Democracy and Development in Africa: Contending Issues and Prospects for the 21st Centuries

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Abstract
The study examines contentious issues related to democracy and development in Africa. Substantially relying on secondary sources of data collection to adequately reflect the issues involved in this study, an interdisciplinary approach to historical research was adopted using content analysis. The study discovered empirical evidence supporting the argument that leadership changes are frequent or uncommon. In both situations, these leaders choose to govern in countries with weak or non-existent institutions, allowing them to avoid accountability for their corrupt behavior and abuse of office. According to the study, some challenges that have slowed development are lack of accountability, transparency, and democratic government, which must be addressed realistically for progress. Making the African system run more effectively and efficiently depends on the characteristics and eccentricities of those in authority.

Keywords: Africa; democracy; development; good governance; political participation

1. Introduction
Most African nations have pursued true economic development since gaining political independence in the early 1960s. A respected and friendly political climate is a necessary condition in this regard. This obvious synergy has been discussed by academics, including Claude Ake, Owudiba, Nnolio, Bade, Onimode, and Okello Oculli. However, given the level of misery experienced by the continent in the years after independence, it may appear that African countries’ efforts have not yielded many benefits.

Michael H. Armacost, head of the Brookings Institute in Washington, DC, stated in 1995 that most Africans are worse off than they were in his forward to Claude Ake’s “Democracy and Development in Africa.” Significant problems with diet and health exist, and infrastructure is eroding. Many studies have put forth causes for these problems. Examples include colonialism, corruption, inadequate technical assistance, unfavorable trade terms, a lack of entrepreneurship, and ineffective management. Armacost asserts that colonialism left behind a strong dedication to independence but few suggestions for a workable economic strategy.

Following independence, most African nations experienced internal power struggles followed by military dictatorships, which dominated their histories from the middle of the 1960s to the 1970s and 1980s and created an environment conducive to internal economic development. The expansion for the glory of the African continent has not been as expected due to this climate. Western capitalism, already firmly established
in most African countries, offered liberal democracy as an option during the chaos brought on by the absence of a development ideology among African leaders. Thus, democracy is the form of government adopted by African nations in the 1980s and 1990s, which refers to as the “third wave of democracy” (Diamond, 1996). Development is elusive for almost all countries, although some of them have been democratic for close to two or three decades. Infrastructure has continued to deteriorate, and nutrition and health problems have worsened. All human development indices are decreasing, and the poverty rate is rising. All of these have questioned the democratic development promise made by Africa. The situation has made it more important to keep addressing democracy and development issues. According to data from The Africa Report (2019), six African nations are rated as “extremely corrupt” (scores below 20), and another 35 are rated as “very corrupt” (scores between 20 and 39). Only Botswana is rated as “slightly corrupt,” and no African nation is rated as “least corrupt,” including most economically developed countries. Thus, approximately one billion of Africa’s 1.2 billion people live under corrupt regimes, a higher percentage than the rest of the world. One of the issues preventing African economies from developing is corruption, a governance issue with various unfavorable social and political repercussions.

As of 2019, more than 70% of Sub-Saharan African countries were either electoral or closed autocracies, according to the V-Dem 2020 Democracy study, which grouped governments into four categories: liberal democracy, electoral democracy, electoral autocracy, and closed autocracy. Likewise, since the index’s inception in 2006, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Ranking 2020 for Africa has shown its lowest score of 4.16 in 2020. Only Mauritius, as of 2020, may be referred to as an entirely democratic nation in Africa; the other seven nations are Tunisia, Cape Verde, South Africa, Namibia, Ghana, and Lesotho. The remaining governments were either autocratic or hybrid, with the latter making up the majority.

In Africa, frequent military coups during the past ten years have also been a sign of deteriorating democracy. Since 2010, there have been 43 successful and attempted coups in Africa. Mali, Tunisia, Guinea, and Sudan saw four successful coups in 2021, while two others were attempted (Central African Republic and Sudan). Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau have already seen one successful coup and one failed coup in 2022 (Duzor & Williamson, 2022). Common justifications for these coups include economic mismanagement, corruption, and slow growth in the target nation’s problems that COVID-19’s negative economic effects have worsened. The democratic reversal has brought attention to the African continent’s fragile democracy and the danger of political instability.

Additionally, it raises the question of whether democracy is bringing about the promised development benefits. On the nature of the connection, scholars are divided. While some contend that democratic systems inhibit progress, others contend they encourage it. While some contend that economic growth promotes democracy, others counter that it has little to no bearing on expansion. But in Africa, there are effective alliances. Based on the EIU and V-Dem index scores for 2019, nine of the top 10 African democracies have very high or medium human development scores. All nations
classified as top 10 democracies by at least one of the two indices, except for Madagascar, are middle-income, with Seychelles being a high-income nation.

Less than 3% of the people in Mauritius, Seychelles, Cape Verde, and Tunisia live in poverty, according to statistics on poverty reduction. The poverty percentages in Ghana, Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa were 9.7 percent, 11.8 percent, 17.1 percent, and 17.2 percent, respectively (EIU, 2019). Could there be alternative avenues for growth? Does autocracy lead to the desired results? Comparing the ten worst African democracies using the indices above reveals an intriguing relationship between authoritarian regimes and degrees of advancement.

Low-income countries Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Congo, and South Sudan dominated the bottom of the democratic indexes. Djibouti, Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and South Sudan also have low levels of human development (Pande, 2008). The least developed countries in governance and development are Somalia, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, and South Sudan. In South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and Burundi, more than 70% of the population subsisted on less than USD 1.90 daily (Calderisi, 2007). Chad, Congo, Somalia, and Guinea-Bissau are all extremely poor. They all have poor governance and have experienced political instability for many years. The worst development outcomes are consequently produced by authoritarian regimes coupled with unpredictability, bad leadership, and bad governance. With certain exceptions, authoritarian governments seem to outperform others regarding development indicators. Extremely undemocratic nations like Libya, Equatorial Guinea, and Algeria have fared better than other nations in terms of development. They are middle-income nations with excellent human development scores and fewer than 2% poverty rates. As a result, excellent governance promotes development regardless of regime type. Africa’s best chances for long-term success are visionary leadership and reliable institutions. Therefore, good governance should take precedence over elections in democratic.

1.1 Objectives of the Study

The study primarily aims to: 1) evaluate the applicability of our current and most popular methods for analyzing the relationship between democracy and development; ii) look into why, despite all attempts to change the continent, Africa has not advanced; iii) advocate the much debated “post-colonial” configuration of the African state as a roadblock to democracy and progress; and iv) make suggestions for policies to improve democracy’s focus on development.

1.2 Conceptual Understanding of Democracy and Political Development in Africa

Over the years, developing theories on how nations grow to be self-governing has taken a lot of time and effort. A working definition of democratic structure has also been accepted. The theoretical quality of democracy has been lost since most scholars restrict the concept of democracy to a certain collection of procedures to provide a brief, widely understood definition of a democratic state. Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl spent
much time emphasizing the crucial role that leaders play in democracies and the insignificant role that people play in their attempts to define democracy. According to Schumpeter, understanding how power is obtained and how decisions are made are crucial parts of comprehending democratic organization. Schumpeter defines modern democracy as “that institutional agreement for obtaining political decisions in which people acquire authority to decide through a ready-to-action battle for the people’s involvement in an election” (Schumpeter, 1942).

