 soldiers, and major attacks in Mocimba da Praia District and Quissanga by Mozambique militants.

Unfortunately, this pattern occurs not only in Africa but also in Indonesia through armed violence in Papua, although the roots and context of the conflict are quite different in each region. The TNI/Polri task force and the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) are still in turmoil. Even since early May 2021, the Indonesian Government has declared the Free Papua Organization (OPM) a terrorist group. The conflict escalation has continued to increase with the number of civilian victims, public facilities being attacked, and the death of the Head of the Papua Regional State Intelligence Agency (BIN), Brigadier General I Gusti Putu Danny Nugraha Karya, in Dambet Village, Beoga District (CNN Indonesia, 2021). As an underdeveloped region, the Papuan people, especially indigenous Pauans, are more vulnerable due to the many limitations. Through the increasing escalation of the conflict and the absence of a ceasefire, the authors see that the human security of the Papuan people is starting to be threatened. This research attempts to identify the dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency of armed violence in Papua during the COVID-19 pandemic and their impact on the human security of the community.

LITERATURE REVIEW

ROOT OF PROBLEMS AND CONFLICT SOLUTIONS IN PAPUA

Papua is endowed with natural resources; however, these resources do not benefit the indigenous Papuan people. According to Bapedda data from 2009, Papua’s natural resources (SDA) of gold and copper mining material reserves were 2.5 billion tons. Examining the statistics, it is a tremendous gift that should be utilized to further the prosperity of the Papuan people. However, the field data do not reflect what it should be. Papua New Guinea’s population is generally impoverished and undeveloped, particularly in places not served by modern transportation infrastructure (Bhakti & Pigay, 2012).

Moreover, Papua is the poorest province in Indonesia, according to the 2010 BPS National Economic Survey (Susenas) (Bhakti & Pigay, 2012). The creation of the Special Autonomy Authority in Papua, with a budget of IDR 9.353 trillion, has had little effect on its poverty rate. Additionally, natural isolation and the predominance of migrants from outside Papua make it difficult for indigenous Papuans to escape poverty, coupled with insomnia, employment from the real sector and tourism, limiting them from getting out of poverty (Bhakti & Pigay, 2021). Poverty in Papua is also one of the factors contributing to the province’s security difficulties (Bhakti & Pigay, 2012).

As if that is not bad enough, Papua’s cost of living is extremely expensive and varies greatly for each region. Basic goods like rice may cost up to IDR 750,000-800,000 for 2.5 kilograms in the Puncak Jaya District, Papua, compared to about IDR 80,000 for 2.5 kilograms in Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia (Bhakti & Pigay 2012). High inflation and a lack of adequate
OPM-PAPUA CONFLICT RESOLUTION EFFORTS THROUGH HORSE-TRADING MECHANISM

OPM was formed on July 26, 1965, under the leadership of Permenas Ferry Awom. OPM attempts to raise global awareness and support for Papua New Guinea’s independence endeavors (Febrianti et al., 2019). The OPM has expanded into a separatist organization that often assaults migrant people, resulting in warfare in numerous districts of Papua. Numerous elements contribute to the OPM’s resistance movement, one of which is discontent with the outcomes of the People’s Opinion Determination (Pepera). Most pro-Papuan individuals believe that the voting process does not adequately engage and reflect the Papuan people’s interests. A separatist struggle ensues when a perceptual gap is associated with this integration. The installation of Papua as a Military Operations Area (DOM), economic inequities, and allegations of natural resource exploitation have all contributed to the separatist movement’s inception (Febrianti et al., 2019). Thus, to accomplish its objectives, the OPM often engages in revolt actions against the Indonesian Government while simultaneously attempting to acquire foreign support.

