Email this article Kepemilikan Bank dan Inefisiensi Investasi Perusahaan Non-Keuangan yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia
Abstract
Latar Belakang: Praktik kepemilikan bank atas saham suatu perusahaan (selanjutnya disebut kepemilikan bank) merupakan hal yang banyak terjadi di sejumlah negara, terutama di negara berkembang. Kepemilikan bank telah mendorong perusahaan untuk mengakses modal yang dimiliki oleh bank dengan lebih mudah. Adanya akses yang lebih mudah tersebut dapat mengurangi hambatan keuangan yang dihadapi oleh perusahaan, sehingga investasi yang inefisien dapat dihindari. Dengan demikian, kepemilikan bank pada akhirnya dapat meningkatkan investasi perusahaan menjadi lebih efisien.
Metode Penelitian: Sampel penelitian ini adalah 479 perusahaan non-keuangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Periode observasi data penelitian yang digunakan adalah dari tahun 2006 sampai dengan tahun 2019. Data penelitian diambil dari laporan keuangan perusahaan yang dapat diakses melalui S&P Capital IQ. Adapun model penelitian yang digunakan adalah model Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dan Fixed Effect.
Hasil Penelitian: Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan bank mengurangi inefisiensi investasi perusahaan. Setelah dilakukan pengujian lebih lanjut dengan menggunakan variabel interaksi Tobin’s Q dengan kepemilikan bank, terjadi peningkatan sensitivitas investasi terhadap peluang investasi yang turut memberikan indikasi bahwa investasi menjadi lebih efisien.
Keterbatasan Penelitian: Penelitian ini hanya mengukur kepemilikan bank dengan menggunakan dummy variable.
Keaslian/Kebaruan Penelitian: Penelitian ini menggunakan model penelitian sebelumnya oleh dkk (2020), model tersebut telah disesuaikan kembali dengan kondisi perusahaan di Indonesia secara umum dengan mengeliminasi sejumlah variabel yang tidak memungkinkan. Selain itu, penelitian ini turut berkontribusi dalam memperluas penelitian sebelumnya dan memberikan bukti empiris bahwa kepemilikan bank dapat mengurangi inefisiensi dalam investasi perusahaan di Indonesia.
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.18196/rabin.v6i2.14037
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