When examining Schumpeter’s idea of a democratic state critically, it is important to note that he is dubious of expressions like “the will of the people,” contending that the people’s will only consist of the ideas that the leaders present to them and that they accept and support as a whole. He argues that the old view of democracy based on the public will is unrealistic in its outlook, fails to handle human nature effectively, and does not accurately represent the current autonomous process.

Dhal and Schumpeter both contend that a high-quality democracy demonstrates the quality of being fully or almost fully responsive to all its citizens, which is the independence that sets democratic organizations apart from other regimes (Dahl, 1972). Since modern democracies are highly popularized, liberalized, inclusive, and generally accessible to public contestation, indicating the inclusion of people, organizations, and well-being that compete in the political sphere, Dahl favored the word “polyarchy” to “democracy” (Dahl, 1972). Although Schumpeter concurred with Dhal in a similar vein that the roles and will of the people are determined by the groups’ interests of the cream of the crop, Dhal contended that individual roles in democracies compete with groupings and common and rival interests. Their use of the word democracy, therefore, has the same meaning as polyarchy. There has been a misconception that democracy is polyarchy since the first formal theories of democracy were produced. The importance of leaders in creating the ideas and standards that people must uphold for democracy to thrive is illustrated by Greek political theorists. Philosophers of traditional democracies acknowledge the potential of strong, influential groups, ideas, and groups in democracies (Lord, 1984).

Democracy in Africa has expanded to embrace polyarchy using Dahl’s concept and Schumpeter’s definition of democracy. A thorough analysis of African democracy reveals the significant role that political parties and leaders have in influencing people’s opinions and political ideas. One of the fundamental characteristics that set African democracy apart from modern democracy is the openness with which citizens’ opinions are susceptible to the prejudice of their leaders. As a result, many academics are worried about the growing disconnection or separation between the public and the government. This issue explains the loss of civic engagement in African democracies, which has resulted in a general lack of contentment with how well policies have met public expectations. Although most people support democracy, they do not like how the government runs its affairs (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). Since the writings of contemporary democratic philosophers like John Locke, Montesquieu, and Alexis de Tocqueville conflict, such displeasure and frustration led to violence, political protest, violent revolution, and terrorism, which characterized African democracies because the
collective behavior of political leaders and the ruling party is totalitarian, flattering an instrument of anti-democratic objectives.

Two foundations of contemporary democracies are rights and qualities, both of which are absent in African democracies. These components fall within the broadmindedness practice associated with the writings of Locke and Montesquieu. In his discussion of rights as a requirement for liberal democracy, based on the premise that all people are equal in power, freedom, and the drive for self-preservation, Locke sees people as free agents with inherent rights (Laslett, 1988).

Locke concurs with Thomas Jefferson that everyone is born equal and has the fundamental human rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (Matlosa, 2003). Individual rights are recognized within the framework of contemporary liberal democracy, allowing citizens to choose their council to govern them as they see fit. African democracy faces a real problem in achieving human rights because citizens fear the state’s vengeance and thus are not free to investigate all aspects of civic policy.

Montesquieu and Tocqueville confirmed that the idea of virtue would offset the rising abuse of rights and sufficiently curb obsessive self-interest, allaying the grave concern that states based purely on rights would not create positive results. Additionally, it will help people form solid moral habits of the heart that will help them manage their life. To that end, Tocqueville concurs with Ibn Khaldun that for the welfare of humanity, democracy should be built on wise leadership, rejected by the obedient, and checked by the righteous (Sandbrook, 1988). In many ways, these traits counterbalance the benefits of Locke’s idea of open-mindedness. These imply that political leaders in democracies must be kind, responsible, and possess lofty ambitions, as well as a sense of justice and cunning, primarily for the creation of national identities and the establishment of political constancy, civic tidiness, and ideological assumptions about political progress in the sense of development that generates wealth (Santiso, 2001).

Historically, development politics and political development in Africa were commonly confused. Political advancement was seen as a financial investment with the modernist aim of building a country tied to economic development. It calls for political stability and order, which tends to take the primary emphasis away from freedom, good citizenship, and equality—the emphasis on order led to the rigidification of growth in many African nations.

The emphasis on political firmness as a characteristic of political development brings together an orderly political process that involves frequent change. For African political growth, change and its frequency are not a problem. Instead, it results from a disregard for democratic standards and political pressure, which leads to the rewriting or erasure of political rules. In pursuit of economic development, this closes off public spaces for the free expression of ideological preferences, which could lead to less than greater political development in Africa. The protectors of democratic values founded on self-determination are an orderly political process and conformity to political laws.

The primary theoretical concern of African governments has frequently been political maturity, characterized by content and cost-effectiveness. It is the stage at which governments have tried to justify their laws and programs. Order and stability have been
necessary for economic progress, a major driver of the expansion of authoritarian governmental control regimes and the democratic process. This theory contends that despite the continent facing the abyss of violent revolution, terrorism, and careless political and religious disputes and protests, African political progress remains constrained and out of touch with current conditions.

1.3 The Phases of Democratization in Africa

Three stages define the development of democracy. A few African nations will logically move from one stage of their genuine democracy processes to the next. While the established democratic process continues to be a mirage to African political actors due to the fusion of authoritarianism and oligarchy in democratic practice, which blurs the drive towards liberalism, the conversion and consolidation processes are particularly interesting in the study of African democracy. The stages of democratization are as follows:

1.3.1 Transition Process

O'Donnell and Schmitter recognized transition as the period between one political system and another, even if the current authoritarian regime is replaced by another authoritarian one (Hood, 2004). As a result, this vicious cycle of repression is repeated throughout the African democratic transition process. The idea that African political elites usually believe that centralized control is necessary for economic growth and survival underlies the emergence of authoritarianism in the continent’s democratic implementation. As a result, under the guise of democratic transition, some African countries descended into authoritarianism with a single party in power. As a result, nations like Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Tunisia, Egypt, and others fail to achieve economic success and democracy.

On the other hand, Richard Gunther, Nikiforos, and Diamandoros contend that a genuine conversion starts with overthrowing an authoritarian system and ends with establishing a democratic regime characterized by free elections (Hood, 2004). In this case, a democratic transition unquestionably means a move from one form of the regime to another. As a result, Steve Hood contends that the appropriate definition of transition is a political circumstance that leads to a change from autocracy to democracy. A change happens when institutions that support democratic elections are agreed to move away from authoritarianism (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

1.3.2 Consolidation Process

No single concept of democratic consolidation is accepted everywhere. Understanding varies from academic to academic. Adam Przeworski claims that democratic ideology is more focused on economic development than there is a general agreement on the need for self-governing institutions. Based on this methodology, he asserts that consolidation does not exist (Przeworski & Limongi, 1993).

Contrarily, Schedler thought that consolidation was a real phenomenon. According to Schedler, democratic consolidation refers to forming the institutions necessary to transform a system into a modern Liberal democracy and proceed beyond only elections (Schedler, 1998). As a result, the definition of consolidation proposed by
Linz and Stepan has gained popularity. According to their definition, democratic consolidation occurs when a sizable majority of the populace agrees that democracy is the best system for governing society and when governmental and non-governmental organizations consent to settle disputes under the principles of the democratic process (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

The analysis of African democracies can be conducted using this definition of a consolidated democracy. Africa has democratic institutions and elections, but there is no democracy there. Elections in Africa lack credibility and serve only to rehabilitate corrupt political figures who use the force of the state to intimidate rivals, amass wealth, and hold onto power in opposition to the will of the populace. At the end of 2006, there were more than 140 democracies worldwide, with half of the 48 African governments designated as democracies by Freedom House. Democracies are states with institutions that allow citizens to pick their leaders in largely free and fair elections (Piano, Puddington, & Rosenberg, 2006). 44 of the 48 Sub-Saharan African nations held de jure elections between 1989 and 2003 (Lindberg, 2007). Since Huntington’s “third wave,” many nations have embraced electoral democracy, with several, including African states, making noteworthy advancements toward democratic governance (Huntington, 1991; Lijphart & Aitkin, 1994).