Febrianti et al. have attempted to resolve conflicts by horse-trading, a technique in which the two sides reach an agreement in which both parties receive what they want, and all requests from both parties are satisfied. After all, sides speak and attempt to reach an agreement, and this resolution procedure culminates in a new decision. This conflict necessitates the existence of amicable relations between the two disputing parties. However, this technique differs from a compromise that satisfies just a portion of each party’s needs since it occurs throughout an open debate (Febrianti et al., 2019).
To conduct a horse-trading analysis of the dispute, it is vital to understand each party’s demands. In general, the Indonesian Government is interested in retaining Papua as a part of Indonesia, but the OPM desires independence (Febrianti et al., 2019). When seen through the lens of each party’s needs, the two are incompatible and impossible to reconcile. Putting aside the difficult requirements of adhering to horse-trading regulations, they are extremely hard to enforce.

It is worth noting that there has never been a discussion between the Indonesian Government and the OPM. Wiranto stressed that discussion between the government and the armed organization OPM is impossible, according to the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. To begin, due to the OPM’s unequal standing concerning the government, they are seen by the government as a criminal organization that must be apprehended or resolved. Moreover, the OPM will question its chance to convey its desires authentically and whether the TNI will welcome them in the debate. Furthermore, there is a strong desire on the side of the OPM to oppose discussion since the Indonesian Government may frame or jail it at any moment on separatist charges. Apart from that, the horse-trading system requires that the debate continue to reach a solution. Nevertheless, the discourse required by this system must be conducted by balanced players. In other words, there must be a balance between the OPM and the Indonesian Government.

To date, OPM has been classified as an insurgent organization, of which the dependents are subject to the Indonesian Government. Thus, OPM’s position cannot be equated with that of the Indonesian Government, allowing the government to change it by reducing the number of parties engaged in discourse. In this instance, the Indonesian Government may send an acceptable party yet experienced at negotiating and armed with adequate knowledge to explain Indonesia’s requests. It is thought that establishing a horse-trading system through discussion and compromise would assist in resolving the conflict between the OPM and the Indonesian Government in a manner acceptable to both sides since dialogue is the most suitable method of resolving such problems (Febrianti et al., 2019).

RESEARCH METHOD
This study utilized a descriptive qualitative research method and secondary data processing. Qualitative research, according to Neuman, is a process of constructing social reality and elucidating the cultural significance of social phenomena. By concentrating on interaction processes and social contexts, qualitative research enables a more in-depth examination of crucial features of a social phenomenon (Neuman, 2011). Descriptive qualitative research methods exist to acknowledge that teaching and learning are complex processes, and to unravel this complexity, researchers must not only examine how learning occurs in general or what factors influence it, but also examine and understand each learner and the behaviors and experiences that groups and individuals have in social phenomena (Nassaji, 2015).

The authors derived secondary data for this study from various literary sources, publications in worldwide and national scientific journals, articles in online media, official government websites, and accurate and trustworthy experiences of the Papuan people shared at multiple online seminars. Its objective is to delve further into the effect of the pandemic and armed violence on the Papuan people.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
INSURGENCE AND COUNTERINSURGENCE
According to Bard O’Neill, the insurgency is a struggle between a non-ruling group and a ruling authority. The non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics. Insurgency consists of rebels leaving and withdrawing from the political community (state) of which they are officially apart. The rebels seek to overthrow the government to achieve an acceptable situation and reflect an essential ideology, creed, religion, or political symbol they believe in (O’Neill, 2005). Insurgency is defined by the use of low-level, protracted,
asymmetrical violence to overthrow the political system and bring about significant changes in the political and economic status quo on a large scale through complex terrain, psychological warfare, and political mobilization (O’Neill, 1990). There are several circumstances in which an insurgency group can succeed in achieving its objectives, including the following: (1) demonstrating compelling reasons to mobilize the populace in its campaign; (2) lacking government counterinsurgency capabilities; (3) geographical conditions that are not difficult or unusual; and (4) external support, including moral, political, technical, financial, and military support (Galula, 2006).