As a result of democracy, a small group of political elites has emerged who are only concerned with securing their power over fulfilling their interests. Government officials encourage expensive, irrational projects, censor dissenting views, and stifle individual interests through austerity measures. Corruption and poverty are pervasive. As a result, people lose faith in democracy as the ideal system for governing society, undermining democracy and jeopardizing the consolidation of democracy in Africa. (Adejumobi, Adesida, & Oteh, 1998).

1.3.3 Established Liberal Democracy

Since most African nations are preoccupied with this stage while addressing transformational concerns, we are more concerned with the transition and consolidation phases of democracy. The term “established democracy” describes advanced or mature democracies that stand out for having a strong sense of individual rights, democratic values, and the conviction that democracy is inherently more resilient than other forms of government. As a result, there are no rights, virtues, or enduring characteristics in African democracies. The advanced phase of established democracy, which guarantees the general well-being and happiness of all citizens, has not been achieved by African nations.

1.4 Contending Issues in African Democracy and Development

Since instituting democratic changes more than 20 years ago, Africa has greatly advanced democracy and human development. However, recent bloody conflicts, corruption scandals, and fundamental rights abuses have undermined the continent’s democracy, demonstrated through undemocratic constitution modifications used to maintain power, coups in several African nations, restrictions on social media, and insurrections. Although the region is far more stable than before democratization,
authorities must address recent violence and corruption in African states to ensure that democracy is long-lasting.

2. Research Method

The qualitative approach to the research methodology was used in this study. Secondary data was included to probe, scrutinize, explore, and analyze the study’s facts. As a result, the information was gathered from pertinent publications, newspaper articles, reports from international organizations, and research articles. In this study, the collected data is analyzed to determine why the applicability of our current and most popular methods for analyzing the relationship between democracy and development, look into why, despite all attempts to change the continent, Africa has not advanced, and make suggestions for policies to improve our democracy’s focus on development.

The study ensured the instruments’ validity by ensuring that the contents of the instruments were consistent with the study’s objectives. Also, efforts were made to ensure that all aspects considered relevant to the study were adequately covered. Therefore, to ensure this study possesses high validity, the external criterion method was adopted and was achieved by checking how correct the findings of a particular instrument are by comparing the results with existing knowledge as well as the findings of the research. The methods described above were carefully employed to ensure the study’s reliability and validity.

Finally, to ensure that the instruments are reliable, enabling a dependable and objective deduction, inferences and conclusions, the internal consistency method was effectively adopted, achieved by crosschecking information alongside other sources of data collection and by ensuring that the facts and figures collected from other sources mentioned earlier are accurate and would remain the same if the collection is repeated over time.

3. Result and Discussion

3.1. Leadership Transitions, Coups, and Corruption in Africa

Several commentators say the lack of effective leadership has been a major factor in Africa’s growth and governance crisis since independence. Claude Ake’s thesis was fundamentally about the issue of leadership, particularly as it related to the area’s growth. Why do underdevelopment and development crises continue to be a prominent aspect of African socioeconomic formations, Ake was prompted to ponder (Ake, 1996a). In response to the previous query, Ake stated: “The answer depends entirely on the nature of the quality and character of the leadership that developed to advocate for African independence.” The colonial capitalist socioeconomic construction contradiction gave rise to the petit bourgeois leadership, which promoted political independence (Ake, 1985).

A disregard characterizes African political leadership for the aspirations of the populace and a violation of the constitution they pledge to uphold. Every form of manipulation is used to keep power at any cost and entails taking advantage of political, religious, and ethnic differences. Nothing is spared in pursuing selfish interests as long
as the objective is achieved. The art of self-succession is the rule in the sub-region, with a few notable exceptions (Ibrahim & Cheri, 2013).

The introduction of numerous thuggish totalitarian rulers following independence, according to Calderisi’s (2007) exhaustive account of Africa’s recurrent problems with bad leadership, institutional failure, and widespread corruption, worsened these issues. The fact that Africa has never had a good government, he continues, and that “no other continent has seen such extended dictatorships” is the simplest way to comprehend the continent’s challenges. The long-running dictatorships in African nations are to blame for the corruption epidemic, according to (Ayittey, 2012). Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (44 years), Omar Odimba Bongo of Gabon (42 years), Moammar Gaddafi of Libya (42 years), Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo (37 years), and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt are all examples of long-serving despots (31 years). Like those in Angola, Teodoro Mbasosgo in Equatorial Guinea, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, and Paul Biya in Cameroon are among the current tyrants who have governed for more than three decades. These rulers or dictators spent their entire careers enriching themselves, like many of their contemporaries who held positions of authority for an extended period fierce, political rival, eschewing all but the barest forms of democracy, actively thwarting movements toward constitutional rule, and at times subtly, at others blatantly thumbing their noses at the international community. They did not separate their personal and governmental wealth and ruled like monarchs (Calderisi, 2007). According to (Ayittey, 2012), their success may be ascribed to their dominance over the major governmental institutions, such as the central bank, electoral commission, civil service, judiciary, and military.

Numerous high-profile examples show that corruption is a pervasive aspect of African politics. Before being overthrown in 1997, Mobutu Sese Seko, the long-time dictator of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), amassed a fortune of USD 5 billion (Campos, Dimova, & Saleh, 2010; Pande, 2008). In the Goldenberg affair, millions of dollars were lost on “huge financial subsidies for bogus shipments of gold and diamonds,” revealing systemic corruption under Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, according to Igwe (2010). Two other public figures involved in significant corruption scandals are Sani Abacha of Nigeria (Iguzor, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007) and Jackie Selebi of South Africa (Schwella, 2013; Sundström, 2013). Recent Arab Spring events showed how hostile Africans are to corruption. Later, Occupy Nigeria was established to protest the loss of an oil subsidy that had supported an uneasy truce between some sectors of Nigerian society and the corrupt government (Anderson, 2011; Maathai, 2009).

independence checks and balances because they preferred to rule through extensive patronage networks rather than through constitutions or state institutions like parliament; in the process, they possessed enormous power and authority, enabling them to dominate all relevant institutions and prevent the necessary checks and balances common to good governance. Because of their autocratic rule, they contributed to the shaky foundation of poor governance and corruption that was felt in their economy. Today’s corruption in Africa results from the weak or failing institutions on the continent’s inability to check the excesses of its leaders. It might be argued that the continent of Africa is unstable due to its bad governance and pervasive corruption (see Table 1).

Mariam (2011) argued that African countries would remain imprisoned and unable to grow until they adhere to a five-stage reform process (Ayittey’s Law) because of the continent’s fragile foundation. Since nations like Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Cameroon, Tunisia, and Egypt skipped some of the stages and moved straight to economic reform, he believes these reforms should start with intellectual reform and end with economic reform (see Table 2). To make matters worse, dishonest politicians frequently hesitate to give up their positions of authority out of concern that they would be looked into for corruption and abuse of office. Political leaders rarely resigned voluntarily, and when they did, they usually hand-picked their replacements and continued to make decisions behind the scenes, effectively hiding their tracks. Therefore, African presidents regularly serve their terms over expiration dates and disregard Ayittey’s Law.

Table 1. Five Stages of Reform to Control Corruption (Ayittey’s Law)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1: Intellectual Reform</th>
<th>Stage 2: Political Reform</th>
<th>Stage 3: Constitutional Reform</th>
<th>Stage 4: Institutional Reform</th>
<th>Stage 5: Economic Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Free Media</td>
<td>• Democratic pluralism</td>
<td>• Limit powers of the Executive to control the six branches – civil, electoral commission, security forces, judiciary, media, the central bank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Freedom of Expression considered the most powerful tool as it opens up freedom and participation</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Independent judiciary</td>
<td>• Independent Media</td>
<td>Remove price and interest rate controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Liberalize trade and foreign exchange</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mariam (2011)

To illustrate the relationship between leadership and corruption in Africa, Table 2 lists the frequency of leadership transitions (FLC), the number of leaders who served (LWS), the number of successful coups d’état (SCD), and the longest tenure held by a leader in each nation. Additionally, the authors included the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores from 2011 from Transparency International for all 53 countries. The authors then re-ranked each nation to account for its position on the continent and globally in the CPI rankings. The results from the 53-country sample were used.

According to Table 2, the majority of Africa has been independent since the 1960s, with 80 percent of the 53 countries having achieved independence by the late 1960s, 15 percent gaining it in the 1970s and 5 percent after 1980, Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in the early 1990s, and Eritrea in the early 1990s. A quick analysis of the FLC variable demonstrates that African leadership transfers are manifestly dualistic. While some
nations experienced infrequent changes in their leadership, others experienced frequent ones. The last column displays the leader with the longest tenure. In 40 countries, some rulers held office for more than 20 years, while in the other 13 countries, periods of office ranged from 10 to 19 years. African leaders tend to hang onto their positions of authority after attaining them, which allows them to thwart efficient checks and balances.

Africa is not the only continent with corruption, but it is nonetheless pervasive and among the worst in the world (Pallister & Capella, 2000; Pande, 2008). According to Transparency International (2009), only Botswana is rated as “extremely corrupt,” and no African country is rated as “very corrupt,” which includes the majority of the economically developed world. Six African countries are classified as “slightly corrupt” (scores under 20), and another 35 are classified as “least corrupt” (scores 20–39). Thus, approximately one billion of Africa’s 1.2 billion people live under corrupt regimes, a higher percentage than the rest of the world.

According to the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index rankings in Table 2, Somalia and Sudan are two of the most corrupt nations in the world. Based on our re-rank, they are also the most corrupt nations in our sample of 53 African nations. Contrarily, Transparency International rankings (TI) place Botswana and Cape Verde at 32 and 41, respectively.

It would be an understatement to say that Africa is where military intervention began. Of all the continents, it has experienced the most coups d’état in its recent and immediate post-colonial past. The coup scenario frequently occurs, quickly following one another in a short time, like a wildfire that resists all attempts to put it out. In 1963, substantial military action in Africa began in Togo, Congo (Brazzaville), and Dahomey, aside from military mutinies that did not result in coups. The 1960s and 1970s were labeled a “decade of coups” on the continent by Gutteridge (1975), who noted that 14 noteworthy military coups occurred in Africa between January 1963 and the end of February 1966 and that by early 1968, there had been no fewer than nineteen successful coups. The total number of coups in eight years had reached close to thirty by the end of 1970 (Gutteridge, 1975). Over 70 successful coups and a sizable number of unsuccessful coup attempts had taken place in Africa as of 1999 (Amadife, 1999). Duzor and Williamson (2022) painted a grim image of military coups in Africa, as seen in Table 3. Out of the 486 coups attempted worldwide, they noted that more than 214 had occurred in Africa.

According to the table above, 106 of the 242 successful coups have occurred on the continent. Concern has long been raised by the perception that military coups could occur in various regions of the continent, supported by the fact that, of the 54 independent African states, 45 have experienced a military coup d’état and that 13 have made coups an everyday occurrence (Duzor & Williamson, 2022). Similar to this is the coups that occurred in Africa starting in the 1950s between 1960 and 1999, namely during the Cold War. Military coups have decreased during the past two decades (2000-2009 and 2010-2019), partly due to the democratization process after the conflict’s end.
Table 2. Year Attaining Independence, Frequency of Leadership Changes, Successful Coup D’état, 2011 Corruption Perception Index, and Ranks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of Ind</th>
<th>FLC</th>
<th>LW</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Corruption Perception Index (2011)</th>
<th>CPI Rank Within Africa</th>
<th>CPI Rank World</th>
<th>Longest Tenure by Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria†</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin‡</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
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Notes: FLC represents the frequency of leadership changes, LWS represents the number of leaders who served since independence, SCD represents the number of successful coup d’états, and * represents countries with more leaders than the frequency of leadership changes due to collective presidency.
Table 3. Success Rates of Coup in Previous Decades

<table>
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<th>Decades</th>
<th>Total Coups Attempts</th>
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<th>Success Rate</th>
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<tr>
<td>1960-1969</td>
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<td>61%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
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<td>42.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>41%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2019</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020-2022</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75%</td>
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Source: Duzor & Williamson (2022) and Powell (2012)

The continent of Africa did not experience a break in the occurrence of military coups until the Cold War’s conclusion sparked a rebirth of the civil society movement for democratization throughout African countries in the 2000s. Multi-party systems replaced the traditional one-party states during the third wave of democracy. Additionally, it cleared the way for a scenario where military regimes lost popularity, partly due to a change in the global support paradigm for advancing democracy and civil rights. These changes have created the notion that military intervention in Africa’s political system is no longer an option. Contrarily, the episodes were far from done, even if the period in question had seen a relatively lower number of military takeovers — only 12 coups were recorded from 2000 to 2012 (Klobucista, 2021; Phakathi, 2018).

According to the turn of events since 2012, military leaders have overthrown civilian governments in Zimbabwe (November 2017), Mali (August 2020), Chad (April 2021), Guinea (September 2021), Guinea-Bissau (February 2022), Sudan (October 2021), and Burkina Faso, among other countries, in the last five years or so (January 2022). The experience of military takeovers in Myanmar, Southeast Asia, and Africa. In Sudan and the West African sub-region, where serial coup plots resulted in the overthrow of constitutional governments in four countries in 18 months (two of them in Mali within nine months), led the United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, to denounce what he called an “epidemic of coups” (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020). Nowhere has this plague worsened as much as in Africa, which has caused many people to worry that the modest progress that some African nations had made toward democratization over the previous decades may be undone. Unless extra care is taken to halt the ugly trend, the contagion effect of coups could easily drag back some nations into the abominable days of military authoritarianism, with its attendant suppression of civil society and denial of human rights and freedoms.