Counterinsurgency is a political-military strategy that aims to thwart insurgent organizations from pursuing their objectives. The dominant authority, the state, or state allies often lead counterinsurgency troops. Fincher asserted that these counterinsurgency players want to preserve their territorial integrity and interests by conducting counterinsurgency operations to the best of their abilities to defeat insurgent groups (Fincher, 2010). The state takes four broad counterinsurgency actions: (1) direct action against the insurgent leader; (2) action against the environment that fuels insurgency; (3) infiltration of the insurgency to erode its effectiveness; and (4) improving the country’s political and bureaucratic structure (Galula, 2006). Like other conventional battles, counterinsurgency is asymmetric and unconventional; the most critical tactic is to elevate minority groups through the installation of community engagement in all facets of a nation, not only military but also political, economic, and cultural (Galula, 2006). Galula contended that although insurgency may escalate conflict from small to huge, from weakness to strength, counterinsurgency does the reverse. The benefit of insurgency is that it can be carried out effectively and inexpensively while stopping it demands high expenses. For example, when an insurgency raises its approach (terrorism and guerilla warfare), it does not require counterinsurgencies to match this capacity immediately; rather, a saturation point arises over time, and the concept of diminishing returns applies to both. Thus, Galula stated, the insurgency is more fluid and straightforward, but counterinsurgency is more complicated, including conflicts of interest and power coordination (Galula, 2006).

HUMAN SECURITY

According to Tadjbakhsh (2005), security is the absence of insecurity and dangers. Developing a feeling of security entails being free of fear (physical, sexual, or psychological torment, violence, persecution, and even death) and want (there will be no work, food, and health). Thus, human security is linked to the ability to recognize dangers, avoid them as soon as feasible, and reduce any resulting consequences. Additionally, human security prioritizes victims of growing insecurity in the areas of armed violence, human rights abuses, and enormous underdevelopment (Tadjbakhsh, 2005). According to General Assembly Resolution 66/290 (2012), the human security concept may be used to address broad challenges and cross-cutting concerns inside the United Nations (UN) system and across nations. Five principles guide the human security strategy: (1) people-centered; (2) comprehensive; (3) context-specific; (4) prevention-oriented; and (5) protective and empowers.

RESULT AND ANALYSIS

INSURGENCY DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: WEST PAPUA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (TPNPB)

The West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) is the primary insurgent group in Papua, dedicated to achieving West Papua’s independence from Indonesia. This actor is the military wing of the Free Papua Movement (OPM). The TPNPB applied the Guerilla method to wage war against the TNI, POLRI, and foreign enterprises and their workers, including Freeport. Since the defeat of the 1969 vote on independence, the TPNPB has grown in membership and momentum in West Papua. Since then, insurgent operations have emerged as a source of hegemonic violence for Indonesian security agencies. The opposition utilized violence, attacking TNI offices and posts, stealing firearms, abducting citizens, attacking mining pipes, and attacking routes used by foreign workers and particular firms (Wangge and Webb-Canon, 2020).
According to Sebby Sambom’s report, the official press releases uploaded in 2021 totaled one, 2020 totaled 62, 2019 totaled 119, 2018 totaled eight, 2017 totaled 34, and 2016 totaled 69. The authors also determined from Table 1 that TPNPB carried out two primary insurgent operations in 2020, after the COVID-19 outbreak, namely assassinations and shootings of Indonesian security forces and assaults on Indonesian security stations. Numerous discourses included in these downloads underline that this armed violence is named The War of National Liberation and that it will continue indefinitely until Papua achieves independence and the Indonesian military’s illegitimate occupation ceases. In 2021, this page posted just one item providing TPNPB membership claims to underline that the TNI-Polri detained and killed people. It is also an act of insurgency carried out often by the TPNPB to demonstrate that Indonesian security forces have harmed people. However, these uploads are distinct from those widely circulated in national media and official data in Indonesia. The victims of violence perpetrated by the Armed Criminal Group (KKB) are classified into two, fatalities and material losses, based on data from the National Counterterrorism Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (BNPT RI) and the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs for the three years ending May 3, 2021. There were at least 110 fatalities, 15 injuries, and 95 deaths, as well as material losses such as school buildings, tribe leaders’ homes, and aircraft being set on fire and shot at. The BNPT RI unveiled that 62% of casualties were civilians, and 38% were officers based on these data.