Generally speaking, Sudan tops the list of African nations with the most attempted and failed coups, with 17 (out of this number, six were successful). Burkina Faso held the top spot with eight successful coups in 1966, 1974, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1987, 2014, and 2022. With eight coup attempts, Nigeria is the next country in line, and six of those were successful in July 1966, July 1975, 1983, 1985, 1993, and 1998. Burundi is ranked sixth, Chad is seventh, Ghana is sixth, Comoros is sixth, Mauritania is sixth, Sudan is seventh, Ethiopia is fifth, Libya is fifth, Sierra Leone is fifth, Central African Republic is fifth, and Benin is fifth. A total of four to five coups have occurred in Mali, Guinea, and Guinea Bissau (Duzor & Williamson, 2022; Kazeem, 2017).
Unfortunately, the list of military pitches in Africa today reveals that only a few African nations are fortunate enough to avoid having military coups in their polities. Southern African countries are insulated from the fallout from coups in the sub-region, except for Lesotho, which has seen two coups, and most recently, Zimbabwe. Only Botswana, South Africa, South Sudan, Cape Verde, Malawi, Namibia, Eritrea, Senegal, Sao Tome & Principe, Seychelles, and Mauritius have avoided a military coup d'état out of all the African nations. Other nations that only experienced one (Morocco and Mozambique) or two coups (Angola, Kenya, Cameroon, and Djibouti) but have since stabilized can be added to the list.

An Overview of Corruption in Africa Since 1984 Table 2 displays the continent’s choropleth maps for 1984, 1990, 1995, and 2000 using Political Risk Services’ corruption rating for 33 African nations. The red denotes extreme corruption, the tan/pink represents little corruption, and the white-shaded areas reflect missing data. Africa’s corruption grew from 1984 (top left) to 2000 (bottom right), as seen by the virtually entirely red color of the map. In 2000, Botswana, Madagascar, Namibia, and South Africa from the South; Morocco and Tunisia from the North; and Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal from the West were the least corrupt countries. South Africa had the least improvement in corruption over the period, while Namibia had the highest. Niger and Burkina Faso in the West, Ethiopia and Somalia in the East, and Mozambique in the South were among the nations that changed from low levels of corruption in 1984 to very high levels in 2000 rankings.

For instance, in some nations that experienced a decline in corruption over this time, Morocco and Tunisia had the longest periods of office held by heads of state, exceeding 30 years, compared to Botswana and Namibia, where the longest terms were less than 15 years. Additionally, South Africa’s longest leadership tenure was only nine years, and the country went from having no corruption in 1984 to having low/moderate corruption in 1990–2000. As discussed, the three dictatorial leaders with the longest reigns were Moammar Gaddafi of Libya (42 years), Omar Odimba Bongo of Gabon (42 years), and Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie (44 years). Tragically, these three countries are among the most corrupt at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Africa’s least corrupt nation, Botswana, is a regional leader in public services, infrastructure, and education. It also has a long history of relatively robust democratic institutions (Armah-Attoh, Gyimah-Boadi, & Chikwanha, 2007), while measures to combat corruption and return stolen money have had various degrees of success (Fombad, 2002; Lawson, 2009; Michael, 2004; Scher, 2005; Transparency International, 2009). The anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana take place in a setting that precludes comparability. Botswana already had relatively low levels of corruption, despite the country’s Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) being established in response to several corruption scandals in the early 1990s. In addition, the country benefited from several factors that make its situation unique: a relatively healthy economy, funds available for public services, a small (and relatively ethnically homogeneous) population, a lack of violent conflicts, and no history of significant corruption (McFerson, 2009; Theobald & Williams, 1999). In addition, the DCEC was modeled after and initially staffed by former members of the Independent Commission.
Against Corruption in Hong Kong (Theobald & Williams, 1999). Although in other African countries, such an agency would be entrusted with tackling bigger corruption with fewer resources, (Fombad, 2002) mentions the DCEC as an example of what a multi-pronged approach to corruption emphasizing prevention and supporting the rule of law can be, even in Africa (Theobald & Williams, 1999). The history and achievements of Botswana show the diversity of African countries and emphasize the importance of taking into account their political, economic, and historical contexts.

3.2 Governance without Democracy

According to Ake (2000), the absence of democracy is the cause of Africa’s ongoing underdevelopment. Even though democracy is good in and of itself, Africa needs it since it would considerably increase the chances for growth. He attributed the failure of the African development mission to political authoritarianism. Political tyranny was practiced by African leaders, who turned politics into warfare. They later learned they were under attack after their compulsion freed a lot of hostile forces. The resulting state of siege distracted African leaders from concentrating on development, with only little priority. In a similar spirit, governments in Africa lost contact with their people and ruled in an unaccountable manner. Public policy is completely disassociated from social requirements and even from being relevant to developmental difficulties (Ake, 1996b). Due to the trauma of repeated subjugation to arbitrary and repressive government, African civilizations have evolved into hostile entities that should be avoided, misled, and crushed wherever feasible. In contrast to the all-encompassing level of the state, they localize their allegiance in community groupings, familial groups, ethnic affiliations, or even religious organizations. However, when there has been more regard for democratic values (however minor), higher rates of growth and more effective models of accumulation have been secured along with better terms for the peasant producers (Ake, 1981; Ogbonnaya, 2011).

It is stated that peaceful power transitions are the finest indicator of human development and civilization. In contrast, selecting, electing, or ousting a leader is a simple procedure in the world’s developed nations. For such operations, many developing nations require both guns and tanks. It may help to explain why there has never been a peaceful transition of power in the area, leading to political crises marked by authoritarianism, a lack of accountability, and bad governance (Svensson, 2005). Even in countries where electoral democracy has made remarkable strides in some areas, these developments are typically balanced by serious declines in other areas. For the most part, the Ibrahim Index reveals that African nations do worse than 50% across all measures of electoral democracy. With an average continental score of 4.36 in 2018 compared to a world average of 5.48 and an average continental score of 4.31 from 2006 to 2018 compared to a world average of 5.51, the Democracy Index (2019) demonstrates that Africa has consistently fared below the global average. Africa continues to have the highest concentration of authoritarian governments globally, with seven of the 15 countries with the lowest ratings, despite the ratings showing a decline globally and in Africa throughout these years.
Another useful tool for determining the extent of electoral democracy in Africa is the research conducted as part of the Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) project, which results in the perception of electoral integrity (PEI) report. The overall PEI score for Africa from 2012 to 2014 was 58, much lower than the PEI score for the world as a whole, which is 64.33. One of the most recent assessments found that Africa’s PEI score was not only the lowest again but had dropped to 46 based on an examination of all national presidential and legislative elections held between July 1, 2012, and December 31, 2018. The three nations with the lowest PEI rankings worldwide, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Equatorial Guinea, all received scores of 24 (Democracy Index, 2017b).

Second, despite the expansion of democracy in Africa, research showed that democratic fragility and backsliding are on the rise. Several countries on the continent still have precarious democracies prone to becoming hybrid systems or non-democracies. According to the GSD Indices, the continent is home to more than 75% of the weak democracies in the globe. There is a growing backsliding because civil liberties are deteriorating, and the checks and balances on the government are deteriorating. This issue, for example, is the situation for Tanzania and Zambia, both of which returned to hybrid regimes in 2018 due to a deteriorating political environment (Democracy Index, 2017a; Karlis, 2018). Democracy erosion and backsliding occur not only in countries that have performed poorly on all metrics but also in those that have consistently performed well, such as Botswana, Cape Verde, Namibia, and South Africa (see Table 4). When looking at electoral democracy-related ratings, particularly the three areas of participation and human rights for 2008 to 2017, the Ibrahim Index for African Governance reveals that, on average, the continent lost momentum in its growth. The data also showed that while most countries have experienced a rise in their scores during the past ten years, only a small number have done so over the past five, and a larger number have begun to witness a fall. According to the Democracy Index, the downward trend grew worse between 2013 and 2017.

For instance, since the end of apartheid in 1994 and the beginning of a new era of multi-party democracy, South Africa has seen a decline or stagnation in both its levels of electoral participation and several of the qualities of electoral democracy. In 1999, there were 88% of eligible voters; today, there are just 65%, a 20% decline from 1999 levels. It is troubling in this instance since studies show that young people and the poor, who rely on government assistance, are the categories least likely to vote. The subject of democratic loss and decline is highlighted in Table 4 from the Democracy Index publications. It contrasts the global rankings and overall scores of the best and worst performers in 2018 with their performance from 2006 to 2017. The table shows that there have been small gains in both the high- and low-performing African states. Democracies in countries with consistently high rankings and ratings, like Botswana and South Africa, have been eroding for more than ten years must be worrisome. Out of the 50 African countries reviewed in 2018 by Democracy Index, only Mauritius is classified as a full democracy; eight other countries are designated as flawed democracies (with the top of this list consisting of Cape Verde, Botswana, South Africa, Lesotho, and Ghana). The remaining 26 countries (52%) are divided into 15 hybrid and 26 authoritarian countries.
The worst performers in 2018 were DR Congo, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Guinea Bissau (Democracy Index, 2017a; Karlis, 2018).

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
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<th>2006-2017 Decline/Improvement</th>
<th>Overall score</th>
<th>African rank</th>
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<td>Flawed democracy</td>
<td>6.49</td>
<td>Improvement</td>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>Improvement</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Source: EIU (2019)
Note: The Economist Intelligence Unit (n 8)

The findings of the Freedom House poll paint the same dismal picture. In its 2019 evaluation, only 17 of the 54 African countries (or 31.4%) are categorized as electoral democracies. It is the least number of African countries to have ever been classified as electoral democracies. An analysis of the trends from 2009 to 2019 shows that the number gradually dropped. In other words, by the standards Freedom House sets, there are fewer electoral democracies in Africa than ten years ago. According to the 2018 GSD Indices data, 20 countries are now categorized as democracies (of which only Mauritius is in the high category), hybrid regimes, and 11 as non-democracies, indicating that representative governance has been strengthened using a slightly different set of criteria (Democracy Index, 2019).

Thirdly, all studies show that democratic elections have improved over the past ten years, with more frequent free and fair elections. However, four countries—Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, and South Sudan- do not currently hold elections for various reasons. Furthermore, there has been a decline in political participation, especially over the past five years, which raises the prospect that citizens’ access to civic and political space is deteriorating. For instance, according to the Ibrahim Index study, the freedom of Africans to participate in political activities or join political groups fell by 56.2% between 2013 and 2017. According to this report, there has been a decline in civil society involvement. Over the past ten years, the civil space of roughly 72.9% of African people has diminished, with the last five years experiencing the largest decline. It is troubling, given the critical function that civil society organizations (CSOs) play in promoting democratic culture and encouraging the delivery of essential public goods and services.

Based on the results of the Perception of Electoral Integrity research (Democracy Index, 2019), showed that electoral processes in sub-Saharan countries are virtually
similarly divided into three categories: failed elections (29%), flawed elections (27%) and fair elections (27%). Maximiliano Herrera adopted a three-part classification of countries into electoral democracies (where the people can change the government through elections), pseudo-democracies (where a country appears to be democratic but where an authoritarian government prevents free and fair elections), and dictatorships (where elections are banned or are only allowed for one party). According to this definition, just 22 (41%) of Africa’s 54 countries are electoral democracies, 50% are “pseudo-democracies,” four (2%), including Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, South Sudan, and Eswatini, are dictatorships, and one, Libya, is in a state of anarchy. According to Freedom House’s 2019 assessment, just 17 of the 54 African nations (or 31.4%) meet the requirements for electoral democracies. Perhaps more importantly, it draws attention to the reality that there are now the fewest African countries ever to be classified as electoral democracies. Its trend analysis from 2009 to 2019 showed that the number gradually dropped. In other words, by the standards Freedom House sets, there are fewer electoral democracies in Africa than ten years ago.

3.3. Representative Democracy and Reform

In Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria, the combined efforts of the government, courts, electoral agencies, and legislatures have led to electoral problems, unequal access for women to human rights, and the distribution of social aid (called “dividends of democracy”) to locals (Achimugu, Stephen, & Aliyu, 2013). Anambra, Edo, Ekiti, Osun, and Borno, opposition party governors, were able to win at election tribunals thanks to the commitment of the Umaru Yar’Adua and Goodluck Jonathan administrations to refrain from interfering with the legal system to follow court orders and to rule against the candidates of their political parties (Tronvoll & Mekonnen, 2014). This interaction of procedures inside “neo-representative democracy” institutions contributed to developing a culture of legitimacy. It supported the significance of citizens speaking up to demand accountability for irregularities in the electoral process. This feature of political development has ramifications for new types of government inside federal periphery zones of sovereignty that give money from governance budgets to local communities, owners of small and medium-sized businesses, schools, clinics, and other institutions. The viability of American democracy depended on elected politicians allocating a share of federal and state funds to projects in their electoral districts. Justice Dahiru Mustapha, Nigeria’s chief justice, instructed judges handling corruption cases to complete their cases within six months to “address the prevalent impression that the judiciary was not exercising its constitutional function of tackling corruption.” It may be claimed that one institution of democratic governance is striving to legitimize the legal system as a tool for political gain. It is frequently forgotten that Tanzania was the first nation to establish competitive elections under a single-party system with broad support to safeguard electoral legitimacy and guarantee that lawmakers were chosen based on the votes cast to support them. Candidates were chosen “unopposed” using the Westminster method when no opposing parties nor independent candidates put out any candidates. Neo-representative democracy had to be safeguarded from these flaws (Arezki & Gylfason, 2013; Tronvoll & Mekonnen, 2014).
In Rwanda’s parliamentary elections, Paul Kagame is accused of purposefully supporting female candidates to avoid being distracted by male opponents who wanted to overthrow him. He allegedly wanted to abolish ethnic tags to counter the German-Belgian policy of utilizing ethnic identities to incite strife. Rural towns are expected to enforce vaccinations against diseases that kill children to rebuild a population ravaged by the 1994 genocide and an 80 percent government-funded health insurance scheme. For jeopardizing national security through population growth, a household head who refuses to pay the health scheme’s 20% contribution and whose child catches malaria but cannot afford medication is imprisoned. The Ugandan system, which guarantees that at least one woman is elected to parliament from each parliamentary seat, inspired Kenya’s 2010 constitution. Human resource development is significantly accelerated by selective “directed democracy” (Kofele-Kale, 2006; Tronvoll & Mekonnen, 2014).

3.4. Innovation and Culture for Development

It has been brought up that talks concerning adopting “representative democracy” fail to consider pre-colonial cultural technology. The demonstration effect of Japan’s growth from a backward Asian region to temporarily forcing European and American colonial powers out of Asia and the Pacific Rim during World War Two, in addition to defeating Czarist Russia in a war, may have gone unnoticed by the majority of African leaders (Lindberg, 2004).

One advantage of such an interaction would have been to research self-confidence in Africa’s cultural values and infrastructure as a source of concepts for nation-building and industrialization. Even more crucial, osmotically absorbed responsibility would have carried the intellectual burden of applying fundamental ideas to permeate attempts to construct modern governance, including capitalist institutions and processes.