Table 1. Number of Uploaded TPNPB Press Releases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Press Releases</th>
<th>Number of Uploads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>The killings and shootings of Indonesian security forces; attacks on Indonesian security posts; TPNPB membership claims to confirm that the TNI-Polri arrested and shot dead civilians; request attention to the United Nations to intervene in Papua and end violence with the mandate of UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Helicopter shooting; the takeover of weapons; threats of shooting to death civilians who become TNI intelligence; TPNPB membership claims to confirm that the TNI-Polri arrested and shot dead civilians; a statement of support for the community’s rejection of the presence of the TNI; attacks on Indonesian security posts; the killing and shooting of Indonesian security forces; statement of retaliation against Indonesian security forces for shooting dead civilians</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>News of the shooting of TPNPB members; denial of the TNI’s accusations against TPNPB; the discovery of rockets fired by the TNI in the TPNPB area; the shooting of the Indonesian Air Force Hercules plane; news about vigilance against the COVID-19; the killing and shooting of Indonesian security forces; an appeal for the 47th anniversary of TPNPB; reporting of TNI air attacks against TPNPB; killing and shooting of Freeport employees</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>News of the shooting of TPNPB members and civil society; news on the procurement of major military operations of the TNI; the shooting of Freeport car property</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Attacks on Indonesian security posts; the takeover of weapons</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>The killing and shooting of the Indonesian security forces (BIN)</td>
<td>1</td>
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COUNTERINSURGENCY DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN PAPUA

According to Halkis, identifying the pattern of Indonesia’s counterinsurgency strategy against the TPNPB can be seen in the formulation and implementation of Law No. 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy (Otsus) for Papua Province, which demonstrates the role of multi-actors in assisting Papua’s integration process. The central government, the Papuan Regional Government, the Papuan People's Representative Council (DPRP), the Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP), the Regional Police, the TNI (Kodam XVII Cenderawasih as Regional Command), and the Papuan Regional State Intelligence Agency are all examples of these actors. Although the Special Autonomy Law was not intended to address the asymmetrical war in Papua, Halkis believed its framework might aid in analyzing Indonesia’s counterinsurgency strategy. The primary strategy based on Otsus is to coordinate various elements ranging from indigenous Papuans through local government to the federal government (police and military). Following the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which includes a reference to the Indonesian security and defense system, namely the universal people’s defense system, the attitude to indigenous Papuans in executing Indonesia’s counterinsurgency strategy is critical (Halkis, 2020).

Table 2 details the counterinsurgency tactics used by Indonesia against the TPNPB from the New Order period to the present. The authors concluded that the counterinsurgency against the TPNPB, being conducted by three major actors, covering the Indonesian Government, the Police, and the TNI, takes two distinct approaches: a soft approach through development (both for the land of Papua and its people) and a security approach when necessary, such as during repressive and life-threatening activities. Domestically and through foreign diplomacy, counterinsurgency is also carried out, particularly against individuals who have historically supported the TPNPB movement. Additionally, the authors concluded that, based on Galula’s (2006) opinion regarding general counterinsurgency actions, the forms that Indonesia has implemented have represented the four actions: (1) direct action against the insurgency leader through Police and Military Special Operations; (2) action on conditions that trigger insurgency through Police and Military Special Operations; and (3) action on conditions that trigger insurgency through Special Operations of the Police and Military; and (4) strengthening the country’s political and bureaucratic system through the implementation of Special Autonomy and OMSP, which assists local governments in times of need.

The authors then identified a turning point in the TNI-Polri strategy for combating TPNPB during this pandemic, namely the designation of terrorists against the OPM. It occurred after the TPNPB intensified its operations and “successfully” aborted several TNI-Polri troops in April 2021, one of which was Brigadier General I Gusti Putu Danny Karya Nugraha, the Head of the Papua Regional BIN (Farisa, 2021). This classification enables the Indonesian Government to pursue further actions to eradicate terrorism in Papua, including sending the Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88). Finally, in May 2021, Densus 88 was granted permission to operate in Papua and successfully apprehended ten suspected terrorists in Merauke who plotted attacks on places of worship (Suwandi, 2021).

In 2021, Papua’s Special Autonomy has been extended (Otsus Papua). Otsus, on the other hand, still elicits a variety of sentiments since it is seen as unable to give Papuans, particularly indigenous Papuans, with justice. An organization representing the Papuan Baptist Church Synod Group claims that the implementation of Otsus often fails to meet expectations due to inconsistencies in central government policies, the inability of local governments, and the low trust of the
Table 2. Forms of Indonesian Counterinsurgency against TPNPB based on Actor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Forms of Counterinsurgency</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>There are two main approaches: (a) development in all aspects of life to reduce the intensity of resistance to armed movements and improve conditions of security and public order; and (b) international diplomacy in responding to the internationalization of the Papua issue to change foreign perceptions that support the insurgency movement (Sianturi &amp; Hanita, 2020).</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strategic steps (Noveria, 2016): (a) strengthening justice and welfare-oriented change; (b) human resource development; (c) expanding access and opportunities for the Papuan people; (d) building social engagement with all actors in Papua; (e) reinforcing the implementation of equal law enforcement; (f) Papuan people’s involvement in policies and decisions; (g) recognition of customary rights, freedom of expression, and protection of human rights; (h) establishing a special envoy as a bridge to the interests of all institutions in Papua; and (i) strengthening dialogue networks between actors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Discourse on Papua Land of Peace seeks to describe the development of a just and prosperous society in Papua with the spirit of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. This discourse has made several contributions, such as (a) the formation of identity and social structure of society in Papua; and (b) the creation and reproduction of inequality in power relations between social groups, social classes, women and men, minority groups and immigrants (Marit &amp; Warami, 2018).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Special Autonomy for Papua Province, as stated in Law no. 2 of 2001, then changed to Law no. 2 of 2021. This regulation gives the Papua Province the authority to manage its interests (Regional Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>TPNPB-OPM labeling from Insurgency Group to Terrorist Group. There were at least three main central government figures who made the statement in April 2021, namely Mahfud MD (Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs of Republic of Indonesia), Bambang Soesatyo (Chairman of the MPR) and Wawan Hari Purwanto (Deputy VII of BIN). This decision refers to Law no. 5 of 2018 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism (CNN Indonesia, 2021).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The authority of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) strengthens the law enforcement processes: (a) Law no. 2 of 2002 concerning the Police, in Article 15 paragraph 1 letter b; (b) Law on Social Conflict Handling, which includes cessation of physical violence, determination of the Status of Conflict Conditions, emergency measures to rescue and protect victims, and assistance in the use and deployment of the TNI; (c) assistance elements in crisis stages such as Samapta/Brimob, Criminal Investigation and Intelligence, which refers to the 2010 PROTAP regarding the use of repressive attitudes when necessary by avoiding human rights violations (Sianturi &amp; Hanita, 2020).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Special Operation to maintain conduciveness and empower the community is the Nemangkawi Operation. This operation applied a combination of law enforcement approaches (hard approach) and police operations with a humanitarian pattern (soft approach) (Sianturi &amp; Hanita, 2020).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The existence of the TNI in Papua is based on Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) according to Law no. 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Army. This task was carried out using a soft power approach and peacebuilding coordinated by Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih (Marit & Warami, 2018).

The Papuan people toward the central government (Rante, 2018). Students in Jayapura (Suwandi, 2021) and the Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP), as well as representatives from the Papuan Provincial Government (DPRP), the Papuan People’s Representative Council, and the Forum for Communication and Aspirations of Members of the DPR-DPD for the Electoral District of Papua and West Papua (Murib, 2021), all protested the Otsus proposal (Basyari and Susilo, 2021). The Papuan people, particularly the indigenous Papuans, were denied a voice in the 2021 Otsus planning because it was deemed too narrow and implemented unilaterally by the central government (Murib, 2021).

Although the strategy has been implemented in the field, the authors believe it has enhanced the TPNPB’s “creativity” in battling the government through guerilla warfare and bringing its operations closer to the populace. Following Galula’s opinion, an insurgency is often relatively simple and seems to be simple, but counterinsurgency may be quite difficult; even in the case of the TNJ-Polri, these two security actors might compete, resulting in unnecessary disputes.