The Japanese imbued labor in factories with Buddhist ideals of excellence in work, fulfillment within the group work brigade, and not outside of it, to structure work processes free from the impact of diversionary individualism. Management teams would leave the office and yell their heads off in train stations to release steam from self-effacing human rituals. The notion that each person gains strength from cooperating with and within a “groupism” or group is expressed in the concept and practice of “collective” in Japanese governance, where subsidiaries of the same corporation and those operating in the same product area own share in each other's companies and provide personnel to participate in each company’s daily management decision-making sessions. Competitive uniqueness, according to Chant and McIlwaine (2009), Ikenberry (2011) and others, is detrimental to everyone.

Africa’s policymakers need to analyze how the Japanese approach to “groupism” expresses itself by supporting companies to engage in a line of manufacturing chosen by the leadership of bankers, scholars, industrialists, and administrators. Management staff from the Bank of Commerce and Industry, the Bank of Japan, and the Ministry of Trade are closely involved in daily management decision-making to guarantee successful implementation and the protection of public funds. Civil employees with a history of siphoning off substantial quantities of money from the budgets of ministries and other government agencies may be fired to accomplish this part of empowering people with
entrepreneurial potential under supervision in Africa. Such a solution would expel active corrupt “farmers” from public organizations without resorting to punitive measures. The Nigerian National Assembly is speaking out more in favor of making corruption among public employees a crime. A modern, prosperous economy has emerged in Japan due to its people’s capacity to assume intellectual responsibility for creating a world based on their values and creativity.

When it comes to study and research, the Buddhist notion that producing great work qualifies one for divine favor and devotion is used, which inspires students to go above and beyond in their pursuit of the highest grades. In real life, parents subject their children to rigorous after-school private education. Ironically, too much emphasis is placed on reading prescribed literature, which is blamed for less success in creativity, imagination, and understanding of what can and could be invented.

Most colonial educational policies, on the other hand, had the flaw of neglecting to consider our regional peculiarities and failing to incorporate Africans in their development. However, this provided the foundation for later educational policies that were created. Students were given the wrong idea about the significance of vocational education because of the emphasis on the white man’s job or the locals’ desire for white-collar jobs, which is now to blame for the deteriorating unemployment situation in Nigeria. Students have misgivings about technical education (Abdulrasheed, 2021b; Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020). Instead of generating their jobs, many job seekers continue to rely on the government and the underdeveloped private sector for job placement and jobs for others since they lack the practical skills to enable self-employment (Abdulrasheed, 2021a). The educational reform by the Asian “Tigers” was a vital tool for social and economic development. Their educational system was modified to meet societal objectives and demands. Nigeria could seek to use home grooming technology to start an industrial revolution and turn its raw materials into completed goods, just like the Asian “Tigers” did. The advantages of technology for accelerating production are obvious (Iriye et al., 1995).

A democracy that produces and shelters such damaged human resources must be a “mechanic’s workshop,” where panel pounding and “engine maintenance” will come before advancing the country. Neo-representative democracy is crumbling from the inside out and lacks the vitality necessary for the agency to function before corporate interest groups paralyze it.

China’s development of “socialism with Chinese elements” was aided by Japan’s occupation of Manchuria. Chinese institutions, particularly the Army, may have profited from Chairman Mao’s Cultural Revolution by focusing on Japan’s abuse of Buddhism rather than China’s horrible feudal past. Africa can learn from China’s ascent in the face of the collapse of Euro-American capitalism.

3.5. Development and Democracy based on the People

African democracies are undoubtedly democratically organized in their institutions, constitutions, and power structures; however, oligarchy control and authoritarianism are imposed, leading to the ascendancy of sham democracy that stifles political advancement in the continent’s political system. Sham democracy is the fusion
of oligarchy and authoritarianism under cover of democracy. The people are forced to live in misery and poverty rather than pursuing the common good and happiness for all because political power is still held by conservative forces of former authoritarian leaders, and economic power is still in the hands of corrupt political figures and global finance capital (Bertram, 2011; Dumont, 1988). How evenly a society is distributed in wealth determines how near oligarchy and democracy are to one another. The ideas and practices of democracy endure and are supported when wealth is divided fairly. In contrast, democracy is more likely to be overthrown by a small group of people when income is distributed inequitably (Sabine & Thorson, 1973). It will be challenging to stop the abuse of authoritarian rule once that happens.

The majority of African democracies limit political discourse; they may discuss political rights but are careful to avoid going into great depth about any specific concept of rights for fear of inciting calls for liberalization and genuine democracy. It is the defining characteristic of sham democracy (fusion of authoritarianism and oligarchy with democracy). Since they are continually aware of political opponents and concerned with circumstances that could lead to them losing control, they instigate racial and religious conflicts. Therefore, while the fake democratic leaders in Africa may be able to implement innovative economic plans and programs, they lack the understanding necessary to foster economic growth or advancement, according to Ikenberry (2011) and Knoke (1996). To encourage successful economic growth, they hire outside experts to provide policy recommendations for economic diversification and development. These experts, whether economists or engineers, are all conversant with liberal economic theory and come from the United States, the International Monetary Fund, or the World Bank. The various economic reforms in Africa that the World Bank and IMF have advocated and have exponentially exacerbated the vicious cycle of dependence, poverty, and underdevelopment are largely the result of their recommendations (McFerson, 2009).

To entice investment, African governments permit their economies to compete with those of more advanced industrialized nations. It lays the groundwork for what is currently known as globalization, which preserves historically unjust international trade regulations. This issue has increased poverty and inequality in African democracies.

Economic liberalization, a condition established by the IMF and World Bank for the democracy of Africa, has devastating impacts. Africa’s democracy is vulnerable to the whims and demands of industrialized countries due to privatization, the loss of subsidies, a minimal role of government in economic activity, and monetary austerity.

African democratic leaders, however, lose touch with the common public, turn out to be immensely corrupt, and use the political system for their gain in their eagerness to meet the demands of economic liberalization and diversification. People in African democracies view the elected officials as problematic and frequently voice their displeasure with the democratic system because democracy hasn’t made the continent’s residents happy. As a result, structures for disaffection, discontent, and frustration have been established, which have sparked armed uprisings, revolutions, and terrorist attacks against the government and its phony democratic institutions, as seen in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and even Nigeria. The political transformation of Africa from an authoritarian
state to a modern liberal democracy is hampered and stopped by these violent acts, which are motivated by poverty and desperation.

3.6. Summary of Major Findings

To “catch up with the west,” rather than actively enhancing the situation of the public through significant socioeconomic transformation, was democracy’s purpose from the perspective of African leaders. Achimugu et al. (2013), Nwekeaku (2014), and Oshiomole (2010), among others who have researched Nigeria’s primitive plutocracy, have a similar viewpoint that the government is encouraging crony capitalism and that obtaining power is based on private wealth. Nigeria is home to many tyrants who amass tremendous money by being primitive collectors and elevating their cronies to positions of power. These happened throughout the privatization process with Bretton Woods institutions and the world capitalist ruling class. Even when the direction of such alteration and change coincides with the constitution of the federation, the Nigerian elite has mastered the skill of rewriting national laws to suit their interests, frequently at the request of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The party politics of the Nigerian ruling class have been replaced by a politics of money driven by the enormous wealth that has been siphoned off of the public coffers and occasionally even outright stolen. It explains the “do or die” attitude that characterizes political campaigns by the various ruling class groups as they contend for governmental control. Nigeria’s democratic politics are found here.