HUMAN SECURITY OF PAPUAN COMMUNITY DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

The Papuan people are one of Indonesia’s most disadvantaged ethnic groups. As a conflict zone, this vulnerability gets more complicated, as the issues that must be addressed span practically every sector (Bhakti & Pigay, 2012). Poverty, poor human resource capacity, violent dominance, human rights abuses, and health difficulties are only some of the issues the Papuan people face. Additionally, indigenous peoples in Papua face vulnerability since they must battle to protect their forest and customary lands from opaque development plans between the government and private sector. It makes it more difficult for indigenous people to satisfy their fundamental requirements and forces them to adapt their lifestyles, as is the case with Papuan indigenous women who have traditionally been responsible for providing their families’ basic needs (Asia Justice and Rights, 2021).

After the COVID-19 pandemic first struck Indonesia in March 2020, the provinces of Papua and West Papua got infected with the virus, directly affecting the human security of their people. Indeed, even before the COVID-19 pandemic struck Indonesia, the Papuan people were categorized as vulnerable, having to contend with endemic ailments such as malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and starvation (Dewi, 2020). Not only are they confronted with chronic illnesses, but the Papuan people are also subjected to extended systemic violence as a result of armed violence between the Indonesian Government and the TPNPB through the TNJ-Polri.

Table 3 demonstrates that managing and controlling the COVID-19 viral transmission in Papua is complicated by the absence of suitable health facilities and services (Perkasa, 2020). With a population of 3,352,526, the current number of hospital beds is insufficient. Even though the government attempts to provide basic health services to the Papuan people through Otsus funds and infrastructure funds, it is still limited to urban areas. The opposite has occurred toward Papuans who live in remote areas, making it difficult to
detect or track the COVID-19 transmission in the community (Perkasa, 2020). Whether great or little, social limitations have impeded the flow of products and services, putting a direct strain on the Papuan people’s capacity to meet fundamental necessities (Wahyuni, 2021).

Additionally, the authors reviewed one of the measures to combat the spread of COVID-19 in Papua, specifically the vaccination program. According to ABC Australia’s report, immunization initiatives in Papua are frequently organized by the TNI-Polri (ABC Australia, 2021). It contributes to the Papuan people’s resistance and refusal to get vaccinated since when the TNI-Polri actors are remembered, the Papuan people often associate them with a violent and forceful attitude. This encounter might have been avoided.

The vulnerability of the Papuan people’s human security cannot be divorced from the ongoing and increasing armed violence, especially during the COVID-19 outbreak. Thousands of Papuans, including children, women, and men from other villages, were compelled to migrate to Timika to avoid war, creating additional challenges during such a pandemic (Dewi, 2021). Meanwhile, according to National Commission on Human Rights (2021), 700 youngsters sought sanctuary in conflict-prone locations, including the Kisor area in Maybrat Regency, Kiwirok in the Bintang Mountains, and Puncak Regency (Costa, 2021). Maria Imbiri, a human rights defender in Papua, during an online seminar in July 2021 entitled “Enduring Impunity in the Time of Corona: A Year After - Community Initiatives Across Asia,” mentioned that children in conflict areas, particularly those living in Bukit Intan Jaya, bear the brunt of the COVID-19 pandemic, not only because they lost their school, which was forced to close due to the pandemic, but also because they were unable to play like other children since their place of residence was used as a conflict area by the TPNPB and the TNI-Polri (Asia Justice and Rights, 2021).