The vision of the African leaders from the time of their independence has been carried on by the following leaders who have arrived without sincere attempts at radical departure. Abdulyakeen made a correct observation (2022). Nigeria’s political structure is undoubtedly not democratic. The expectations of most Nigerians conflict with the kind of change that has been taking place since 1999. This fact is true despite the abundance of literature asserting that Nigeria is establishing democracy, growing its democracy, and solidifying its democracy. As the manifestation of the contradictions in the Nigerian political process grows increasingly apparent, some experts even now refer to the situation as “stuck in transition to democracy” (Rakner & van de Walle, 2009). It is argued that none of these descriptions of the political system in Nigeria are correct. So, the question is, what is it? What specifically is going on in Nigeria? The cause is Nigeria’s transformation into a full-fledged plutocracy (Roskin, 2008). A plutocracy is the government of the rich, by the affluent, and for the rich. It is reasonable to add that Nigeria is currently undergoing primitive plutocracy, which combines plutocratic governance with a system of primitive economic accumulation, distinct from the plutocracy that prevails in several of the modern capitalist nations of the west.

A bold leadership to launch a creative social revolution for the continent’s benefit will determine how well Africa develops. As properly pointed out, Asia’s “Tigers” did not get to where they are now by chance; rather, it was because of the immense sacrifices that their leaders and followers made. Both those in power and those being ruled are more concerned with what they can give their country than what they can get out of it. Africa can learn valuable lessons from the Asian “Tigers” for her progress goal. The two groupings of countries share several similarities. Both countries are young democracies
with a colonial past, a wealth of natural resources and human capital, challenges posed by racial and religious diversity, outmoded traditions that impede societal growth, and substantial mineral and human capital. The “Tigers” of Africa and Asia were previously bound in a web of poverty, dependence, and mono economy. The study showed that one group had dominated the other in cabinet formation and has profited more regarding socioeconomic provisioning since Nigeria’s restoration to civil rule in 1999. Marginalization and unequal representation are used to achieve this. One requirement for long-term democratic government, participation in decision-making, has been stymied.

The study’s important conclusions, however, reveal that while the majority of Nigerians, for example, are now living in abhorrent poverty and suffering, African leaders at all levels appear to be losing the public’s trust as a result of rising reckless public spending and a decline in accountability and transparency in governance. Every area of the economy seems to have failed. Public schools, once a point of pride for the older, elite generation, are now little more than shadows of what they once were. Compared to regular hospitals, public hospitals are potential abattoirs even in less developed countries. Basic subsistence resources are always in jeopardy, and teenage unemployment is rising. Nigerians deserve admiration for their tenacity and resilience. The circumstances in Nigeria are not at all unlike those that sparked rage in the Middle East and North Africa. The administration should know that no one is invincible forever (Abdulrasheed, 2021b).

The report also revealed that despite having an abundant supply of natural resources, being the largest economy in Africa, and having the highest population, Nigerians are not happy with the country’s existing political system. Over these years, poverty spread throughout Nigeria, affecting rural and urban populations. The incidence grew from 27.2% in 1980 to 46.3% in 1985, 42.7% in 1992, 65.6% in 1996, and 69.0% in 2010 (Abdulyakeen & Aminu, 2020). Among other things, some of the manifestations include deteriorating infrastructure, child abuse, labor, trafficking, cultism, brain drain, insecurity, industrial unrest, “sorting,” handouts, exam fraud, certificate racketeering, lewd behavior at work, extortion by uniformed men, and degrading environments (Igwe, 2010). For instance, between 1965 and 1995, the GDP per capita of Indonesia climbed by 52 times, from $3.8 billion to $198 billion, the GDP per capita of Malaysia by 27 times, from $3.1 billion to $85 billion, and the GDP per capita of Venezuela by 20 times. However, Nigeria’s GDP only increased 3.6 times, from $5.8 billion to $26.8 billion. Again, the GNP per capita in Cameroon increased from $599 in the 1975–1984 period to $771 in the 1989–1998 period, Senegal’s from $436 to $629, Benin’s from $313 to $367, Togo’s from $325 to $363, and Ghana’s from $356 to $396; however, Nigeria’s figure rather decreased from $599 to a pitiful $258 during that period (Abdulrasheed & Daniel, 2020; Matti, 2010).

3.7. Prospects for the 21st century

Reducing the appeal of holding political office by capping politicians’ pay rates is the solution. As long as the salaries of political office holders triple those of academics,
Chief Justices, tenured engineers, and other professions, political positions will continue to be a treasure that everyone who finds it will go and sell everything he has to obtain.

Enough information must be available to stop African voters from pledging their consciences and selling their ballots to established incumbents. If informed of the long-term consequences, voters would refrain from buying and selling votes. However, this step will not work if poverty persists in the country. The government must do everything possible to increase the average African’s standard of living by encouraging employee development and creating social programs for the unemployed.

An urgent need to address the pervasive poverty afflicting the population. An effective strategy for alleviating poverty in Africa must be implemented to battle the varied nature of this malignant disease known as poverty. This strategy must consider poverty’s political, social, cultural, and economic components. To reduce poverty on the continent and ensure that democracy functions, the populace must be provided with a means of subsistence, such as a job that enables them to take care of themselves.

Providing Africans with proper education. For the populace to participate in politics with knowledge, the government must educate them on political awareness and self-reliance.

The African economy needs to be restructured to achieve financial independence from the system of global capitalism by diversifying our economy to make us less susceptible to the whims of the world market. Modernization of our agricultural sector is necessary. Sectorial linkages of the air economy must be tried to achieve economic growth and development.

Number five is sound political education. The mission of the National Orientation Agency (NOA) needs to be urgently refocused from serving as the government’s propaganda arm to being a truly national and people-oriented agency entrusted with educating the citizenry about democratic processes and the importance of good governance. This purported organization must also support civic and moral education. In addition, government programs should be promoted with a focus on obtaining public feedback.

Dealing with the corruption problem. The institutions combatting corruption in Africa ought to be provided the power they require to complete their task without interference from other parties. If all the elements above are correctly considered, it will considerably aid in developing a strong democracy in Africa.

The study recommends including a mid-term evaluation of each candidate for a political post. Politicians should be compelled to solicit their supporters for re-election after serving two years of a four-year term or two and a half years of a five-year term. Such a provision would ensure that elected officials give the benefits of democracy to the electorate and ensure that they are accountable to and responsive to them.

4. Conclusion

This study concludes that implementing democratic governance in Africa has not been straightforward because armed insurrections, corruption, primogeniture, and elite politics have frequently jeopardized such endeavors amid the continent’s ethnic and ethno-religious conflict. This paper argued and provided empirical evidence that the
poor governance undermining democratization and democratic consolidation in those countries is the fault of dictatorial leaders in African countries who prefer to rule in environments with weak or non-existent institutional checks and balances. The study also showed that African institutional systems are weak regardless of how frequently presidents change and that corruption has worsened over the past forty years. A prolonged credibility crisis has resulted from the state’s incapacity to conduct a free, fair, and genuine election due to fragile democratic structures and a dismal political environment carried on by a shaky economic base. It is ultimately found that creating a sustainable democracy in a society racked by poverty is a pipe dream.

References