The authors predict that if refugee situations deteriorate, it will become more difficult to manage COVID-19 in the region, such as in the Bintang Mountains, particularly at the Kiwirok Health Center, where nine out of 11 health professionals were killed in the TPNPB assault in September 2021. At the armed encounter, four health workers attempted to flee through the chasm, and one worker died due to torture and sexual assault (Anugerah, 2021). It was not the end of it. Conditions in Papua have deteriorated further after TPNPB was designated a terrorist group. The TPNPB's aim to become a terrorist group would further exacerbate the situation in Papua. Declaring the group a terrorist organization equates to allowing the Indonesian military to station more military soldiers in Papua (Perkasa & Satria, 2021). This increase will only frighten the Papuan people concerned about their safety. However, because this condition will encourage new military operations by the TNI-Polri aimed at eradicating terrorists, the TPNPB will also be able to create a counter-operation against the Indonesian military in the future. When it occurs, the community’s security is jeopardized. This effort will inevitably increase the number of people fleeing war zones.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
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<th>Total</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Health Facilities</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Medical specialist</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>General practitioners</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Public Health Center</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dentist</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Auxiliary Health Center</td>
<td>1,146</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>5,744</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pharmacy</td>
<td>125</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Midwife</td>
<td>1,794</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Polyclinic</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data adapted from Perkasa (2020)
As such, the authors urge that the Indonesian Government, as the accountable party, utilize a human security approach to resolve issues in Papua, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. The authors also stress that, based on current realities, the Papuan people are the most susceptible population to have their human security jeopardized. This method is judged acceptable in light of Tadjbakhsh’s idea of human security since it primarily emphasizes the victims of growing insecurity in the areas of armed violence, human rights abuses, and vast underdevelopment. The aggressive method is not a solution, either short or long term, since it jeopardizes the Papuan people’s human security, which is already precarious. Furthermore, the authors advocate cross-sector collaboration, ranging from local governments and the central government to non-governmental groups, to establish a better Papua. However, it should be mentioned that to use this multi-sectoral collaboration effectively, a balanced power relationship is required, given the many instances of injustice in Papua. The Papuan people are now confronted with security and humanitarian difficulties. They are compelled to leave and must withstand three simultaneous crises, including endemic sickness, violence, and COVID-19. The authors then stress that to ensure the Papuan people’s human security, the TPNPB and the TNI-Polri should prioritize a dialogue approach or perhaps a ceasefire, as urged by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres. It should also be performed from the onset of the pandemic, and the objective should be none other than the Papuan people’s human security.

CONCLUSION

When examining the history of the conflict between the TNI-Polri and the TPNPB, it is clear that the Papuan people have always been the most vulnerable victims of this long history of armed violence. Particularly since the COVID-19 pandemic struck Indonesia, it was once again the people who bore the brunt of the disease. The Papuan people were compelled to combat this pandemic and indigenous ailments long before the COVID-19 pandemic struck the planet. It is not the end of it. The Papuan people, particularly in Intan Jaya, Mimika, Puncak, and Nduga, have been forced to escape due to a protracted struggle between the Indonesian military and the TPNPB. It is clear that the Papuan people’s human security is jeopardized. Rather than diminishing, the antagonism between the TNI-Polri and the TPNPB has increased throughout this pandemic. Before the Indonesian Government can deal with COVID-19 in Papua, it must deal with the TPNPB’s threat of violence and terror. Given the group’s actions, it is unsurprising that the government has eventually designated TPNPB as a terrorist organization.

However, the authors assert that this labeling does not offer the Papuan people a good fortune, but what is available should be improved. The administration should bring this fight into the realm of discourse, or at the very least, attempt to broker a temporary truce during the present pandemic. However, no effort at a discussion between the Indonesian Government and the TPNPB has been made today. The establishment of the Special Autonomy policy has had little effect on Papua’s situation, and armed violence has continued throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. The government’s labeling of TPNPB will only exacerbate human security concerns and add to the suffering of the Papuan people during this pandemic, as it can create new problems, such as (1) the suffering experienced by the Papuan people during a pandemic is increasing due to the position of those forced to evacuate; (2) the threat of discrimination and stigmatization against Papuans is increasing; and (3) a decrease in the government’s intention to resolve problems through dialogue. The authors argue that a consistent approach to human security on the side of the government as the responsible party and multi-sectoral collaboration with balanced power relations are required to address complex issues in the Papuan conflict zone.

REFERENCE


Hasil Penelitian Hukum, 2, 333-357.